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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and its application in labour 
law in South Africa. After an initial examination of the general concepts with regards to 
employment equity and current international conventions regarding employment equity, 
the study will move on to examine employment equity as it stands in the law today. In 
examining the current law regarding employment equity, a brief historical background 
will be offered in order to show the legacy of apartheid: the immense disparity between 
the different categories of South African people in the modern era. By using this 
background and analysing the relevant provisions of the Constitution, it will be argued 
that there is a very real need for employment equity measures to bring about a true sense 
of equality in South Africa and that such measures are fully endorsed by the Constitution. 
 
After it has been established that affirmative action is an important tool in the creation of 
an equal South Africa, the measures put in place to help create this equal South Africa 
will be critically analysed. This critical analysis will point out certain weaknesses in the 
current affirmative action system. Following this critical analysis of the South African 
employment equity law, the employment equity systems used in Brazil, Canada and 
Malaysia will be examined in detail. The purpose of this analysis will be to find the 
strengths and weaknesses and successes and failures of these foreign systems. This will 
be done in order to highlight those areas of the foreign systems that can be implemented 
into South African law in order to make the South African employment equity system 
stronger. The weaknesses of those systems will also be highlighted in order to learn 
valuable lessons from other system’s failures so that South Africa does not make the 
same mistakes. 
 
The final part of this thesis will be in depth discussions and the proposal of solutions to 
the weaknesses of the South African employment equity system that have been 
highlighted throughout the thesis. These proposals will be put forward in order to ensure 
the most efficient and effective employment equity system in South Africa. There will 
 iii 
also be a reassessment of the most valuable lessons learned from the foreign systems that 
would be easily implemented into or avoided by the South African system in order to 
ensure an effective employment equity system. 
 
The purpose, therefore, of this thesis is to critically analyse employment equity in South 
Africa. A further purpose will be to propose certain amendments and changes to the 
current system to ensure the Employment Equity Act is reflective of the needs of the 
people South Africa. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
  
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
 2 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
 
Affirmative action is a controversial concept. It is also a concept which has created hope 
for many. Most people do have a view about affirmative action and either support it or 
feel it is an unnecessary threat. For many, I would suggest, the negative response to this 
concept is a visceral one based on limited knowledge and anecdotal evidence. One of the 
objectives of this work to explain affirmative action in the South African context and to 
help to clarify issues around what is, I will argue, one of the most important and positive 
measures to be implemented in South Africa. 
 
This work supports affirmative action and will argue that it has a major role to play in 
modern South African society. The fact that affirmative action will be supported does not 
mean that the concept is supported in its entirety. It will be argued that this policy is 
dynamic. Whilst supporting the need for affirmative action, the purpose of this study is to 
analyse the present policy, compare it with, and contrast it to, some foreign affirmative 
action policies and make recommendations for a more effective affirmative action system 
in South Africa. 
  
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
 
1.2.1 Chapter II – General Concepts and International Instruments 
 
Chapter II serves the function of introducing the concept of affirmative action in a broad 
and general manner. The concept of affirmative action will not be discussed in fine detail 
in this chapter in order to prevent repetition and an overlap with later parts of the work. 
Chapter II will also deal with the two major international instruments which cover the 
concepts of discrimination and employment equity. These are: the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination1, and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.2 The 
                                               
1 International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965. 
2 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979. 
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purpose of this portion of chapter II will be to provide a brief introduction to some 
important concepts and review international views and positions on affirmative action 
and employment equity. 
 
This background is necessary in order to be able to have a greater insight into the views 
and positions of affirmative action in South Africa and to fully understand the manner in 
which is implemented. The South African Constitution requires courts to look at 
international law when coming to decisions and, therefore, a review of international 
instruments regarding affirmative action is essential. 
 
1.2.2 Chapter III – Employment Equity in South Africa: The Past and The 
Present 
 
In order to arrive at a conclusion of what needs to be changed under the current 
affirmative action system; first, one needs to explain the current system that is in place. 
The third chapter of this thesis will be an analysis of affirmative action in South Africa as 
it stands in the law today. Chapter III will serve three major functions: 
i. A determination on the constitutionality of affirmative action; 
ii. A discussion on possible alternatives to affirmative action; and 
iii. A critical analysis of the measures in place that create and regulate affirmative 
action. This critical analysis will serve to highlight the weaknesses of the current 
affirmative action system. 
 
1.2.3 Chapter IV – Employment Equity around the World: Lessons for South 
Africa 
 
Chapter IV is an analysis of certain foreign legal systems as they relate to affirmative 
action. This will help give an insight into the status of affirmative action in some parts of 
the world. The purpose of comparison between the South African system and foreign 
systems is to find possible areas of weakness in the South African system and strengths in 
the foreign law systems. The purpose of comparing and contrasting these systems is to 
 4 
make recommendations that may lead to a more effective affirmative action policy in 
South Africa. The affirmative action systems of Brazil, Canada and Malaysia will be 
examined in this chapter. 
 
1.2.4 Chapter V – Employment Equity in South Africa: The Future 
 
The fifth chapter of this thesis is a critical review of affirmative action in South Africa. 
Chapter V answer questions raised in chapter III of the thesis relating to the weaknesses 
with the current affirmative action system in South Africa. The purpose of this part of the 
thesis is to be forward looking; to submit recommendations as to the future of affirmative 
action in South Africa to ensure its continued existence in the best possible way. 
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INSTRUMENTS  
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2.3 The Purpose of Affirmative Action 
2.4 Types of Affirmative Action 
2.5 Employment Equity in the International Arena: International Instruments 
 6 
“You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you are free to 
go where you want, and do as you desire, and choose the leaders as you 
please. You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains 
and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of the race and then say, 
‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe you have 
been completely fair.” 
– Lyndon B Johnson3 
 
2.1 Affirmative Action Defined 
 
Affirmative action has been defined by both the UN Economic and Social Council and 
the International Labour Organisation as “a coherent packet of temperate measures, 
aimed at correcting the position of the target group to obtain effective equality.”4 
Accordingly, it can be seen that affirmative action is the implementation of certain 
measures for a limited period of time aimed at improving the way of life for designated 
groups. This is done in order to ensure that substantive equality5 is given effect. 
 
2.2 The Origins of Affirmative Action 
 
 “The phrase affirmative action was first used [in a racial discrimination context] by 
President John F. Kennedy in 1961, in an executive order that prohibited federal 
government contractors from discriminating on the basis of ‘race, creed, color, or 
national origin… [and required them] …to take affirmative action’ to prevent such 
discrimination.”6 After Kennedy’s inauguration, the then Vice-President Lyndon Johnson 
asked Hobart Taylor Jr, a black lawyer from Detroit to work on the first anti-
discrimination law.7 Taylor said “I put the word affirmative in there at that time. I was 
                                               
3 President of the USA in a speech at Howard University (1965). See 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp to view the speech in full 
text. 
4 Buys ‘Why should affirmative action have a sunset clause?’ at 
http://www.solidaritysa.co.za/Home/wmview.php?ArtID=164 (accessed on 15 May 2006). 
5 The concept of ‘substantive equality’ will be discussed in further detail in chapter III of this work. 
6 Oxford Reference ‘Affirmative Action’ at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?entry=t122.e0020&srn=2&ssid=355374901#firsthit 
(accessed on 13 March 2005). 
7 Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action: Social Justice or Reverse Discrimination? (1997). 
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searching for something that would give a sense of positiveness to performance under 
that executive order, and I was torn between the words positive action and the words 
affirmative action … And I took affirmative action because it was alliterative.”8 Nine 
years later in 1970, the Johnson administration created the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.9 The main aim of this Commission was the growth of minority 
representation in federal employment and contracting.10 
 
These were the seeds of what would become an international concept.11 The fact that 
affirmative action is so well established and widespread gives a opportunity for South 
Africans to examine the way in which affirmative action has functioned in other countries 
over the years. An examination of the way in which those countries have developed their 
own affirmative action policies over the years can only benefit the process in South 
Africa. 
 
2.3 The Purpose of Affirmative Action 
 
Affirmative action includes “any measure aimed at ensuring the equal employment 
opportunities and equitable representation of suitably qualified persons from designated 
groups in all occupational categories and levels of the workforce.”12 This definition 
seems somewhat complex yet it merely encompasses the fact that the end goal of 
affirmative action is equal opportunity. The best way to show the purpose of affirmative 
action is to use a practical example based on the speech of Lyndon B Johnson quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter: 
 
Two swimmers are on the starting blocks preparing to dive into the pool to 
swim a two hundred and fifty metre sprint. The gun fires and the first 
swimmer in lane  1 dives in while swimmer two in lane two is held back by 
                                               
8 Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action 39. 
9 Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action. See http://www.eeoc.gov/ for further information on the US 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
10 Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action. 
11 A further in-depth analysis and case studies on various countries around the world that have adopted 
affirmative action will be made in chapter IV of this work. 
12 Basson Essential Labour Law: Volume 1 – Individual Labour Law 3rd ed (2002) 324. 
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her opponent’s coach. After going fifty metres into the lead, swimmer two 
is released by the coach and allowed to compete against swimmer one. 
 
By looking at this simplistic example, it can clearly be seen that the second swimmer is at 
a major disadvantage. The question must be asked, what must be done to solve this 
situation? The two possible solutions are: either restart; or make the first swimmer wait 
for the second swimmer to catch up. Unfortunately, in life, society cannot be restarted. 
For this reason disadvantaged groups need to be allowed to catch up to those groups who 
have previously had no constraints on them. “It is clear from the text that affirmative 
action measures designed to enhance the position of previously disadvantaged people 
form part of the right to equality.”13 
 
By allowing for members of a certain race or gender to catch up while members of 
another group are forced to wait ensures substantive equality in society. It allows for all 
people to have an equal opportunity to compete in ‘the race’. The majority of affirmative 
action policies around the world favour ‘non-white’ race groups and women as these are 
the groups that have traditionally been discriminated against in societies around the 
world.14 “Supporters of affirmative action argue that the history of discrimination … has 
resulted in white males dominating and controlling the social network of social 
institutions which is the focus of power and authority in our society … Thus, in order to 
truly achieve justice and fairness there must be a shift in the power base in these 
institutions.”15 
 
2.4 Types of Affirmative Action 
 
Beckwith and Jones point out that affirmative action can range from one extreme to 
another and can be along a continuum of positive favouritism on the basis of race – 
reverse discrimination. They term the one pole weak affirmative action. Under this form, 
                                               
13 Kruger Equality and Non-Discrimination in South Africa (2004) Unpublished 5. 
14 One only needs to look at the affirmative action systems of Brazil, Canada, Malaysia, the USA and South 
Africa, for example, to observe this phenomenon. 
15 Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action 11. 
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all racially and gender oppressive laws are struck down though persons who were 
previously disadvantaged are not given special status. It is, in essence, the creation of 
formal equality. 
 
The group from which an individual or group comes allows them access to  “certain 
privileged positions, special scholarships for disadvantaged classes, using under-
representation, or a history of past discrimination as a tie breaker when candidates are 
relatively equal and the like.”16. The major policy consideration under this form of 
affirmative action is the stress of equal opportunity and the ability to compete in society 
without any regard being taken to a person’s characteristics. 
 
The second pole is the other extreme of reverse discrimination. This type of affirmative 
action is termed strong affirmative action. This type of affirmative action involves a 
stronger form of reverse discrimination by giving people opportunities on the basis of 
their race or gender, with the end goal being substantive equality.17 “This view stresses 
equal results by using timetables, goals, or quotas as criteria by which to judge whether 
one has achieved fairness.”18 
 
Affirmative action can be implemented in various ways. Among these are: 
- by the allocation of certain jobs or promotions to certain disadvantaged groups; 
- by the granting of government contracts to certain groups only; 
- the granting of business loans to designated groups; or 
- making less stringent requirements or greater admission to the designated 
groups.19 
 
 
                                               
16 Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action 11. 
17 Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action. 
18 Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action 12. 
19 Human Development Report ‘Building Multicultural Democracies’ at 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_chapter_3.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2005) 69. 
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2.5 Employment Equity in the International Arena: International 
Instruments 
 
There are two major international conventions governing the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination and the implementation of affirmative action measures. These two 
conventions govern the promotion of formal and substantive equality. The first is the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination20 and 
the second is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women.21 
 
2.5.1 International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
 (a) General 
ICERD was opened for signature on 7 March 1966 and finally came into operation in 
1969, with South Africa ratifying this Convention in 1998.22 One aspect to note from a 
South African perspective is the condemnation of segregation and apartheid under article 
3 of the Convention. Upon its adoption, this Convention became the “first human rights 
instrument to establish an international monitoring system and was also revolutionary in 
its provision of national measures toward the advancement of specific racial or ethnic 
groups.”23 
 
(b) Formal Equality 
As stated above, ICERD aims to achieve formal equality. This is promulgated early in 
ICERD and discrimination is defined as follows:  
 
                                               
20 International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965. Hereinafter 
referred to as ICERD. 
21 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979. Hereinafter 
referred to as CEDAW. 
22 Cotter Discrimination Law: Professional Practice Guides (2005). 
23 Cotter Discrimination Law 10. 
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“In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, 
or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life.”24 
 
Furthermore, in Article 5, signatories agree to guarantee certain rights to the people of 
their respective countries. These include a guarantee not to discriminate against civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights as well as guaranteeing all persons within 
their jurisdiction protection and remedies against acts of racial discrimination.25 The 
promotion of formal equality continues under article 2 (1) and article 5 (f), which, 
respectively, read as follows: 
 
“State Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial 
discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all 
races…”26 
 
“The right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general 
public, such as transport hotels, restaurants, cafes, theatres and parks.”27 
 
(c) Substantive Equality 
In a similar vain to the later created South African Constitution, the earlier ICERD does 
not merely promote formal equality but also promotes substantive equality. Article 2 is 
worded in such a way that it not only promotes formal equality but also makes way for 
affirmative action measures. This Article requires parties to the Convention to condemn 
all forms of racial discrimination and to eliminate racial discrimination by all appropriate 
means. This may seem that it is merely promoting formal equality but the “elimination by 
all appropriate means” implies the implementation of affirmative action measures. 
                                               
24 Article 1 of ICERD. 
25 Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 2nd ed (2001). 
26 Article 2 (1) of ICERD. 
27 Article 5 (f) of ICERD. 
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Although Article 2 only makes an indirect reference to the adoption of affirmative action, 
the Convention does directly recognise affirmative action. Article 1 (4) allows for 
affirmative action by stating that: 
 
“Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate 
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such 
protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals 
equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall 
not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures 
do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for 
different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives 
for which they were taken have been achieved.”28 
 
“On the other hand, article 2 (2) obliges states to take affirmative action ‘when the 
circumstances so warrant.’”29 Article 2 (2) reads as follows: 
 
“State Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social, 
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure 
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or 
individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full 
and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These 
measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal 
or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they 
were taken have been achieved.”30 
 
(d) Enforcement 
“Of particular note is the enforcement procedure of the [ICERD], which provides for an 
optional system of individual petition whereby an individual, or group of individuals, can 
lodge a complaint within the Convention.”31 Under this enforcement procedure, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination created to help enforce the 
Convention receives reports from States who are party to the Convention. The Committee 
                                               
28 Article 1 (4) of ICERD. 
29 Dugard International Law 249. 
30 Article 2 (2) of ICERD. 
31 Wallace International Law (2002) 222. 
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then examines these reports and makes recommendations. On top of this, “by signing the 
Convention, each state automatically accepts the possibility of an inter-state complaint.”32 
The matter will then be heard by the International Court of Justice unless the disputing 
States agree to other means of resolution.33. One of the weaknesses of the system is that 
any award made is not binding and, therefore, the country alleged to have violated the 
ICERD may, in effect, continue to do so. 
 
 2.5.2 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 
 
 (a) General 
CEDAW was opened for signature in 197934 and came into force on 18 December 
1979.35 South Africa became party to the Convention after ratifying it in 1995. In order to 
be capable of complying with the provisions of CEDAW upon ratification, “Parliament 
adopted the General Law Fourth Amendment Act36 [in 1993] which removed all traces of 
legislative discrimination against women so as to enable South Africa to ratify 
CEDAW.”37 Under this Convention, parties to CEDAW agree to implement both formal 
and substantive equality measures in the promotion of equality between men and women. 
 
(b) Formal Equality 
In terms of CEDAW, discrimination refers to any distinction based on a person’s gender, 
which “has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights in any field.”38 Article 2 goes on to say that signatory states are 
required to implement a policy aimed at removing all forms of discrimination against 
women. States are also required to adopt “appropriate legislative and other measures, 
                                               
32 Dixon International Law 2nd ed (1993) 285. 
33 Wallace International Law. 
34 Dugard International Law. 
35 Cotter Discrimination Law. 
36 Act 132 of 1993. 
37 Dugard International Law 250. 
38 Article 1 of CEDAW. 
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including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women.”39 
Article 11 (1) becomes more specific when it guarantees the right to equality with 
specific regard to employment and equal pay. 
 
(c) Substantive Equality 
“Affirmative action is recognised in article 4 (1), which permits states to adopt 
‘temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and 
women.’ Article 4 (2) provides that special measures aimed at protecting maternity ‘shall 
not be considered discriminatory’.” 40 These measures, must, however, be removed once 
the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been attained41, thus only 
giving affirmative action measures validity if they are temporary measures. The inclusion 
of the temporary nature of affirmative action measures could be problematic with regard 
to South African affirmative action. South African affirmative action measures have no 
structure for the removal or even an amendment of the measures once its goals have been 
achieved. This will be discussed in further detail in chapter V of this work. 
 
(d) Enforcement 
In terms of enforcement of CEDAW, the Convention creates a twenty-three person 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. A party to the 
Convention will make a report to this Committee for its consideration. “In 1999 an 
Optional Protocol was adopted to permit the committee to receive and consider individual 
petitions relating to violations of the Convention and to investigate systematic violations 
of the Convention.”42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
39 Article 2 (a) of CEDAW. 
40 Dugard International Law 249 – 250. 
41 Cotter Discrimination Law. 
42 Dugard International Law 250. 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EMPLOYMENT EQUITY 
IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE PAST AND THE PRESENT 
 
 
 
3.1 South Africa: a Historical Background 
3.2 Right to Equality and the Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination 
3.3 Levelling Down: An Alternative to Affirmative Action? 
3.4 The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
3.5 Affirmative Action in South Africa 
 16 
3.1 South Africa: a Brief Historical Background  
 
Before examining the Employment Equity Act43, it is appropriate to give a brief historical 
background of South Africa. That South Africa suffered a torrid past of oppression, 
discrimination and racism is well known and well-documented. This was not merely a 
societal racism but was implemented by the government and so was an institutionalized 
racial system established and enforced by a variety of laws. There was a callous disregard 
of the concept of equality for all citizens. Legislation was specifically implemented with 
the function of creating a society that favoured white males and gave white males ample 
opportunity to succeed while, at the same time, destroying the hopes of ambitions of 
black people and women around South Africa.44 The fact that the oppression occurred is 
not an issue and is accepted history and need not be dealt with in great detail. However, 
the legal ramifications are the focal point of this work. This thesis considers the actions 
taken to rectify the discrimination of the past and to create an equal society for all people 
where race and gender no longer need to be considered as a problem or a classification; a 
South Africa where people are people: not Black, White, Indian, Coloured, women, men, 
disabled or able. 
 
After the election to power of the National Party in 1948, racial discrimination was 
gradually institutionalized.45 “The NP was led by D.F. Malan, who stood for drastic measures against the 
‘black menace’, coined the concept of ‘apartheid’ and consistently enforced this devious policy.”46 Laws were 
promulgated that touched every aspect of social life, including a prohibition of marriage 
between ‘non-whites’ and whites, and the sanctioning of ‘white-only’ jobs.  “The Group 
Areas Act, rigidifying the racial division of land, and the Population Registration Act, 
which classified all citizens by race, were passed in 1950. The pass laws, restricting black 
                                               
43 Act 55 of 1998, hereinafter referred to as the EEA. 
44 See the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 (Amendment Act 6 of 
1980), the Immorality Act 21 of 1950, the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 and many other examples for an 
example of this type of legislation. See Thompson History of South Africa (2001) for a further discussion 
on the history of South Africa and oppressive legislation. 
45 Southern Domain Online Travel Guide ‘Brief History of South Africa’ at http://www.southafrica-
travel.net/history/eh_menu.htm (accessed on 7 July 2006). 
46 Southern Domain Brief History. 
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movement, came in 1952.”47 Laws forbade most social contacts between races, 
authorised segregated public facilities, established separate school systems with lower 
standards for non-whites, and restricted each race to certain jobs. More than eighty 
percent of South Africa’s land was set aside for its white residents despite the fact that 
they comprised less than ten percent of the population.48 
 
As a response to these harsh laws, there was a continuous struggle to oppose apartheid in 
all its respects.49 The struggle was spearheaded by the African National Congress which 
fought a mainly political campaign.50 A “watershed moment came when, after an ANC 
campaign to gather mass input on freedom demands, the Freedom Charter - based on the 
principles of human rights and non-racialism - was signed on June 26 1955 at the 
Congress of the People in Soweto.”51 
 
White South Africa eventually yielded to world pressure and to domestic violence in 
1990 by repealing most of the apartheid laws. Three years later, a new constitution gave 
people of all races the right to vote, and the following year South Africans elected a 
Black man, Nelson Mandela, as President.52 A Constitutional Court was established in 
1994 by South Africa’s first democratic constitution - the interim constitution of 1993. 
“The 1993 constitution, agreed upon at multiparty talks, ushered in a legal order based on 
the concept of constitutional supremacy and an 11-person court was established and 
continues to function under the final Constitution of 1996 as the highest legal authority in 
the land in all constitutional matters.”53 
  
                                               
47 Big Media Publishers (Pty) Ltd ‘A short history of South Africa’ at 
http://www.safrica.info/ess_info/sa_glance/history/history.htm (accessed on 7 July 2006). 
48 SAHO ‘The Freedom Charter Special Project’ at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/specialprojects/june26/menu.html (accessed on 7 July 2006). 
49 See such incidences as the Rivonia Trials of 1963–64, the Sharpeville Massacre of 1966 and the Soweto 
Uprising of 1976 for an example of the continuous struggle. See Steyler ed The Freedom Charter and 
Beyond: Founding Principles for a Democratic South African Legal Order (1992) for further discussion on 
such incidences. 
50 Southern Domain ‘Brief History’. 
51 SAHO ‘Freedom Charter’. 
52  SAHO ‘Freedom Charter’. 
53  Author Unknown ‘History of the Court’ at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/history.htm (accessed on 7 July 2006). 
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3.2 The Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination and the Right to 
Equality 
 
“Apartheid systematically discriminated against black people in all aspects of 
social life. Black people were prevented from becoming owners of property or 
even residing in areas classified as ‘white’ which constituted nearly 90% of 
the land mass of South Africa; senior jobs and access to established schools 
and universities were denied to them; civic amenities, including transport 
systems, public parks, libraries and many shops were also closed to black 
people. Instead, separate and inferior facilities were provided. The deep scars 
of this appalling programme are still visible in our society.” 
– O’Reagan J54 
 
In 1993, the interim Constitution55 came into effect and the legalised right to equality was 
a challenging new experience in South Africa. This was a radical change from the past of 
South Africa, as described in the previous section. In the new order, all people had an 
equal opportunity and an equal status in the eyes of the law. The questions are now 
posed; what was the result of merely giving the right to equality? Was there any effect on 
social status of different race group? Did the labour market suddenly open up to allow for 
equal opportunities for all people and was there no longer a gap between the races? 
 
Just because all citizens in South Africa were granted the right to equality did not mean 
that they were necessarily equal. People were still disadvantaged as a result of the long 
term effects of previous racial and gender discrimination. There was still a huge disparity 
between different groups of people in society.56 This was a major problem that required 
some analysis and a solution to this problem needed to be found. The solution to the 
problem was affirmative action. 
  
                                               
54 Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) par 40. 
55 Act 200 of 1993. 
56 At the end of the apartheid era in 1995 whites accounted for 13% of the population and earned 59% of 
personal income; Africans, 76% of the population, earned 29%. See Human Development Report ‘Bringing 
Multicultural Societies Together’ at 69 for a further discussion on these statistics. 
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Affirmative action has many critics.57 Many people believe that it is a contradiction of the 
Constitution58 in that it seems to deny the right to equality. Some white people, especially 
white males, claim that they are being cheated out of an equal opportunity to work. 
“Now, on the basis of race, blacks are claiming special status and reserving for 
themselves privileges they deny to others. Isn’t one as bad as the other?”59 The purpose 
of this commentary on the right to equality is to argue that affirmative action not only 
complies with the Constitution but is endorsed by the Constitution and ensures that the 
Constitutional right to equality has its full effect. 
  
In setting about this task, sections 9 (1) and 9 (2) of the Constitution will be examined 
and their purposes will be analysed. Certain problems with section 9 (2) and affirmative 
action – allowed by section 9 (2) – will be analysed and hopefully resolved. In resolving 
the problems, section 9 (3) and 9 (4) will be analysed. It will be submitted that, although 
some critics may believe that section 9 (2) – which allows for affirmative action – does 
not comply with the right to equality, section 9 (3) leaves little room for debate 
surrounding the unconstitutionality of affirmative action. 
 
3.2.1 The Right to Equality: Formal Equality 
 
The right to equality is formulated in section 9, which is part of chapter 2 of the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights. The institutionalisation of the right to equality made a 
huge leap from the previous era in which so many South African citizens had been denied 
any form of equality. In previous years, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the entire  
political and social system had been based on a system of inequality and different laws, 
attitudes and possibilities for different groups of people, whether it was based on race, 
religion, gender or sexual orientation.  
 
Section 9 of the Constitution states: 
                                               
57 See Rautenbach Liberating South African Labour from the Law (1999); Brassy ‘The Employment Equity 
Act: Bad for Employment and Bad for Equity’ (1997) 18 ILJ 1359; and Cavanagh Against Equality of 
Opportunity (2002) for examples of anti-affirmative action literature. 
58 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
59 Beckwith & Jones (eds) Affirmative Action: Social Justice or Reverse Discrimination (1997) 143. 
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“Equality 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law;60 
 
The importance of the right to equality was articulated by Mohamed DP when he stated 
in Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North61 that: 
 
“There can be no doubt that the guarantee of equality lies at the very heart of 
the Constitution. It permeates and defines the very ethos upon which the 
Constitution is premised.”62 
 
The importance of the right to equality is also shown by the right to equality’s positioning 
in the Bill of Rights. On reading the document, it is noticeable that the first individual 
right in the Bill of Rights is the right to equality. The importance of the right to equality, 
and equality as a value upon which South Africa is founded, does not end there. In fact, it 
does not even start there. The first place in the Constitution that the right to equality is 
mentioned is in the preamble. It is then referred to again in section 1 of the Constitution. 
These provisions read that South Africa is a “democratic and open society in which … 
every citizen is equally protected by law” and in section 1: “The Republic of South 
Africa is one sovereign state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.”63 
 
Equality is mentioned in four further provisions. It is mentioned in sections 3 (1) and 7 
(1) respectively. It is then mentioned in both sections 36 and 39 (1) (a). The importance 
of the right to equality is clearly shown by its inclusion in so many sections of the 
Constitution. The reason for equality’s paramount and central role is due to its non-
existence prior to 1994. Giving the right to equality to all people is perceived as the only 
                                               
60 Section 9 (1) of the Constitution. 
61 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). See SAHO ‘Freedom Charter’ for a further discussion on the case of Fraser v 
Children’s Court, Pretoria North. 
62 Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North para 20. 
63 Carpenter ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination in the new South Africa Constitutional Order (1): The early 
Cases’ 2001 (64) THRHR 409 at 409. 
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way for a society with such diverse peoples to be a truly just society. It has been put best 
by Kruger, that an “appraisal of these constitutional provisions regarding the role of 
equality and non-discrimination leaves no doubt as to the central place of equality in the 
South African legal system.”64 
 
However, the equality provision as provided for in section 9 (1) – which was adopted 
from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms65 – is merely a form of formal 
equality. “Formal equality means sameness of treatment: the law must treat individuals in 
like circumstances alike.”66 One must ask if this goes far enough to redress the inequality 
of the past as the problem with mere formal equality, is that “economic inequality in the 
forms of poverty and unemployment … are the outcomes of injustice and inequality.”67 
Accordingly, by merely having formal equality, a large percentage of South Africans 
appear to be the victims of inequality. 
 
“If one looks at the 2003 survey, 14.6 per cent of the African population 
above the age of 20 had received no formal education at all, while the white 
population was only 0.3 per cent. 
 
The Gini coefficient is used to measure inequality of distribution of personal 
income and consumption in society. A perfectly equal society will have a 
coefficient of 0 while a maximally unequal society will have a coefficient of 
100. South Africa’s coefficient was measured at 59.3 in 2004, ranking it as 
one of the most unequal societies in the world. The richest ten per cent of the 
population was responsible for almost half of the country’s income or 
consumption expenditure.”68 
 
                                               
64 Kruger Equality and Non-Discrimination in South Africa (2004) Unpublished 4. 
65 Davis Fundamental Rights in the Constitution – Commentary and Cases (1997) 61. 
66 Currie et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2005) 232. 
67 Nikelly ‘Origins of Equality’ (1990) 46 Individual Psychology 20 at 25 – 26. 
68 Currie Bill of Rights 233 fn 4 and 6 of 233. 
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These statistics make the right to equality seem like a rhetorical - a right that is not in 
touch with reality.69 Based on these findings it can be argued that “although South Africa 
has made a remarkable transformation from a racial oligarchy to a democracy, the entire 
social and economic fabric of our society is riddled with the pernicious consequences of 
the policy of institutionalised racism of the past.”70  
 
However, this only appears so when looking at equality from a formal equality point of 
view. The Constitution is concerned with more than attempting to give the right to 
equality by bringing about a sense of parity between different classes of persons as will 
be seen in the following section. “A formal approach to equality assumes that inequality 
is aberrant and that it can be eradicated simply by treating all individuals in exactly the 
same way. A substantive equality, on the other hand, does not presuppose a just social 
order.”71 
 
3.2.2 The Right to Equality: Substantive Equality 
 
“Few egalitarians propose equality in an absolute sense; rather, they usually advocate 
eliminating particular kinds of existing inequalities.”72 The South African Constitution 
addresses this way of dealing with inequality. In the preamble to the Constitution it is 
stated that one of the fundamental values of South Africa is to “improve the quality of life 
of all citizens and free the potential of each person.”73 
 
The preamble contains the first reference to what is known as substantive equality in the 
Constitution. Section 9 (2) of the Constitution reads as follows: 
 
                                               
69 One only needs to look at the world around oneself when in South Africa to note the vast disparity 
between the race groups with regard to social status. A drive through any rural area or looking at any 
informal settlement in any area of South Africa will show this. 
70 Devenish Commentary on the Bill of Rights (1999) 39. 
71 Thompson and Benjamin South African Labour Volume 1 (2005) C 1-14. 
72 Joseph ‘Some Ways of Thinking About Equality of Opportunity’ (1980) 33 Western University Political 
Quarterly 393 at 394. 
73 Preamble of the Constitution. In essence, substantive equality can be said to be an equal status in life, an 
equality of opportunity and social well being. It is the acceptance that formal equality is not enough to 
create true equality. 
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(2) “Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken;” 
 
Examining this clause, it can be assumed that the drafters of the Constitution had 
substantive equality in mind. They also understood that the only way to achieve this was 
by the implementation of supportive legislation. In fact, the “post-constitutional 
Parliament focuses sharply on correction of injustices and imbalances.”74 
 
It can be argued that affirmative action is a means to bring back a sense of parity to South 
African society and redress the discrimination and oppression of the past. In the case of 
Public Servants’ Association of South Africa v Minister of Justice75, the “High Court held 
that the words ‘design’ and ‘achieve’ denotes a causal connection between the designed 
measures and objectives.”76  
 
Section 9 (2) and its contained affirmative action policy came into question again before 
the Constitutional Court in the case of Minister of Finance v Van Heerden.77 In this case, 
the court set out certain parameters and requirements for an affirmative action policy to 
be acceptable. The Constitutional Court scrutinised section 9(2) in the Van Heerden case 
and Harms JA stated that: 
 
“Section 9(2) of the Constitution does not postulate a standard of necessity 
between the legislative choice and the governmental objective. The text 
requires only that the means should be designed to protect or advance. It is 
sufficient if the measure carries a reasonable likelihood of meeting the end. 
To require a sponsor or a remedial measure to establish a precise prediction 
                                               
74 Venter ‘Equality in the Constitution’ (2005) at 
www.fwdklerk.org.za/download_docs/05_11_05_Code_Good_Practoce_Venter_E.doc (accessed on 10 
March 2006) at 5. See also the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, 
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, the Promotion of Access 
to Information Act 2 of 2000 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 11 of 2002 for legislative 
examples of such corrections of injustices. 
75 (1997) 18 ILJ 241 (T). 
76 Currie Bill of Rights 265. 
77 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC). 
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of a future outcome is to set a standard not required by section 9(2). Such a 
test would render the remedial measure stillborn, and defeat the objective of 
section 9(2).”78 
 
This interpretation of section 9(2) clearly allows the government to go about the task of 
bringing about a state of substantive equality. The government can now legitimately 
implement procedures that are based in the present if they are ‘designed to protect or 
advance’.79 The court has clearly interpreted section 9(2) in such a way as to give the 
legislature a significant power to bridge the gap between the races and bring about equal 
opportunity and status for all people. 
 
3.2.3 Some Problems with Section 9 (2): The Questions 
 
“It is clear from the wording of section 9 (2) that affirmative action measures are to be 
seen as supportive of the ideal of equality and not as an exception to or limitation on the 
right to equal treatment and non-discrimination. However, this raises a number of 
difficult issues which have not yet been addressed by the Constitutional Court.”80 Three 
major problems have been identified as arising from affirmative action measures and 
their conflict with equality. 
 
The first problem is that section 9 (1) states that all people are ‘equal before the law and 
have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law’. In fact, “equality requires that 
the government apply its laws even-handedly. This concept is not part of any law, but 
rather is derived from the notion of equality.”81 Does the right to equality not then 
                                               
78 Minister of Finance v Van Heerdan para 42. 
79 See National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).for an 
explanation for the need for remedial legislation designed to correct the injustices of the past, where it was 
held at para 60 that: “Particularly in a country such as South Africa, persons belonging to certain categories 
have suffered considerable unfair discrimination in the past. It is insufficient for our Constitution to merely 
ensure, through its Bill of Rights, that statutory provisions which have caused such unfair discrimination in 
the past are eliminated. Past unfair discrimination has ongoing negative consequences, the continuation of 
which is not halted immediately when the initial causes thereof are eliminated, and unless remedied, may 
continue for a substantial time and even indefinitely.” 
80 Carpenter ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination (1)’ 412. 
81 Chemerinsky ‘In Defence of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen’ (1982) 81 Michigan Law Review 
575 at 581. 
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contradict itself by section 9 (1) promoting equal protection and benefit of the law and 
section 9 (2) allowing for a deviation from section 9 (1) by allowing one group to benefit 
more from the law? 
 
It is submitted that it does not. Section 9 (1) of the Constitution is not the most essential 
part of the right to equality. This section is only relevant in an ideal society where all 
people have equal status and equal opportunities. To gain this type of equality, the South 
African Constitution is required to go further and does so in section 9 (2). This section 
needs to be in place to ensure section 9 (1) has full effect. 
 
The second problem arises around the interpretation by the courts of section 9(2)82. This 
interpretation has given the legislature a huge array of powers. It has almost stated the 
government can take any steps it deems necessary in order to bring about substantive 
equality. These judgments, in fact, do not even require the government to be completely 
sure of what it is doing as the government only requires a ‘reasonable likelihood of 
meeting the end’.83 As can be seen, this creates a significant problem in the law and an 
opportunity for a tremendous abuse of power by government.  
 
The second problem is, therefore, the problem of a possible abuse of power. What 
prevents the government from going too far in the aim of protecting ‘those groups’? It 
can, in theory, take any measures, as long as there is a reasonable – not definite – 
likelihood of meeting the end result. By doing so, inequality and discrimination may once 
more be allowed to creep into South African society. This argument may sound weak, but 
the only limitation in section 9(2) is that the government must promote the achievement 
of equality. The question must then be asked: “‘Equality of what?’ and even though this 
may seem more obvious, ‘equality for whom?’”84 
 
                                               
82 See Public Servants of South Africa & Another v The Minister of Justice & Another; Motala v University 
of Natal 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D); Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security 2002 (3) SA 468 (T); and 
Minister of Finance v Van Heerden for examples of the court’s interpretation of section 9 (2) of the 
Constitution. 
83 See Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC). 
84 Carpenter ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination (1)’ 412. 
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Furthermore, the third problem is that section 9 (2) could be in conflict with section 9 (3). 
Under section 9 (3), any discrimination based on one of the listed grounds, including race 
and gender, is presumed to be automatically unfair. “Most forms of affirmative action 
explicitly require consideration of race or sex. They plainly invoke discrimination in the 
ordinary sense: they require race or sex to be taken into account in awarding benefits or 
advantages.”85 
 
Following section 9 (3), it would seem that affirmative action measures must be 
presumed to be unfair. 
 
The first problem has been solved, therefore, two questions remain unanswered: 
1. Could there be an abuse of power? and 
2. Does affirmative action amount to unfair discrimination? 
 
The best way to address these questions and decipher whether or not any of these 
problems could have a detrimental effect is to delve deeper into section 9 and analyse 
sections 9 (3) and (4) – the ‘protection against unfair discrimination sections’, which will 
be done later in this chapter under 3.2.5. 
 
3.2.4  The Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination 
 
The South African Constitution is unique in that it does not prohibit discrimination.86 
Section 9 (3) – (4) of the Constitution deals with the prohibition of unfair discrimination 
as follows: 
 
(2) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
                                               
85 Townshend-Smith Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (1998) 64. 
86 The Canadian Constitution, for example, outlaws all forms of discrimination, be they fair or unfair 
discrimination. See Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (2002) for a further discussion on 
the Canadian Constitution. 
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(3) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation 
must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.87 
 
What is discrimination? What happens if a person is discriminated against on a ground 
not listed by this section? Discrimination has been referred to by the Constitution in 
sections 9(3) and (4), yet is a fairly nebulous concept due to the fact that the Constitution 
only refers to ‘unfair discrimination’. The concepts found in these two sections will be 
discussed in further detail to determine whether or not affirmative action can be 
considered to fall under the definition of ‘unfair discrimination.’ 
 
(a)  ‘Discriminate’ 
Discrimination, in the ordinary sense of the word, can be said to be “treating people who 
are alike, unalike.”88 How does this differ from differentiation? Several academics have 
attempted to define the term discrimination in the following ways: 
 
“The theory of civil rights law has often identified ‘discrimination’ with 
prejudice, and defined an act as discriminatory when it is caused by 
prejudice.”89 
 
 “‘Discrimination’, as it is ordinarily used, refers to a process of noticing or 
marking a difference often for evaluative purposes.”90 
 
“Discrimination is a particular form of differentiation. Unlike mere 
differentiation, discrimination is differentiation on illegitimate grounds.”91 
 
The International Labour Organisation92 has included a definition of 
discrimination in its conventions: 
                                               
87 Section 9 of the Constitution. 
88 Makins (ed) Collins New Pocket English Dictionary (1992) 330. 
89 Sustein ‘Three Civil Rights Fallacies’ (1991) 79 California Law Review 751 at 753. 
90 Rutherglen ‘Discrimination and its Discontents’ (1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 117 at 127. 
91 Currie, De Waal and Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2005) 243. 
92 Hereinafter referred to as the ILO. 
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“For the purpose of this Convention the term discrimination includes – 
(a) any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, 
colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social 
origin, which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of 
opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation; 
 
(b) such other distinction, exclusion or preference which has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in 
employment or occupation as may be determined by the Member 
concerned after consultation with representative employers' and 
workers' organisations, where such exist, and with other appropriate 
bodies.”93 
 
Discrimination can, therefore, be defined as the differentiation of an individual or group 
of people on illegitimate grounds. The Constitution lists several grounds under section 9 
(3) of the Constitution. The question has been posed as to whether or not these listed 
grounds are the only grounds that the Courts will consider to be differentiation on 
illegitimate grounds. According to the Constitution, “discrimination on one or more of 
the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination 
is fair.”94 
 
The major problem with section 9 (5) is that it can be interpreted to mean that 
discrimination is only unfair if such discrimination is based on one or more of the 
grounds listed in section 9 (3) of the Constitution. This raises the question as to whether 
listed grounds are the only grounds that the Courts will consider to be differentiation on 
illegitimate grounds.  
 
 
 
                                               
93 Article 1, Convention 111 of the International Labour Organisation, Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958. As can be seen from the definition of discrimination by the ILO, 
discrimination is a form of differentiation but is differentiation with the deliberate purpose of treating 
individuals as unequal and denying them certain rights. 
94 Section 9 (5) of the Constitution. 
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(b)  ‘One or More Grounds’ 
Discrimination on the Listed Grounds 
According to the Constitution, “discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in 
subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.”95 Several 
cases have arisen since this was drafted relating to claims on one or more of the listed 
grounds. An example is the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice.96 This case centred on the fact that sodomy was a criminal offence 
and this, therefore, discriminated against people on the basis of their sexual orientation 
and gender. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender is fairly obvious 
in this case since sex between two women was not illegal. Sexual orientation and gender 
are both listed grounds in the Constitution. The Court accordingly declared that it was 
unconstitutional for sodomy to be considered as a crime and so the law criminalising 
sodomy was struck down. 
 
A second example is the case of Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North. In this case, 
the applicant and second respondent (Naude) lived together and during that time Naude 
became pregnant. While pregnant she decided to give the child up for adoption. The 
applicant did not agree with this decision and so launched series of unsuccessful 
applications to prevent the child being given up for adoption and to be given custody of 
his child. He was denied this opportunity as section 18 (4)(d) of the Child Care Act97 only  
required the consent of the mother to give up children born out of wedlock for adoption. 
The court declared this to be unconstitutional as it discriminated against fathers of 
children born out of wedlock on the basis of their gender. The Constitutional Court 
ordered Parliament to bring this provision of the Child Care Act in line with the 
Constitution within two years. 
  
Discrimination on Analogous Grounds 
Although section 9 (3) and (4) of the Constitution respectively declare that the State and 
                                               
95 Section 9 (5) of the Constitution. 
96See De Vos ‘Sexual Orientation and the Right to Equality in the South African Constitution’ (2000) 117 
SALJ 17 for a further discussion on the National Coalition case and the right to equality. 
97 Act 74 of 1983. 
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individuals may not discriminate on one or more of the listed grounds, this is not a 
numerus clausus of the grounds of discrimination. This is merely a list of the grounds of 
discrimination that will lead to a presumption of unfair discrimination. Although this list 
is not an exhaustive one, “certain scholars … have opined that the prohibition is restricted 
to the enumerated grounds and those which are analogous to those expressly listed.”98 
  
An example of what constitutes analogous grounds occurred in the case of Andrews v 
Law Society of British Columbia99. In this case, McIntyre J interpreted “section 15 as a 
prohibition of discrimination and [defined] discrimination as disadvantage caused by the 
classifications listed in section 15 and analogous classifications.’”100 An analogous 
ground, as referred to by McIntyre J is one “that is based on attributes or characteristics 
which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, 
or to affect them seriously in a comparably serious manner.”101 
 
This can be adopted into South African law as there are several listed classifications but 
there could be many more grounds. To attempt to consider all possible discriminatory 
scenarios would result in two major problems. Firstly, all acts of discrimination would be 
presumed discriminatory creating an unfair reverse onus. Secondly, the list of grounds 
would have to be impossibly long and would always be growing as it is impossible to 
conceive all possible scenarios of discrimination. 
 
The Constitutional Court has, in fact, adopted the American approach as per McIntyre J 
in the Andrews case. In the case of Harksen v Lane NO,102 the issue of discrimination on 
the basis of marital status was brought into question.103 In this case, Goldstone J, like 
McIntyre J, highlighted the importance of dignity in discrimination and stated: 
                                               
98 Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 50. 
99 56 DLR (4th) (1989) 1. 
100 Devenish Commentary 50. 
101 Currie Bill of Rights  244. 
102 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). See Fredman ‘Understanding the Right to Equality’ (1998) 115 SALJ 243 for a 
further discussion on the case of Harksen v Lane NO. See also Ntai & others v SA Breweries Ltd (2001) 22 
ILJ 214 (LC) and Roberts v Agricultural Research Council (2001) 22 ILJ 2112 (ARB) for further cases 
revolving around unlisted grounds. 
103 This case was decided under the interim Constitution, which did not include marital status as one of the 
listed grounds. Marital status was only included later on, in the final Constitution. 
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“At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that 
the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the 
establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal 
dignity and respect regardless of their memberships of particular groups.”104 
 
Although the discrimination was not based on one or more of the listed grounds, the 
Constitutional Court, nonetheless, found the discrimination to be unfair. They came to 
this finding as they considered marital status to be a ground that was analogous to the 
listed grounds and discrimination on this basis would be unfair. 
 
In Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education (North-West Province)105, the Constitutional Court 
heard a challenge against a “regulation prohibiting non-citizens from being permanently 
employed in State schools.”106 Although citizenship was not, in fact, one of the grounds 
listed in section 9 (3), it “had the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of 
non-citizens affected by the regulation.”107 It was, therefore, considered to be an 
analogous ground and thus was an illegitimate ground of discrimination. 
 
The case of Hoffman v South African Airways108 is another prime example. Hoffman argued that 
he had been unfairly discriminated against on the ground of disability due to being HIV positive. 
The Constitutional Court held that HIV was not a disability but that discrimination on this basis 
would constitute an infringement of dignity as it was discrimination due to a person’s medical 
health. Discrimination on the basis of HIV, as part of discrimination on the basis of illness, was 
held to be analogous to the listed grounds and was, therefore unfair discrimination. 
  
(c) ‘Direct or Indirect Discrimination’ 
Section 9 (3) of the Constitution refers to direct and indirect discrimination. The inclusion 
                                               
104 Harksen v Lane NO para 41. 
105 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC). 
106 Carpenter ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination in the new South Africa Constitutional Order (3): The Saga 
Continues’ 2002 (65) THRHR 37 at 38. 
107 Currie Bill of Rights  257 . 
108 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC). See Cameron ‘Legal and Human Rights Responses to the HIV / AIDS 
Epidemic’ (2006) 17 (1) Stellenbosch Law Review 39 at 47 for a further discussion on the case of Hoffman 
v South African Airways. 
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of the two forms of discrimination (direct and indirect) is not merely a South African 
phenomenon. “This bifurcated approach to discrimination was adopted in two English 
statutes dealing with race and gender discrimination, and by the Canadian courts, in 
construing both federal and provincial human rights statutes.”109 The main function of 
this approach, it is submitted, is to ensure that discrimination cannot occur in any possible 
manner. However, the question that must now be posed is; what is the difference between 
direct and indirect discrimination? 
 
Direct Discrimination 
“Direct discrimination is defined in s 6 of the [English] Employment Equality Act 1998 
as treating one person less favourably than another ‘is, has been or would be treated’.”110 
Direct discrimination is a fairly easy concept. A person is directly discriminated against 
on a particular ground, be it one of the listed groups or an analogous ground. “The test for 
establishing direct discrimination consisted of applying what was termed the ‘but for’ 
test. If it is established that a person would not have been denied a benefit ‘but for’ his or 
her sex, then direct discrimination had been established.”111 
 
Indirect Discrimination 
The issue of indirect discrimination is more complicated than the issue of direct 
discrimination. The best way of explaining this issue is by example. A good example is 
provided by the US case of Griggs v Duke Power Co112. The facts of this case were fairly 
simple. As one of its requirements for hiring and promotion, the company required 
applicants to possess a high school diploma. The court held that although the direct effect 
of this cannot be seen to be discriminatory, “indirectly, it had the effect of keeping black 
people out of the job since disproportionately few were able to meet this requirement.”113 
 
                                               
109 Devenish Commentary 46. 
110 Cotter Discrimination Law: Professional Practice Guides (2005) 117. 
111 Fredman Discrimination Law (2002) 105. 
112 401 US 424 (1971). For a further discussion on the case of Griggs v Duke Power Co, see Dupper ‘Old 
Wine in a New Bottle? Indirect Discrimination and its Application in the South African Workplace’ (2002) 
14 SA Merc LJ 189 at 190. 
113 Currie Bill of Rights 260. 
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A South African example is the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act.114 It is claimed that 
“the problem of squatting in South Africa is almost entirely confined to the black 
community, and implementation of the Act therefore amounts to de facto 
discrimination.”115Although this statute can be seen as prima facie non-discriminatory, it 
clearly discriminates against black people as they are the predominant members of the 
group – nearly the entire group – that it affects. 
 
A further example of indirect discrimination can be found in American law. In Dothard v 
Rawlinson,116 the court held that Rawlinson had been discriminated against in an indirect 
manner.117 The Alabama Board of Corrections created certain requirements for 
acceptance to the post of prison guard. These requirements were that all applicants must 
be no less than 5 feet 2 inches tall and must weigh no less than 120 pounds. Although 
Rawlinson had studied correctional psychology and was well qualified for the job, she 
did not meet the requisite weight requirement. “Evidence presented to the court indicated 
that a combination of the height and weight requirements would exclude 41.13% of the 
female population, but only 1% of the male population.”118 Thus, although the rule did 
not set out to discriminate in any way, it had the impact of being discriminatory towards 
women who were denied jobs due to the requirements set down in the rule. 
 
As can be seen, indirect discrimination is aimed at insuring no discrimination gets 
through the net. By clamping down on indirect discrimination, it stops the continued 
existence of laws that are prima facie non-discriminatory but have the end result of being 
discriminatory. Indirect discrimination is a vital feature of the right not to be unfairly 
discriminated against. The inclusion of indirect discrimination “ensures substantial 
equality, particularly in a country with a legacy of the prejudicial consequences of past 
institutionalised inequality.”119 
                                               
114 Act 52 of 1951. 
115 Van der Vyver ‘Private Sphere in Constitutional Litigation’ 1994 (57) THRHR 370 at 378. 
116 433 US 321 (1977). 
117 The court held at 322 B that: “For the reasons we have discussed, the District Court was not in error in 
holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits application of the statutory 
height and weight requirements to Rawlinson and the class she represents.” 
118 Basson et al Essential Labour Law: Volume 1: Individual Labour Law 3rd ed (2002) 307 – 308. 
119 Devenish Commentary 51. 
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An example of both direct and indirect discrimination being examined to find whether or 
not discrimination has occurred is the American case of A Complainant v Civil Service 
Commissioners.120 In this case, the complainant applied for a position, which “was 
confined to persons entitled to be registered with the then National Rehabilitation 
Board.”121 Although being successful in the initial stage of the hiring process and passing 
a typing test, he was denied the job because he failed to meet the standard required during 
his interview.122 The complainant was unsuccessful in his application as the Court found 
that there was no direct discrimination. Furthermore, the “Equality Officer also found that 
the evidence available was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of indirect 
discrimination on the grounds of disability.”123 
 
(d) ‘Unfairly’ 
Fair Discrimination 
“‘Unfair’ discrimination is prohibited in terms of section 9 (3) of the 1996 Constitution. 
This suggests that ‘fair’ discrimination is sanctioned.”124 The term ‘fair discrimination’ 
may be thought to be an oxymoron but discrimination need not always be unfair. 
Although certain actions may amount to discrimination on an illegitimate ground and, 
therefore, not merely differentiation, the discrimination may be considered to be fair. The 
best way to explain what constitutes fair discrimination is by looking at case law. 
 
An example is the case of President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo.125 In this 
case, Nelson Mandela, the then President of South Africa, used his prerogative powers 
and released all female prisoners who were parents of children under a certain age. Hugo 
applied to the court and argued that he had been unfairly discriminated against on the 
                                               
120 Dec-E-2002/015. 
121 McCann ‘Disability Discrimination in the Workplace and the Equality Act, 2004’ at 
http://www.sys.ie/fileadmin/Documents/SYS_Lecture_disability.pdf (accessed on 13 March 2006) at 29. 
122 McCann ‘Disability Discrimination’. 
123 McCann ‘Disability Discrimination’ 29. 
124 Devenish Commentary 45. 
125 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). See Kende ‘Gender Stereotypes in South African and American Constitutional 
Law’ (2000) 117 SALJ 745 at 745 for a further discussion President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Hugo. 
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basis of his gender in that female prisoners were the only candidates considered for early 
release. Although the President had discriminated against prisoners on the basis of their 
gender, “the judge emphasised that to determine whether the impact of the discrimination 
is unfair, one must have regard not only to the group which has been disadvantaged but 
also to the nature of the power in terms of which the discrimination is made and the 
nature of the interests affected.”126 
 
 “The effect of the act was to do no more than deprive fathers of minor children of an 
early release to which they had no legal entitlement … Moreover, it could be said that the 
purpose of the President’s act was to achieve a worthy and important societal goal.”127 
 
The case of Harksen v Lane NO is another good example of the difference between ‘fair’ 
and ‘unfair’ discrimination. This case revolved around section 21 of the Insolvency 
Act.128 This section purportedly violated the solvent spouse’s constitutional rights. These 
were; the right not to have property expropriated without compensation; and the right to 
equality before the law and not to be unfairly discriminated against. This contention arose 
due to the fact that the spouse of an insolvent can be deprived of their property due to the 
fact they are the insolvent’s spouse. 
 
The Court found that the discrimination was not unfair for three main reasons. Firstly, it 
did not affect a vulnerable group or a group that which had suffered discrimination in the 
past. Secondly, it intended to achieve a worthy goal in that it prevented spouses from 
defrauding creditors. Thirdly, it did not impair the fundamental right to dignity of solvent 
spouses. 
                                               
126 Carpenter ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination in the new South Africa Constitutional Order (2): An 
important trilogy of decisions’ 2001 (64) THRHR 619 at 621. 
127 Currie Bill of Rights 246. 
128 Act 24 of 1936. Section 21 (1) of the Insolvency Act reads as follows: “Effect of sequestration on 
property of spouse of insolvent: (1) The additional effect of the sequestration of the separate estate of one 
of two spouses who are not living apart under a judicial order of separation shall be to vest in the Master, 
until a trustee has been appointed, and, upon the appointment of a trustee, to vest in him all the property 
(including property or the proceeds thereof which are in hands of a sheriff or a messenger under a writ of 
attachment) of the spouse whose estate has not been sequestrated (hereinafter referred to as the solvent 
spouse) as if it were property of the sequestrated estate, and to empower the Master or trustee to deal with 
such property accordingly, but subject to the following provisions of this section.” 
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Unfair Discrimination 
As has been shown, fair discrimination is permissible in terms of the Constitution. 
However, unfair discrimination is not. What is unfair discrimination though? “Unfair 
discrimination is discrimination with an unfair impact. Such an impact is deemed unfair if 
it imposes burdens on people who have been victims of past patterns of discrimination … 
or where it impairs to a significant extent the fundamental dignity of the complainant.”129 
 
The approach of the Constitutional Court is set out in the case of Prinsloo v Van der 
Linde.130 The Constitutional Court held the following: 
 
“In regard to mere differentiation the constitutional state is expected to act in a 
rational manner. It should not regulate in an arbitrary manner or manifest 
'naked preferences' that serve no legitimate governmental purpose, for that 
would be inconsistent with the rule of law and the fundamental premises of 
the constitutional state. The purpose of this aspect of equality is, therefore, to 
ensure that the state is bound to function in a rational manner.”131 
 
A second example from case law is the case of Pretoria City Council v Walker132. 
Although the majority of the Constitutional Court found the discrimination in casu to be 
discrimination on the listed ground of race, such discrimination was not found to be 
unfair. The Court held that “section 178 (2) of the interim Constitution did not require 
that tariffs for electricity consumption should be identical for all consumers.”133 The 
court held that such a differentiation was rationally related to the quality of service and 
type of circumstances of the user is permissible and does not amount to unfair 
discrimination. 
 
 
                                               
129 Currie Bill of Rights 246. 
130 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC). See Fagan ‘Dignity and Unfair Discrimination: A Value Misplaced and a Right 
Misunderstood’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 220 at 224 for a further discussion on the case of Prinsloo v Van der 
Linde. 
131 Prinsloo v Van der Linde para 27. 
132 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC). 
133 Devenish Commentary 46. 
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3.2.5 Some Problems with Section 9 (2): The Answers 
 
Once again, the two questions revolving around section 9 (2) posed in 3.2.3 remain 
unanswered: 
 (a) Could there be an abuse of power? and 
 (b) Does affirmative action amount to unfair discrimination? 
 
(a) Could there be an abuse of power? 
It is argued that section 9 (3) is a safeguard to the abuse of power. If the legislature 
decides that equality allows for one race being made dominant over another, then the 
Constitutional Court can argue that the legislature’s act amounts to unfair discrimination 
and strike the law down. It is the term unfair discrimination that limits the legislature and 
preventing them from abusing their power. They are allowed to discriminate, even if 
there is only a ‘reasonable likelihood of meeting the end’, as long as it is not unfair.134 
 
(b) Does affirmative action amount to unfair discrimination? 
It has been argued above that section 9 (2) of the Constitution – the provision that 
allows for affirmative action – does not conflict with the Constitution itself. 
Section 9 (2) can continue to function and, as shown above, an abuse of power 
will be kept in check by section 9 (3). For this reason, the legislature may 
implement procedures and laws that allow for discrimination on the listed grounds 
in order to bring about a state of substantive equality as long as they are not unfair 
discrimination. 
 
                                               
134 See East Zulu Motors v Empangeni / Ngwelezane Transitional Local Council 1998 (1) BCLR (CC); 
Moseneke v Master of the High Court 2001 (2) BCLR 103 (CC); Satchwell v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2002 (9) BCLR 986 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2002 
(10) BCLR 1006 (CC); J and B v Director General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 (5) BCLR 463 
(CC); and Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) are examples of challenges 
against the government revolving around the right to equality and the prohibition against unfair 
discrimination.  
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In order to determine whether or not affirmative action passes the test of being 
fair discrimination, one must go through the step by step inquiry of what 
constitutes unfair discrimination as set out in the case of Harksen v Lane NO135: 
 
(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? 
 
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a 
two stage analysis: 
 
i. Firstly, does the differentiation amount to ‘discrimination’? 
ii.  If the differentiation amounts to ‘discrimination’, does it amount to 
‘unfair discrimination’? 
 
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have 
to be made as to whether the provision can be justified under the 
limitations clause.136 
 
The first step of this three stage inquiry is based in section 9 (1) in that it must be 
determined whether or not people are not receiving equal benefit or protection under the 
law. It must, therefore, be determined whether or not affirmative action differentiates 
between people or categories of people. The entire purpose of affirmative action is to 
differentiate. Accordingly, it would seem that affirmative action fails the first proviso of 
the enquiry 
 
Moving on to the second step of the enquiry, one finds that affirmative action does 
‘discriminate’ as it differentiates on illegitimate grounds – both race and gender are listed 
grounds. Due to the fact that the discrimination is occurring on one or more of the listed 
grounds, the affirmative action can be automatically presumed to be unfair.137 
                                               
135 Harksen v Lane NO para 54. 
136 See Dupper ‘Justifying Unfair Discrimination: The Development of a ‘General Fairness Defence’ in 
South African (Labour) Law’ (2001) Acta Juridica 147 at 149 for a further discussion on the test developed 
in the Harksen case, with particular reference to unfair discrimination in the labour law context. See also 
De Waal, Currie and Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2005) at 217 for a discussion of the three 
step enquiry established in the Harksen case. 
137 In terms of the shifting in onus, it would therefore be on the government who implement affirmative 
action measures to prove that affirmative action is fair. 
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Although presumed to be unfair discrimination, the next and most important step in the 
inquiry, is whether or not affirmative action is actually fair or unfair discrimination. In 
order to determine this answer, one must consider whether the ‘differentiation is 
rationally related’138 to the outcome. In order to find a conclusion, one must consider 
what the rationale of affirmative action is. This question can only be answered after an 
analysis of the purpose affirmative action.  
  
As has been proposed earlier in this chapter, giving all people the right to equality does 
not make all people equal. There is no sense of substantive equality and, therefore, the 
likelihood is that people will continue to suffer due to the inequalities of the past being 
carried through to the present. Although the right to equality exists and all people are 
required to be treated equally, there is still a gaping disparity between the different races 
and genders with regards to employment and employment opportunities. It can therefore 
be argued that “affirmative action is justified by its consequences.” 139 The intended 
consequence of affirmative action is the bridging of the gap between different groups in 
order bring about a sense of parity.140 For this reason, it can be argued that the 
differentiation is rationally related to the outcome. 
 
Following the application of the Harksen test to affirmative action, it is submitted, then, 
that criticism of affirmative action in South Africa is premature. Affirmative action is 
allowed for in section 9 (2) and is not, as has been suggested, an unnecessary over-
extension of power by the government. Affirmative action passes the discrimination test 
in that it amounts to fair discrimination. For this reason, affirmative action can be seen to 
be a vital tool in South African society. It fully promotes the right to equality in that it 
allows for all people who had previously been disadvantaged to be given an equal 
opportunity. Affirmative action is therefore an important part of the Constitution, it is 
                                               
138 The test to determine whether or not discrimination is unfair based on the differentiation being rationally 
related to the outcome was set in Pretoria City Council v Walker. 
139 Currie Commentary 265. 
140 This sense of ‘parity’ will be found once employment equity has been reached. 
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“not an exception to equality, but is a means of achieving equality understood in its 
substantive or restitutory sense.”141 
 
3.3 Levelling Down: An Alternative to Affirmative Action? 
 
“Even when it is not raised overtly, the presumptively available option of 
levelling down hangs over potential discrimination claims like a dark cloud, 
undermining the effectiveness of equality rights, and even deterring 
individuals from bringing such claims in the first place.” 
- DB Blake142 
 
3.3.1  Introduction 
 
There are two ways in which inequality can be dealt with in the process of bringing about 
equality. The first is to ensure that those who are worse off are given some form of 
advantage so that they may catch up to those who are better off. The second means, the 
process that will now be discussed, is to take away from those who are better off so that 
they are at a level with those who are worse off. This second process, known as ‘levelling 
down’ seems to be an inadequate system in that everyone is better off. “However, while 
equalitarianism implies that levelling down may nonetheless make things better in at least 
one respect (i.e., in respect of equality), prioritarians deny that it may make things better 
in any respect.”143 
 
3.3.2  Egalitarianism 
 
“Egalitarianism, we were once told, is the ‘politics of envy’. It is better, so egalitarians 
were alleged to believe, to make everyone equal than to allow inequalities, even if some 
or all would be better off.”144 This, it is submitted, is a very narrow and blinkered view.  
                                               
141 Currie Bill of Rights 264. 
142 Blake ‘When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Levelling Down in Equality Law’ 
(2004) 8 University of Pittsburgh School of Law Working Paper Series 512 at 522-523. 
143 Brown ‘Giving Up Levelling Down’ at 
http://personal.bgsu.edu/~browncf/papers/GivingUpLevellingDown.pdf (accessed on 24 April 2006). 
144 Wolff ‘Levelling Down’ at 
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To accept the egalitarian view that everyone is equal and, therefore, the world is a better 
place is a complete and utter devotion to the notion of equality and a rejection of any 
other social concept of self-worth and self-gain. 
 
However, some egalitarians have come to accept the fact that levelling down is not 
appropriate in the majority of cases but still feel that it can be used in some cases. One 
such egalitarian author is Wolff who puts the following example forward as a situation 
when levelling down would be the acceptable process to bring about substantive equality: 
 
“Suppose, for example, we want to maximise the preference satisfaction of the 
worst off. Doing this may require us to move to a form of society in which 
everyone, including the worst off, has fewer material resources. For example 
the worst off may now get better use of, and thus more preference satisfaction 
from, their smaller bundle of resources because of reduced over-crowding 
effects. Preferring a lower total stock of material goods may in one way seem 
inefficient or wasteful but this is irrelevant.”145 
 
Although egalitarians seem to have accepted that merely attaining equality is not enough, 
this example shows nothing of this new found acceptance. This example clearly 
illustrates that the author believes that people will be satisfied if every person has an 
equal portion even though that portion is smaller than what they have before the levelling 
down. This somewhat simplistic view overlooks the possibility that there is likely to be 
mass dissatisfaction of both those who were advantaged now having less and those who 
were disadvantaged who are still not well off. The example also ignores the possibility 
this may result in a waste of economic resources leaving the state a backward and archaic 
economy unable to compete in the world economic stage.146 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctyjow/Levelling%20Down.doc (accessed on 24 April 2006). 
145 Wolff ‘Levelling Down’. 
146 See Brown Giving Up Levelling Down (2002) for a further discussing of the egalitarian approach to 
levelling down. 
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3.3.3 Examples of Levelling Down 
 
Although this discussion on levelling down is critical of the process, levelling down has 
been used on several occasions in the United States of America in a professed attempt to 
achieve equality. In the case of Cazares v Barber147, a school opted to use levelling down 
procedures to bring about equal treatment. Cazares was one of the top students and was 
heavily involved in the student government, for which she served as the leader. The 
school’s selection committee was required to choose candidates to induct into the 
National Honour Society and rejected Cazares even though she was a model student and 
had better formal qualifications than the majority of inductees. Cazares was rejected due 
to the fact that she had fallen pregnant at 15 and was neither married nor lived with the 
father of the child. 
 
Cazares successfully sued the selection committee “on the basis of sex in violation of her 
rights under both Title IX and the Fifth Amendment.”148 The schools response to this 
victory by Cazares, however, was not to induct her into the National Honour Society but 
cancelled the ceremony, terminated its participation in the society and implied that it was 
due to Cazares’ actions. “Although all of the students were treated the same with respect 
to the denial of NHS participation, Elisa Cazares was left no better off, and quite possibly 
worse off, for having won her sex discrimination case.”149 
 
A second case in which levelling down was used in order to bring about equality was the 
case of Cohen v Brown University150. In this case, Brown University was challenged due 
to the fact that it did not adequately and equally cater for female athletes. Brown’s 
response was to cancel 213 men’s positions in athletics to create equality. The matter was 
taken to court and the Court rejected Brown’s response as “Brown had not made a good 
                                               
147 959 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1992). 
148 Blake ‘When Equality 517. 
149 Blake ‘Problem of Levelling Down’ 518. 
150 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 43 
faith effort to comply, the district court imposed its own remedy, ordering Brown to add 
several new women's varsity teams.”151 
 
Despite the fact that it seemed that the United States took a step forward in helping to 
create an equal society where everyone is well off, the First Circuit court forced the 
promotion of equality to take two steps back. The first Circuit Court “did not share the 
district court's perception of any tension between Brown's plan and Title IX, and faulted 
the district court for imposing its own remedy.” 152 The First Circuit Court did not feel it 
was important to consider Brown's motives for its proposal to cut men’s opportunities 
drastically and merely accepted the fact that it was taking measures to bring about 
equality.153 The action of Brown to cancel 213 men’s positions in athletics to create 
equality, therefore, stood as a valid decision. 
 
A third case, showing that levelling down is a process used in all levels of society from 
high schools to town municipalities, is the case of Palmer v Thompson154. In this case, the 
applicants successfully challenged policy of the city of Jackson, Mississippi to operate 
racially segregated swimming pools. In order to bring about the equal treatment of all the 
people of Jackson, regardless of race, the municipality used levelling down procedures 
rather than integrate the pools. “The city decided to end its role in providing public pools 
to city residents by closing the four pools that it owned and relinquishing its lease on the 
fifth.”155 
 
3.3.4 Levelling Down: An Inadequate Concept 
 
The cases referred to clearly show the irrationality of levelling down as a process of 
bringing about substantive equality. In these cases the process was used in bad faith. In 
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fact, one can go so far as to say that the “uncritical acceptance of levelling down 
functions to undermine popular support for equality law.”156  
 
A further negative critique of levelling down can be shown in this example used by 
Brown in his discussion about the concept: 
 
“The population of Inegalitaria is divided roughly into two equal-sized classes 
such that (a) everyone within the same class is equally well off, and (b) 
everyone in one class is better off than everyone in the other. In short, 
Inegalitaria has significant inequality. 
 
Now suppose that one day Inegalitaria is struck by a bomb. Fortunately ... 
there are no casualties. None the less, the results of the bombing are 
devastating; the infrastructure of the village is entirely destroyed. 
Consequently, everyone is reduced to roughly the same low level of welfare; 
everyone is made rather badly off, but more or less equally so.”157 
 
As shown by these examples, levelling down is an alternative to affirmative action 
measures. However, the measures would leave everyone worse off and, therefore, 
everyone dissatisfied. Such dissatisfaction is a certain way for political and economic 
stability to collapse. It would seem to be unacceptable to place such a high premium on 
equality that everything else is sacrificed to the concept of equality. Equality is an 
important state that society should aim to achieve but society should not achieve this state 
if it is detrimental to its people. For this reason, it is submitted, that levelling down is a 
concept that should be rejected. It is a process of ‘cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s 
face’ and would seem to have no place in South Africa.  For this reason, there is no doubt 
about the fact that affirmative action (levelling up) is the best system available. 
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3.4 The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
 
 
“We want to build a South Africa with a diverse and representative workforce. 
We want to abolish discrimination in the workplace. Let this Bill be the 
subject of debate in every workplace and by all workers and employers.” 
– T. T. Mboweni, MP158 
 
“The Employment Equity Act is the third and final volume of the trilogy in which the 
new Labour Law is written, the first two being the Labour Relations Act159 and the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act.”160 The EEA was assented to on 12 October 1998 and 
has since become an important part of the labour law and, in particular, the promotion of 
equity and substantive equality in South Africa. The EEA is a comprehensive piece of 
legislation in the fight against discrimination and provides South Africa with a vital tool 
in the battle against discrimination in the labour arena. It is the EEA that sets out the 
affirmative action measures that have been accepted into South African law. 
 
3.4.1  The Employment Equity Bill161 and the Employment Equity Act 
 
There are a number of significant changes from the original Employment Equity Bill162 to 
be found in the EEA. Firstly there has been “an extension of the application of the Act 
from employers with workforces greater than 50 to those with annual turnovers ranging 
from R2-million in the agricultural sector to R25-million in the wholesale trade and 
commercial sectors.”163 
 
Secondly the EEA relates to the merit of applicants for a job. Applicants are no longer 
‘suitably qualified’ only if they possess the formal qualifications, prior learning and 
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relevant experience required for the job. In terms of section 20 (3) (d) an applicant can be 
suitably qualified for a position if they possess the ‘capacity to acquire, within a 
reasonable time, the ability to do the job’. A less significant change is that the “adoption 
of positive measures to redress social imbalances” has now plainly and openly been 
referred to as affirmative action. 
 
3.4.2   Influences on the Employment Equity Act and Related Acts 
 
(a) International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Since being readmitted into the international political arena, several ILO conventions 
have been ratified by South Africa. These include the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.164 These conventions have 
been discussed in further detail in the previous chapter and no further discussion need be 
advanced at this stage. 
 
(b) Influence of the interim and final Constitution 
The interim Constitution and final Constitution have both included a provision for 
substantive equality. The EEA is the fulfilment of section 9 (5) of the Constitution in that 
it is a legislative measure with the aim of bringing about substantive equality. The 
Constitution also binds the way in which the EEA is interpreted and applied. In the 
George v Liberty Life165 it was held by Landman P that: 
  
“In giving content to the unfair labour practice, it is my view, imperative to 
take into account the values of the broader community. An important source 
of such values, which will guide this court, are the rights enshrined in the 
Interim Constitution.”166 
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In Association of Professional Teachers and Another v Minister of Education & 
Others167, Landman P and AC Basson AM stated that: 
  
“In exercising its unfair labour practice jurisdiction, the Industrial Court will 
also be called upon to infuse the very wide definition of the unfair labour 
practice definition with meaning in accordance with the provisions of the 
chapter of the Constitution setting out our Bill of Rights.”168 
 
(c) The Labour Relations Acts 
The Labour Relations Act of 1956 included no specific provisions preventing 
discrimination in the form of refusal to appoint an applicant on any grounds. Other 
legislation, in fact, promoted discrimination on arbitrary grounds; for example: the Bantu 
Building Workers Act169 of 1951, the Industrial Conciliation Act170 of 1956 and the Wage 
Act171 of 1957. 
 
“The Labour Relations Act,172 1995, was the first piece of legislation to deal with 
discrimination in the workplace. Section 187, for example, provides that dismissal based 
on discrimination is automatically unfair.”173 The LRA was enacted before the EEA but 
the EEA has since repealed Schedule 7 Items 2 (1) (a), 2(2) and 3 (4) (a) of the LRA. 
These Items of Schedule 7 all dealt with the topic of discrimination in the workplace. 
Item 2 (2) gave an employer grounds of justification – inherent requirements of the job 
and affirmative action measures – against a claim of unfair discrimination.174 
 
(d) The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
Although the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act175 was 
enacted after the EEA, it is very closely related to the implementation of the EEA. 
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PEPUDA impacts strongly on the issue of discrimination in South Africa. The EEA, 
however, deals with the employer-employee relationship whereas PEPUDA is aimed at 
other sectors and spheres of the country. The use of a variety of legislative measures 
revolving around discrimination is necessary “to ensure a coherent development of anti-
discrimination law across all sectors of society.”176 
 
Although they are separate Acts and aimed at different sectors of society, the EEA and 
PEPUDA are complementary to each other and work in unison to prevent discrimination. 
The EEA, for example, “does not apply to members of the National Defence Force, the 
National Intelligence Agency, or the South African Secret Service”177 However, any 
claim that would arise involving members of these three services or where unfair 
discrimination has been committed by an independent contractor and a supplier of an 
employer can be brought in terms of either the Constitution or the PEPUDA.178 
 
Furthermore, the open-ended nature to its list of prohibited grounds and unlisted grounds 
of discrimination are any ground that “causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; 
undermines human dignity; or adversely affect the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights 
and freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable to discrimination on a [listed] 
ground”179 
 
3.4.3 Chapter I of the Employment Equity Act: Definitions, Purpose, 
Interpretation and Application 
 
(a) Purpose of this Act 
The major function of the EEA is to correct “the demographic imbalance in the nation’s 
workforce by compelling employers to remove barriers to advancement of ‘blacks’, 
‘coloureds, ‘Indians’, women and the disabled and actively to advance them in all 
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categories of employment by ‘affirmative action’.”180 This can clearly be seen as a 
legislative measure, as required by section 9 (2) of the Constitution181 to achieve the right 
to equality contained in section 9 (2); the promotion of substantive equality. The goal of 
setting out to achieve substantive equality and formal equality is declared in the preamble 
of the EEA which states, that the Act recognises “that those disparities create such 
pronounced disadvantages for certain categories of people that they cannot be redressed 
simply by repealing discriminatory laws.” 
 
In order to achieve this goal the EEA has two major thrusts. These are to implement 
measures that “ensure fair treatment of all employees by eliminating unfair 
discrimination and [to] implement affirmative action measures to redress the 
disadvantages that occurred in the past.”182 These two aspects have distinct functions. 
The first aspect aims at bringing about formal equality and the second aspect aims at 
bringing about substantive equality. By promoting both forms of equality, the EEA 
advances the right to equality as set out by section 9 of the Constitution with full effect. 
The EEA also attempts to advance and further the constitutional right to equality and 
preventing discrimination by including three further prohibited grounds of discrimination, 
namely; family responsibility, HIV status and political opinion.183 
 
(b) Interpretation of this Act 
The EEA clearly sets out the manner in which it should be interpreted: 
 
“(3) Interpretation of this Act. 
This Act must be interpreted 
a. in compliance with the Constitution; 
 
b. so as to give effect to its purpose; 
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c. taking into account any relevant Code of Good Practice issued in 
terms of this Act or any other employment law; and 
 
d. in compliance with the international law obligations of the 
Republic, in particular those contained in the International 
Labour Organisation Convention (No. 111) concerning 
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.”184 
 
Thus any interpretation of the EEA must be made in light of the Constitution, the 
purposes of the EEA (as set out in its preamble and section 1), codes of good practices 
and international law – the International Labour Organisation Conventions discussed in 
the previous chapter of this work, for example.185 
 
(c) Application of this Act 
The EEA applies to all employees and employers and also binds the State.186 As stated 
above under 3.4.2 (d), there are certain bodies that are excluded from the ambit of the 
EEA. 
 
3.4.4 Chapter II of the Employment Equity Act: Prohibition of Unfair 
Discrimination 
  
One of the major facets of the EEA is the prohibition of unfair discrimination, in 
accordance with section 9 (1) of the Constitution. By preventing all unfair discrimination 
in the employment field, the EEA aims to eliminate inequity and to create a prima facie 
equal opportunity for all people to be employed. 
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Section 6 of the EEA, as contained in chapter II of the Act, is the main part of the 
prohibition against unfair discrimination and reads as follows: 
 
“6.   Prohibition of unfair discrimination 
1) No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against 
an employee, in any employment policy or practice, on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, 
political opinion, culture, language and birth.”187 
 
The list includes all the prohibited grounds specified in the Constitution as well as the 
three new grounds of family responsibility, HIV status and political opinion. This section 
is, essentially a rewording of section 9 (4) of the Constitution with the inclusion of new 
grounds of discrimination. Although this seems to be a simply worded section, “locked 
up in this section is the basic protection of all employees against unfair 
discrimination.”188 The section can, therefore, be considered to be the most important 
protection of all employees regarding unfair discrimination in any legislation in South 
Africa today.189 
 
(a) Unfair Discrimination 
Meaning of Unfair Discrimination 
Although one of the pivotal facets of the EEA is the prohibition of unfair discrimination, 
the EEA does not define discrimination at any point. It can, therefore, be argued that the 
“EEA contains no more than the basic structure of a prohibition on unfair discrimination. 
It is left to the courts to give content to and develop discrimination law. As a result, the 
context within which the EEA operates becomes important as the courts grapple with 
some very difficult issues raised under the banner of discrimination.”190 
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Since 1989 the courts seemed to have adopted the injunction to give content to and 
develop discrimination law on a case to case basis. In J v M191 it was held that the test is a 
“subjective one, that is, the reactions of the employee rather than the employer determine 
the effect of its conduct or practice.”192 Later on, schedule 7 of the 1995 LRA attempted 
to set a test for unfair discrimination. The test was that the alleged discriminatory act was 
“measured, rather, against the treatment accorded others … [and] the distinction [must] 
be said to be ‘arbitrary’. ‘Arbitrary’ means in turn that the distinction is based on some 
irrelevant criterion.”193 This test can, like the 1989 precedent, be seen to be a subjective 
one. The LRA leaves the implementation wide open in that it must be on an irrelevant 
ground. The court is then given a wide discretion of what is or is not an irrelevant ground. 
 
In the case of NUMSA v Vetsak Co-Operative Ltd & Others 194 it was held that in 
“finding an unfair labour practice, the tribunal concerned is expressing a moral or value 
judgment as to what is fair in all circumstances. The test is too flexible to be reduced to a 
fixed set of sub-rules. The relevant factors cannot all be captured in a single formula or 
formulation.”195 
 
The court came to a similar conclusion in Leonard Dingler Employee Representative 
Council & Others v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd & Others.196 In this case, the court 
maintained its wide discretionary powers in holding that “discrimination is unfair if it is 
reprehensible in terms of society’s prevailing norms.”197 
                                               
191 (1989) 10 ILJ 755 (IC). 
192 Du Plessis et al A Practical Guide to Labour Law 5th ed (2001) 80. 
193 Grogan Workplace Law 281. 
194 (1996) 17 ILJ 455 (A). See Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 4th ed (2003) at 441 for further 
information regarding the case of NUMSA v Vetsak Co-Operative Ltd & Others. 
195 Thompson Labour Law fn 386. 
196 (1998) 19 ILJ 285 (LC). See Partington and Van Der Walt ‘The Development of Defences in Unfair 
Discrimination Cases Part 2’ (2005) 26 (3) Obiter 595 at 606; Louw ‘Should the Playing Fields be 
Levelled? Revisiting Affirmative Action in Professional Sport (Part 1)’ (2004) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 
120 at 125; and Dupper (2001) Acta Juridica 147 at 161 for further discussion on the test put forward by 
the Dingler case. 
197 Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council & Others v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd & Others 
295H. On occasion, however, the prevailing norms of society may conflict with the requirements of a job 
with regards to unfair discrimination and dismissal scenarios. In FAWU & Others v Rainbow Chicken 
Farms (2000) 21 ILJ 615 (LC), for example, the court upheld the dismissal of Muslim employees being 
absent from work on the day of Eid ul Fitr as they were hired for that position “in accordance with Halaal 
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Fair and unfair discrimination has already been defined previously in this chapter. 
Discrimination itself can now be easily defined: It is the differentiation between people 
on illegitimate grounds. Unfair discrimination, on the other hand, involves a major policy 
decision.198 When deciding if discrimination is indeed unfair, it is submitted that the 
courts must, for stated reasons, have wide discretionary powers in order to promote the 
boni mores of society. This submission is based on the belief that the ‘morals of society’ 
is such a subjective and constantly evolving concept and, therefore, a finite test cannot be 
created. The problem with a finite test, it is finally submitted, is that it will become 
outdated and, therefore, redundant. 
  
The only problem, it is submitted, with this approach is that it takes away from legal 
certainty. Without a set precedent as to what constitutes unfair discrimination, the court’s 
conclusion may just be based on how the judge feels on the day. It is, however, submitted 
that this does not deny the need for the wide discretionary powers of the courts to 
determine what is unfair. The subjectivity of fairness is far too important to have any set 
standard or test applied to it and, therefore, legal certainty may reasonably be limited in 
this instance. 
 
Onus of Proof in Discrimination Cases 
Section 11 of the EEA contains a provision regarding the onus of proof in unfair 
discrimination cases. It states that “whenever unfair discrimination is alleged in terms of 
this Act, the employer against whom the allegation is made must establish that it is 
fair.”199 This seems to create heavy burden on employers. However, the courts have not 
taken a literal approach to this section. In Transport & General Workers Union & 
Another v Bayete Security Holdings,200 it was held that the mere claim that discrimination 
has occurred is not sufficient to shift the onus of proving or disproving that 
                                                                                                                                            
standards as approved by the Muslim Judicial Council and for the Muslim Market.” See McGregor ‘An 
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discrimination has occurred. The courts have interpreted section 11 to mean that “the 
onus of proving discrimination, on a prima facie basis, still rests with the employee.”201 
For this reason, the employee (complainant) must establish that discrimination has 
occurred before it can be presumed to be unfair.202 
 
Section 11 would seem to present a further problem. Section 9 (5) of the Constitution 
provides the presumption of unfairness – a shifting onus – only occurs where it has been 
established that discrimination has occurred on a listed ground. This presents a quandary. 
A comparison of the two provisions suggests two completely different approaches to the 
shifting of onus. The EEA allows for a reverse onus when any discrimination is 
established and the Constitution allows for a reverse onus when discrimination on a listed 
ground203 has occurred. The problem with this is that the Constitution is the supreme law. 
For this reason, it is submitted that the EEA must be amended204 and that the 
discrimination must: firstly, be established and secondly, be based on one of the listed 
grounds (be it the Constitutional list or extended EEA list), for the onus to shift, as per 
the Constitutional requirement. 
 
Harassment205 
In terms of the provisions of the EEA, “harassment of an employee is a form of unfair 
discrimination and is prohibited on any one, or a combination of grounds of unfair 
discrimination listed in subsection (1).”206 According to the EEA, an employer could also 
be held liable for any harassment occurring in his/her place of business.207 This is based 
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on the fact that section 5 requires an employer to be pro-active in preventing unfair 
discrimination. The Code of Good Practice on Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases, 
2005, states “that there is a positive duty on employers to implement the policy – 
including effective communication to employees, the creation of procedures to deal with 
sexual harassment and taking disciplinary action against employees who do not 
comply.”208 
 
(b) Obligation on Employers 
Section 6 is not a passive provision. Section 5209 ensures that all employers must act in a 
positive manner with regards to section 6, to ensure that unfair discrimination does not 
occur.  Employers must also take steps in order to promote equal opportunities in their 
workplaces. It is submitted that this provision is one of the most vital provisions in the 
entire EEA. Without this provision, substantive equality could never be achieved. 
Employers hold the power to ensure that there is no discrimination and to ensure that 
equal opportunities are given to all employees. 
 
(c) Who is Protected by the Employment Equity Act? 
The EEA applies to all employees and employers with the exception of the National 
Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service.210 
The question arises as to what constitutes an ‘employee’. In terms of the provisions of the 
EEA, the definition of an employee is as follows: 
 
“employee” means any person other than an independent contractor who— 
a. works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is 
entitled to receive, any remuneration; and 
b. in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an 
employer, 
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and “employee” and “employment” have corresponding meanings;211 
 
Section 1 of the EEA must then be read with section 9 in order to glean a full insight into 
what an ‘employee’ truly is. This section reads as follows: 
 
9.   Applicants 
For purposes of sections 6, 7 and 8, “employee” includes an applicant for 
employment. 
 
Employee not only includes persons who are currently employed but also persons who 
are applying for a position and may be discriminated against. It can be interpreted from 
the case of Whitehead v Woolworths212 that in order to be considered an employee, “an 
applicant has to prove that he or she met the employer’s requirements to be considered 
for employment but was rejected.”213 
 
The purpose of including applicants for employment, it is submitted, is to ensure that 
there are equal opportunities for people to become employed.214 By not allowing 
applicants to be protected by the EEA, affirmative action could become circumvented. 
This is due to the fact that, if a person was denied a job due to the colour of their skin, he 
or she would have no claim under the EEA. Therefore, the EEA might as well not even 
have the affirmative action provisions. 
 
(d) Who are ‘Employees’ Protected Against? 
In determining who the employees are protected against in terms of the EEA, one must 
“note that section 6 does not speak of the employer – it provides that ‘no person’ may 
discriminate.”215 This is seemingly an extremely wide provision. It is limited, however, 
by a further stipulation in section 6 (1) that the discrimination involved must be part of an 
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‘any employment policy or practice’.216 By saying this, it limits ‘no person’ to be people 
within the place of employment in which the discrimination could take place. It is 
submitted that the reason that the EEA includes ‘no person’ is that it includes 
discrimination by one employee against another and gives further effect to section 5 in 
that the employer must be pro-active in preventing discrimination by other people within 
his or her business and thus further eradication unfair discrimination. 
 
(e) Inherent Requirements of the Job217 
One exception to unfair discrimination is when the discrimination is based on an 
‘inherent requirement of the job’. “The word ‘inherent’ suggests that possession of a 
particular personal characteristic must be necessary for effectively carrying out the duties 
attached to a particular position. The test must of necessity be relative.”218 If an applicant 
lacks an inherent requirement of the job then they may be discriminated against on one of 
the listed grounds. An example is a role in a film for a female part. Although not hiring a 
male would be discrimination on the basis of his gender, it would not be considered 
unfair discrimination as it is an inherent requirement of job that the actor be female. 
 
In the case of Hoffman v South African Airways,219 South African Airways220 turned 
down Hoffman’s job application on the basis that he was Human Immuno-Virus221 
positive. SAA argued that in an emergency situation, flight attendants would have to deal 
with injured passengers and must not have HIV as they could infect the passengers. The 
Constitutional Court held that being HIV negative, or not having HIV, was not an 
inherent requirement of the job. SAA’s argument that it was dangerous for passengers to 
be cared for by an HIV positive person was not important enough to constitute an 
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inherent requirement of the job. For this reason, SAA was found to have unfairly 
discriminated against Hoffman on the basis of his HIV status.222 
 
Essentially, the job requirement must relate to the job or duty. Whether or not a certain 
requirement is an ‘inherent’ requirement is assessed on a case-to-case basis of each 
employment position as the factors surrounding it can differ from business to business. 
One example of differing surrounding circumstances is commercial requirements of the 
business, for example, customer preference.223 A case involving customer preference is 
that of Diaz v Pan American World Airways Inc.224 In casu, it was contended by the 
employer that only female flight attendants could be employed as a part of a business 
strategy to “[provide] psychological support for the male passengers involved in the 
‘stressful experience’ of flying.”225 Although the court considered commercial success to 
be a requirement of an employment position, it held226 that the business would not suffer 
by exclusively employing female flight attendants.227  
 
(f) Affirmative Action 
A second exception to unfair discrimination is affirmative action. It has already been 
argued in this chapter that public policy dictates that affirmative action is not unfair and 
so this exception to unfair discrimination need not be discussed further. The EEA fulfils 
the function of section 9 (2) in promoting substantive equality by eliminating “unfair 
discrimination in the workplace and by providing for affirmative action measures.”228 
Affirmative action measures will be discussed in further detail at a later stage in this 
chapter. 
 
 
                                               
222 Although this case was decided before the EEA was enacted, it gives valuable insight into what the 
courts determine to constitute an inherent requirement of the job. 
223 Grogan Workplace Law. 
224 311 F.Supp 559. 
225 Basson Individual Labour 310. 
226 The court held that at 388 that “discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the 
business would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.” 
227 Basson Individual Labour. 
228 Kruger ‘Non-Discrimination’ (2004) 18. 
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(g) Medical and Psychological Testing 
Under the EEA, all medical and psychological testing of employees (including 
applicants) is deemed unfair “unless legislation permits or requires testing; or such testing 
is justifiable in the light of medical facts, employment conditions, social policy, the fair 
distribution of employment benefits; or the inherent requirements of the job.”229 Whether 
or not the testing is fair will be based on a value judgment by the court. 
 
(h) Dispute Resolution230 
The EEA not only sets out provisions that, if contravened, may give grounds for 
disputation but also sets out the path and procedure that must be followed when such 
disputes arise. Any dispute about unfair discrimination must be brought in terms of the 
provisions of section 10 of the EEA. In terms of the Act, unfair discrimination (including 
harassment) must be reported within six months of the incident.231 
 
The process which must be followed is best presented by means of a diagram: 
 
 
Report within 6 months 
 
 
Referred to CCMA232 for conciliation and arbitration 
 
 
If this fails 
 
 
Referred to Labour Court for adjudication 
 
 
Just and equitable decision by Labour Court 
 
3.4.5 Chapter III of the Employment Equity Act: Affirmative Action 
 
Chapter III of the EEA is the most important tool in achieving substantive equality and 
creating equal opportunity for employment within the EEA itself and will be discussed at 
                                               
229 Thompson Labour Law CC 1-75. 
230 See Du Toit Labour Relations Law at 617 for a further discussion on the dispute resolution process. 
231 Du Plessis Practical Guide. 
232 The CCMA is the Commission for Conciliation and Arbitration. 
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a later stage in this chapter. 
 
3.4.6 Chapter IV of the Employment Equity Act: Commission for Employment 
Equity233 
 
Chapter IV of the EEA sets about establishing a Commission for Employment Equity. 
The functions of the Commission for Employment are to establish codes of good practice 
(to be issued by the Minister of Labour), to create policies concerning the EEA, give 
employers who further the EEA rewards, research and report on any matter relating to the 
application of the EEA to the Minister and perform any other function as prescribed by 
the Minister.234 
 
 
3.4.7 Chapter V of the Employment Equity Act: Monitoring, Enforcement and 
Legal Proceedings235 
 
Chapter V of the EEA is also essential as it ensures that the EEA has some force and 
effect. One major problem with this chapter is the wide powers given to labour inspectors 
“to enter, question and inspect as provided for in sections 65 and 66 of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act.236”237 This section, it is submitted, may have certain 
problems if put to the constitutional test. This is because section 14 of the Constitution 
gives all persons the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have: 
 
(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed 
 
                                               
233 See Pretorius et al Employment Equity Law (2006) at 11-1 for a further discussion on the Commission 
for Employment Equity; and Du Toit Labour Relations at 360. 
234 Section 30 of the EEA. 
235 “The Act makes provision for a system of monitoring not only by officials of the Labour Department, 
but by employees and trade unions as well.” See Pretorius Employment Equity Law at 11-3 for a further 
discussion on the Monitoring, Enforcement and Legal Proceedings. 
236 Act 75 of 1997 (Amendment Act 11 of 2002). 
237 Section 35 of the EEA. 
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This right can be limited in terms of a search warrant. Section 21 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act238 allows for the police - and only the police - to enforce a search warrant 
in order to justifiable infringe section 14 of the Constitution. In the case of Extra 
Dimension & Others v Kruger NO & Others239, it was held that a search warrant giving 
power of search and seizure to police and private persons was invalid due to the 
‘irregular’ powers it granted. It may be argued, however, that the EEA extends the 
Criminal Procedure Act in that it allows for extra powers to justifiably infringe on section 
14. On the contrary, however, it is submitted, that by following the precedent as set down 
in Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa & Others240, the 
EEA would fail the constitutional test and that section 35 would be required to be 
amended. 
 
In the Mistry case, section 28 of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act241 
was argued to be unconstitutional. Section 28 is extremely similar to section 35 of the 
EEA and reads as follows: 
 
“inspectors of medicines were given the authority to enter into and inspect any 
premises, place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft where such inspectors reasonably 
believed that there are medicines or other substances regulated by the Act, and 
to seize any medicine or any books, records or documents found in or upon 
such premises, place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft which appear to afford 
evidence of a contravention of nay provision of the Act.”242 
 
In casu, the Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa243 received a 
complaint against the applicant – a general practitioner. The INMDCSA Council ordered 
an inspection of the applicant’s surgery by two investigating officers. The applicant 
argued section 28 (1) which conferred these powers was unconstitutional as it 
unreasonably infringed against his right to privacy. The Constitutional Court struck down 
                                               
238 Act 51 of 1977. 
239 2004 (2) SACR 493 (T). See Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (2006) at 21 for 
a further commentary on search warrants and the Extra Dimension case. 
240 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC). 
241 Act 101 of 1965. 
242 Section 28 (1) of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act. 
243 Hereinafter referred to as INMDCSA. 
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this provision as it gave sweeping powers to private individuals and so unreasonably 
infringed section 14 of the Constitution. 
 
One argument that could be made in favour of the EEA and section 35, it is submitted, is 
that the labour inspectors are merely an extension of the police and are not a separate 
body. A second argument is that the promotion of substantive equality is essential in 
South Africa and the achievement of equal opportunities could allow for a reasonable 
infringement of the right to privacy. The matter has yet to arise in the Constitutional 
Court and it will be interesting to see how the Constitutional Court assesses the 
situation.244 
 
3.4.8 Chapter VI of the Employment Equity Act: General Provisions 
 
The final chapter of the EEA contains twelve further provisions to the EEA. These range 
from the rules regarding contracting with the State to the issuing of codes of good 
practice to sanctions for contravening provisions of the EEA. 
 
3.5 Affirmative Action in South Africa 
 
“If well handled, affirmative action will help bind the nation together and 
produce benefits for everyone. If badly managed, it will simply re-distribute 
resentment, damage the economy and destroy social peace. If not undertaken 
at all, the country will remain backward and divided at its heart.” 
– ANC Statement on Affirmative Action245 
 
 
Since an understanding of affirmative action in the South African context is vital to this 
thesis, it is appropriate to re-visit the concept as related to South African practice.  
                                               
244 It is in the opinion of the author that section 35 of the EEA will have to be amended to be consistent 
with section 14 of the Constitution. The wide and sweeping powers conferred on labours inspectors by the 
EEA are likely to be deemed to be an over-extension of power by the legislature and will have to be 
amended accordingly. 
245 www.anc.org.za. 
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Affirmative action in South Africa was first proposed by the ANC in the 1980s in order 
to deal with the inequalities that were created by apartheid.246 When the Constitution 
Committee had to deal with redressing the inequalities of apartheid, it was faced with 
three options. First, it could have the government take away the rewards given to people 
by apartheid and share them out amongst those people who had been dispossessed during 
apartheid.247 The second option was to “adopt a Constitution and Bill of Rights that 
would scrap apartheid laws, but establish the constitution as a Chinese wall against any 
attempt to alter the social and economic status quo.”248 The Constitution Committee went 
with the third option, which was to adopt measures to allow for the introduction of 
affirmative action in South African law. 249 
 
Affirmative action in South Africa is justified by its purpose.250 “At the end of the 
apartheid era in 1995 whites accounted for 13% of the population and earned 59% of 
personal income; Africans, 76% of the population, earned 29%.”251 These statistics paint 
a gory picture of South African society. They show a major disparity between different 
race groups with the minority race group earning more as a group than the majority race 
group. For this reason, affirmative action measures were put in place to redress the 
imbalances of the past and a move a substantively equal society. 
 
Affirmative action in South Africa is, therefore, not merely put in place to promote 
‘cosmetic changes’, i.e. changing the colour of employment in South Africa, but also 
involves “the necessary education and training, and in co-ordination with extra-market 
reforms designed to reduce the degree of socio-economic disadvantage of the 
majority.”252 As shown previously in this chapter, the Constitution upholds the value of 
substantive equality and requires legislative measures to be put in place to enhance this 
value. In accordance with ILO Conventions, affirmative action measures are “affirmative 
                                               
246ANC ‘Affirmative Action and the New Constitution’ at 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/affirm.html (accessed on 27 April 2006). 
247 ANC ‘Affirmative Action’. 
248 ANC ‘Affirmative Action’. 
249 ANC ‘Affirmative Action’. 
250 Currie The Bill of Rights. 
251 Human Development Report ‘Bringing Multicultural Societies Together’) 70. 
252 Labour Market Commission Restructuring the South African Labour Market (1996) para 434. 
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action is a coherent packet of measures, of a temporary character … Special attention has 
to be paid to the temporary nature of the measure taken.”253 The EEA has neither given a 
termination clause nor was any structure for its removal envisaged. This creates a serious 
problem as affirmative action, by its very nature, is a temporary measure. By not creating 
an end of the EEA, the EEA is given a sense of permanence and, therefore, loses much of 
its validity. This issue will be dealt with and discussed in further detail in Chapter V of 
this work. 
 
3.5.1 Chapter III of the Employment equity Act: Affirmative Action 
  
(a) Introduction 
The affirmative action measures of the EEA are contained in Chapter III – Affirmative 
Action - and can be found in section 15 of the Act. Section 15 (1): 
 
15.   Affirmative action measures. 
Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably 
qualified people from designated groups have equal employment 
opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational categories 
and levels in the workforce of a designated employer 
 
(b) To whom does Affirmative Action Apply? 
 
 Designated Employers 
The affirmative action measures, unlike the EEA as a whole, apply only to ‘designated 
employers’.254 According to the definitions section of the EEA, a designated employer is 
any person who employs fifty or more employees or has a total annual turnover that is 
equal to or above the applicable annual turnover of a small business, as set out in 
Schedule 4 of the EEA.255 The term ‘designated employer’ also includes a municipality256 
                                               
253 UN ‘Daily Reports of the 54th Session of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights’ at http://www.imadr.org/geneva/2002/SCHR54.Week2.doc (accessed on 21 
August 2006). 
254 Section 12 of the EEA. 
255 Section 1 (a) of the EEA. 
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and any organ of state257 as defined in the Constitution.258 A designated employer also 
includes any employer who is bound to implement affirmative action measures in terms 
of a collective agreement made in terms of the Labour Relations Act.259 Any employer 
may also voluntarily comply with the affirmative action measures found in the EEA. The 
EEA sets out several duties that such designated employers must perform. These duties 
include: consulting with its employees; conducting an analysis; preparing an employment 
equity plan; and reporting to the Director-General on the progress made in implementing 
its employment equity plan.260 
 
Designated Groups 
The next concept that must be defined in order to ascertain to whom the affirmative 
measure apply, is the concept of ‘designated groups’. The term ‘designated groups’, 
according to the EEA means black people, women and people with disabilities.261 ‘Black 
people’ is also a broader concept and includes Africans, Coloureds and Indians.262 People 
with disabilities are defined as “people who have a long-term or recurring physical or 
mental impairment which substantially limits their prospects of entry into, or 
                                                                                                                                            
Schedule 4 of the EEA 
TURNOVER THRESHOLD APPLICABLE TO DESIGNATED EMPLOYERS 
Sector or sub-sectors in accordance with the Standard Industrial Classification Total annual turnover 
Agriculture  
Mining and Quarrying  
Manufacturing  
Electricity, Gas and Water  
Construction  
Retail and Motor Trade and Repair Services  
Wholesale Trade, Commercial Agents and Allied Services  
Catering, Accommodation and other Trade  
Transport, Storage and Communications  
Finance and Business Services  
Community, Special and Personal Services 
R2,00 m  
R7,50 m  
R10,00 m  
R10,00 m  
R5,00 m  
R15,00 m  
R25,00 m  
R5,00 m  
R10,00 m  
R10,00 m  
R5,00 m 
 
256 Section 1 (b) of the EEA. 
257 “‘organ of state’ means –  (a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or 
local sphere of government; or (b) any other functionary or institution – (i) exercising a power or 
performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial 
officer.” See Section 239 of the Constitution. 
258 Section 1 (c) of the EEA. 
259 Section 1 (e) of the EEA. 
260 Section 13 (2) of the EEA. 
261 Section 1 of the EEA. 
262 Ibid. 
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advancement in, employment.”263 In order to be a beneficiary of affirmative action, an 
employee must be a ‘suitably qualified person’, which “means a person contemplated in 
sections 20 (3) and (4).”264 
 
A number of issues arise from this broad definition of ‘designated groups’. Firstly it 
allows for an entire group of people, some of whom were never discriminated against in 
the past, to be beneficiaries of affirmative action even though they may not need the 
benefits of affirmative action, for example, university graduates. In the United States of 
America, for example, “one of the main criticisms of affirmative action in the United 
States has been that it has primarily benefited middle-class women and black people who 
were well able to look after their own interests and less deserving assistance than those 
trapped in the under class.”265  
 
Secondly, as the law stands, affirmative action benefits groups rather than individuals, as 
held in the case of Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & others.266 However, the 
Court does not give a comprehensive justification267 for allocating groups as 
beneficiaries. The issue, therefore, needs some commentary in order to give clarification 
and will be dealt with in Chapter V of this work. 
 
Thirdly is the issue of whether or not the beneficiary of affirmative action must be South 
African. In the case of Auf der Heyde v University of Cape Town 268 the court considered 
“the applicant’s submission that a non-South African citizen cannot be a beneficiary of 
affirmative action. While no authority could be found in South African jurisprudence, the 
                                               
263 Section 1 of the EEA. 
264 Section 1 of the EEA. The term ‘suitably qualified person’ will be discussed in further detail when 
section 20 (3) and (4) of the EEA are examined. 
265 George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 1007 D – G. See also Johnson ‘The Last Twenty-Five 
Years of Affirmative Action’ at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=577283  (accessed on 
21 August 2006); and Andrews ‘Unfair Discrimination’ at http://www.wlce.co.za/advocacy/seminar1.php 
(accessed on 21 August 2006) for a discussion of the failure of affirmative action in the United States in 
this respect. 
266 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T). 
267 See Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & others; and George v Liberty Life Association of Africa 
Ltd in this regard. Both the George and Stoman cases touch on the issue of group v individuals as 
beneficiaries but neither provides a comprehensive answer to this important question. 
268 (2000) 21 ILJ 1758 (LC). 
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court accepted that there was merit in the argument.”269 This can define an entire group 
that will or will not be a beneficiary of affirmative action. A definitive answer was given 
by the legislature in May 2006, when the Amended Employment Equity Regulations270 
limited the category of designated groups to South African citizens.271 It can be argued 
that it was not only South African’s who suffered due to the discrimination of apartheid 
and that many foreign nationals were subject to the discriminatory practice. This issue 
will also be dealt with in Chapter V of this work.272 
 
The fourth problem area regarding the broad concept of ‘designated groups’ revolves 
around racial classification; more specifically, who falls under the category ‘black 
person’. This is an important issue as one of the beneficiary groups of affirmative action 
is ‘black people’ is not given an absolute definition. The problematic part of this is that 
black people are not a class in South Africa that is finitely defined. This means that one 
may have to institute a classification of people into different race groups in order to allow 
for employment equity to be properly implemented. If there is a hierarchy in affirmative 
action, then these groups need to be defined into the subcategories of black person in 
order to ensure that the proper people are benefiting from affirmative action. The 
potential problem of racial classification is that it may have the adverse effect of 
perpetuating the apartheid ideology. Instead of uniting South Africa and creating one 
people, affirmative action may have the effect of dividing the country even further 
 
A further aspect of racial classification revolves around racial hierarchy under the defined 
beneficiaries of affirmative action. The hierarchical nature of affirmative action was 
prevalent in the case of Motala v University of Natal. In this case the University had a 
lower standard for admissions for black applicants than it did for “Indian” applicants. The 
argument was that “African pupils were subjected under the ‘four tier’ system of 
education [which] was significantly greater than that suffered by their Indian 
                                               
269 Dupper Essential Discrimination 269. 
270 GN R480, Government Gazette 28858 of 26 May 2006. 
271 Pretorius Employment Equity Law. 
272 See Partington and Van Der Walt (2005) 26 (3) Obiter 595 at 601 who, although they do not provide an 
answer to this issue, they also raise this unanswered question. 
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counterparts.”273 The issue of racial hierarchy also arose more recently in the April 2006 
private arbitration award in the case of Christiaans v Eskom 274 revolving around the 
hiring of a black person over a coloured person for similar race hierarchy reasons.275 
 
It is submitted that there are certain problems with this approach. If this affirmative 
action programme is accepted as fair, people of Indian origin will continue to be 
discriminated against due to their race. Both black people and people of Indian origin 
were previously disadvantaged groups under apartheid but now black people seem to be 
more advantaged than Indian people. There is an argument that black people were more 
disadvantaged during apartheid than people of Indian origin so that there is a hierarchy of 
affirmative action in favour of blacks. The case of Christiaans v Eskom raises some 
questions about affirmative action measures yet to be answered. Although the decision 
effectively brings about a substantive equality by reversing people’s roles until equality is 
achieved, the issue still remains of whether or not it is fair to do so? Does this still 
amount to discrimination? Is there enough of a causal connection between the designed 
measures and objectives? These issues will all be dealt with in further detail Chapter V of 
this work. 
 
Suitably Qualified Persons 
One of the major misconceptions of affirmative action is that a member of a designated 
group will be employed in preference to a white male even if the white male is far better 
qualified for the job in question. “The idea of ‘merit’ – that the person with the highest 
qualifications and the most experience for the job must be appointed – is superficially 
unassailable.”276 . 
 
Section 15 (1) of the EEA specifically states that the beneficiaries of affirmative action 
are ‘suitably qualified people from designated groups’. In other words, a person must be 
suitably qualified for the job in order to be employed in the respective position. If that 
                                               
273 Motala v University of Natal 383. 
274 Private Arbitration Proceedings Held at Bellville: Western Cape. 
275 See Mbao ‘The Province of the South African Bill of Rights Determined and Re-determined’ (1996) 113 
SALJ 33 at 37 for a further discussion on Motala v University of Natal. 
276 IDASA How to Make Affirmative Action Work in South Africa (1995) 6. 
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person does not meet up to the standards required of the job, they cannot be employed in 
that position over a person falling outside the designated groups. 
 
It has been stated that affirmative action measures should over-ride the conventional idea 
of ‘suitably qualified’ and changing the formal definition of merit is important in 
achieving employment equity. “They [the new criteria for merit] ensure that only relevant 
and appropriate criteria are used for appointments and promotions, and that proper 
consideration is given to all qualified candidates, regardless of gender and race.”277 
 
The provisions of the EEA have, in fact, changed the conventional idea of suitably 
qualified and merit. ‘Suitably qualified’ has now become a broader term than an applicant 
merely having the requisite formal qualifications. It covers persons who have not 
acquired formal education and now includes the notion of ‘the potential to learn on the 
job’. This important provision aims to remedy a major legacy of apartheid education and 
training whereby many people are left without the formal qualifications to compete on an 
equal footing in the employment world.278 A further legacy of apartheid is that people 
from designated groups have not been able to gain experience in employment. For this 
reason, “although the Labour Court accepted that candidates from previously 
disadvantaged would mostly lack the necessary experience, it considered that experience 
                                               
277 IDASA How to Make 7. 
278 During apartheid, many black people and women were either denied positions in education facilities or 
required to attend sub-standard or inferior facilities. The Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 is a prime 
example of this. See Maylam South Africa’s Racial Past: The History and Historiography of Racism, 
Segregation and Apartheid (2001) for a further discussion on the oppression of these groups with regards to 
education. See also IMAWU v Greater Louis Trichardt City Council 2000 (21) ILJ 1119 (LC) where it was 
held at 1129 B –D: “For affirmative action to succeed and help achieve the desired objective, merit and 
experience would remain relevant insofar as the applicants previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination are concerned in their own group. In other words the successful candidate should be the best 
out of the group previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. I say this for the simple reason that if 
the playing field is levelled, i.e. where all groups are considered, candidates from groups previously 
advantaged by unfair discrimination will always come second especially if one considers experience. 
Candidates previously advantaged by unfair discrimination invariably possess the necessary experience 
which candidates from groups previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination would not normally 
possess In view of this situation it would be prudent therefore in affirmative action appointment to consider 
the qualification and potential to develop crucial and successful candidates from previously disadvantaged 
groups are the best from those groups.” 
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would remain relevant but not decisive.” 279The new criteria for ‘suitably qualified’ are 
set out in the EEA: 
 
(3) For purposes of this Act, a person may be suitably qualified for a job as a 
result of any one of, or any combination of, that person's— 
a. formal qualifications; 
b. prior learning; 
c. relevant experience; or 
d. capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the 
job.280 
 
This implies that if an applicant can show that they have the capacity to carry out the job 
but cannot yet perform the work required, they could be given the job over a person who 
has the relevant experience and qualifications. This leaves a number of questions that 
need answering. Who is to give the on-the-job training? What does ‘reasonable time’ 
involve and in what employment context? The surrounding factors must be dealt with on 
a case to case basis as each job is different and it may be dangerous or economically 
inefficient to employ someone for too long a period without them being able to carry out 
the position with full effect. This process will be demanding of human and economic 
resources. 
 
To conclude whether or not an applicant is suitable a prospective employer must review 
all the factors of section 20 (3), as set out above, and then “determine whether that person 
has the ability to do the job in terms of any one of, or any combination of those 
factors.”281 In coming to that determination, the individual’s lack of relevant experience 
cannot be a sole ground for rejection as this would amount to unfair discrimination 
according to the Act.282 
 
                                               
279 McGregor ‘Affirmative Action: An Account of the Case Law’ (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 253 at 262. 
280 Section 20 (3) of the EEA. 
281 Section 20 (4) (a) of the EEA. 
282 Section 20 (4) (b) of the EEA. 
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“The Act requires an employer to ensure the appointment of employees who are suitably 
qualified to perform the inherent requirements of a job. It therefore explicitly rejects 
tokenism.”283 The misconception of merit is therefore exactly that – a misconception. An 
applicant will not be rejected merely because of their race or gender but because someone 
from the designated groups could do the job as effectively.284 This attempts to ensure a 
continuation of a high level of performance in the workplace. 
  
An example of a decision  relating to this issue is found in the case Independent 
Municipal and Allied Workers Union v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Local 
Council285, the respondent – a local town council – had placed an advertisement for the 
position of town treasurer. Three candidates were short listed, of whom two were white 
males and the third was a black male. The Executive Committee was required to convene 
and appoint one of the three candidates. At the meeting, the Committee could not come to 
a conclusion and referred the matter to another body. “The majority of the full Council 
decided that affirmative action should be the only criterion on which to base the selection 
and [the third applicant] was appointed as town treasurer.”286  
 
The applicant union then challenged the appointment in the Labour Court on the basis 
that it was unfair discrimination as defined by Schedule 7 item 2 of the Labour Relations 
Act.287 In this case, the Court considered the fact that the merit of the other two applicants 
was far higher than that of the third applicant who also lacked the necessary experience. 
“For these reasons the Court found that the decision to appoint him could not be justified 
on any other basis. The Court concluded that [the third applicant’s] appointment as town 
treasurer discriminated unfairly in an arbitrary manner against the other candidates.”288 
 
                                               
283 Thompson Labour Law 1-B – 16. 
284 See IDASA How to Make for a further discussion on the ‘Myth of Merit’. 
285 (2000) 21 ILJ 1119 (LC). 
286 Cheadle et al Current Labour Law (2000) 28. 
287 Schedule 7 item 2 of the Labour Relations Act was the predecessor to the current measures governing 
unfair discrimination as found in the EEA. 
288 Cheadle Current Labour Law 28. 
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Although this case was not heard under the current provisions as contained in the EEA, it 
does illustrate the public policy decision to reject the idea of tokenism.289 Policy requires 
that a candidate be qualified for the job and for the candidate to be able to perform the 
job. Any appointment based solely on race or gender will amount to unfair discrimination 
against unsuccessful applicants. 
 
(c) Affirmative Action Measures 
The affirmative action measures designated employers are required to implement are 
contained in section 15 (2) of the EEA and read as follows: 
 
(1) Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated 
employer must include— 
a. measures to identify and eliminate employment barriers, 
including unfair discrimination, which adversely affect 
people from designated groups;  
 
b. measures designed to further diversity in the workplace 
based on equal dignity and respect of all people; 
 
c. making reasonable accommodation for people from 
designated groups in order to ensure that they enjoy equal 
opportunities and are equitably represented in the 
workforce of a designated employer; [reasonable 
accommodation] 
 
d. subject to subsection (3), measures to— 
i. ensure the equitable representation of suitably 
qualified people from designated groups in all 
occupational categories and levels in the 
workforce; and [preference and numerical goals] 
 
ii. retain and develop people from designated 
groups and to implement appropriate training 
                                               
289 This judgment will not be binding on a Court hearing a similar case in the modern era but, it is 
submitted that this case will have persuasive value. 
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measures, including measures in terms of an Act 
of Parliament providing for skills development. 
[retention, development and training measures] 
 
The affirmative action measures have a five pronged attack. They are: 
 
Identification and Removal of Barriers 
The identification and removal of barriers in the workplace is set out in section 15 (2) (a). 
This provision attempts to set out to create a sense of formal equality amongst employees 
and create a level playing field. This section then goes further by specifically mentioning 
‘designated groups’. The inclusion of the term ‘designated groups’ seems to imply that 
the barrier removal and creation of an equal opportunity workplace requires some extra 
consideration with regards to the designated groups. 
 
Diversity in the Workplace 
Section 15 (2) (b) of the affirmative action measures is the creation of diversity in the 
workplace. This aims to create a working place where all people can enjoy their 
constitutional rights in full. People are free to practice their own religions; enjoy freedom 
of speech, sexual orientation and so on. There is also a requirement that affirmative 
action measures must be designed to promote the right to dignity. This may be somewhat 
superfluous as the right to dignity is protected in its fullest by the Constitution and so any 
provision that is inconsistent with the Constitution would necessarily be unlawful. 
However, this measure merely gives added protection and so ensures the right to dignity 
is protected in the workplace.290 
 
Reasonable Accommodation 
Section 15 (2) (c) of the EEA measures is aimed at reasonably accommodating persons 
from designated groups to ensure that they are given the full benefit of affirmative action 
                                               
290 It is submitted that the inclusion of these provisions in the EEA, even though they are included in the 
Constitution, ensures that the EEA covers all aspects of employment equity on its own. This enables the 
EEA to be a stand alone document when it comes to employment equity. This ensures that a dispute arising 
out of the provisions of the EEA need not involve the Constitution and, therefore, make the matter a 
constitutional issue but can remain within the boundaries and limits of the EEA. 
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and to allow for an efficient diversification of the workplace. “‘Reasonable 
accommodation’ means the modification or adjustment to a job or the working 
environment that will enable a person from a designated group to have access to, or 
participate or advance in employment.”291 This is an essential affirmative action measure. 
A designated employer may implement affirmative action measures but these will be 
ineffective if there is not a reasonable accommodation of designated groups so that they 
can enjoy the benefits of such affirmative action measures. 
 
Preferential Treatment 
Section 15 (2) (d) of the EEA contains the final two affirmative action measures 
designated employers are required to implement. These, it is submitted, are the two most 
important affirmative action measures as they are the two measures that require the 
designated employers to implement measures to create substantive equality through 
representivity in the workplace. The first measure is found in section 15 (2) (d) (i) and 
requires the preferential treatment292 of suitably qualified people from designated groups 
in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce – i.e. for every job possible. 
This is vital as it ensures an efficient and effective creation of an equitable workplace by 
enforcing the employment of people from designated groups. 
 
Training and Skills Development 
Training and skills development is the second measure found in section 15 (2) (d). This 
measure293 requires designated employers to retain people from designated groups and 
also to implement ‘appropriate’ training measures for skills development. This is also 
vital as it ensures the creation of skilled labourers and professionals from designated 
groups and thus ensures a high quality of employee performance. Economic growth is 
vital to the continued existence of affirmative action and, therefore, employees with the 
necessary skills must be available to ensure economic growth. This measure is, 
                                               
291 Basson Individual Labour 324. 
292 The EEA requires the preferential treatment of people from designated groups but specifically excludes 
the implementation of quotas. See Section 15 (3) of the EEA. 
293 Section 15 (2) (d) (ii) of the EEA. 
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accordingly, important for the continued existence of affirmative action as well as the 
creation of substantive equality. 
 
The training and skills development of employees is entrenched further by the Skills 
Development Act294, which was passed in the same year as the EEA. This Act acts as a 
direct support for the EEA. The purposes of the Skills Development Act are set out 
clearly in section 2 of said Act and read as follows: 
 
“(1) The purposes of this Act are – 
 
(a) To develop the skills of the South African workforce – 
(i) to improve the quality of life of workers, their prospects of work 
and labour mobility; 
(ii) to improve productivity in the workplace and the competitiveness 
of employers; 
(iii) to promote self-employment; and 
(iv) to improve the delivery of social service. 
 
 
(b) To increase the level of investment in education and tainting in the labour 
market and to improve the return on that investment; 
 
(c) to encourage employers – 
 
(i) to use the workplace as an active learning environment; 
(ii) to provide employees with the opportunities to acquire new skills; 
(iii) to provide opportunities for new entrants to the labour market to 
gain work experience; and 
(iv) to employ persons who find it difficult to be employed; 
 
(d) to encourage workers to participate in learnership and other training 
programmes; 
 
                                               
294 Act 97 of 1998. 
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(e) to encourage the employment of persons previously disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination and to redress those disadvantages through training 
and education; 
 
(f) to ensure the quality of education and training in and for the 
workplace; 
 
(g) to assist – 
 
(i) work-seekers to find work; 
(ii) retrenched workers to re-enter the labour marketer; 
(iii) employers to find qualified employees; and 
 
(h) to provide and regulate employment services.” 
 
A reading of this section of the Skills Development Act clearly illustrates the policy goal 
of training and developing the skills of employees. The aim of this Act enhances the 
EEA, by promoting the training of employees to be of an adequate level to perform in the 
workplace. This supports and enhances the aim of allowing for the reasonable time to 
learn ‘on-the-job’ as a facet of suitably qualified. The Skills Development Act, therefore, 
serves as an essential support for the training and development of skills as required by the 
EEA.  
 
3.5.2 Consultation 
 
The EEA empowers consultation over employment equity matters. Provision is made for 
consultation in section 16 and 17 of the Act. 
 
(a) Parties to the Consultation 
Upon reading section 16 and 17, the parties to the consultation can be identified as being, 
essentially, the designated employer and the employees. If there is a representative trade 
union representing members of the workplace, the consultation must take place with said 
union and the employees or representatives nominated by them. If there is no 
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representative trade union in the workplace, the consultation must take place with the 
employees or representatives nominated by them.  
 
(b) Content of the Consultation 
Under the EEA, a designated employer must take reasonable steps to consult with its 
employees and attempt to reach agreement on certain measures.295 These measures 
include the conduct of the analysis; the preparation and implementation of the 
employment equity plan; and the report.296 The consultation must reflect the interests of 
the workforce, employees from designated groups and employees not from designated 
groups. This is an important provision as it ensures that the affirmative action measures 
put in place have the goal of furthering employment equity but also do not discriminate 
against non-designated groups. This ensures that the affirmative action measures do not 
result in unfair discrimination. The consultation has no affect on the provisions regarding 
workplace forums297 as set out in section 86 of the LRA.298 
 
(c) Disclosure of Information 
When the designated employer consults with the employees, their unions and / or their 
representatives; that employer is required to disclose all relevant information that will 
allow for an effective consultation with the consulting parties.299 Section 18 (2) goes on 
to state that the provisions of section 163 of the LRA, with the relevant changes 
applicable in the circumstances, apply to the disclosure of information. 
 
3.5.3  Analysis 
 
The EEA requires all designated employer to analyse their workplace: 
                                               
295 Section 16 of the EEA. 
296 Section 17 of the EEA. 
297 Workplace forums are a forum that provides an opportunity for all employees in a workplace (i.e. not 
just members of the respective union of that workplace) to participate in managerial decisions that may 
affect them. The workplace forums are established voluntarily. See Basson Essential Labour Law: Volume 
2 – Collective Labour Law 3rd ed (2002) at 182 for a further discussion on workplace forums. 
298 Section 16 (3) of the EEA. 
299 Section 18 (1) of the EEA. As of 18 August 2006 and the Amendment to the Employment Equity 
Regulations contained in GN R8531 Government Gazette 29130 of 18 August 2006, the disclosure of 
information regarding the consultation must now include “regular meetings and feedback to employees and 
managements.”  
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19.   Analysis.— 
(1) A designated employer must collect information and conduct an 
analysis, as prescribed, of its employment policies, practices, 
procedures and the working environment, in order to identify 
employment barriers which adversely affect people from designated 
groups. 
 
(2) An analysis conducted in terms of subsection (1) must include a 
profile, as prescribed, of the designated employer's workforce within 
each occupational category and level in order to determine the 
degree of under-representation of people from designated groups in 
various occupational categories and levels in that employer's 
workforce.300 
 
(a) Analysing the Workplace 
Analysis of the workplace is vital in order to develop an effective employment equity 
plan and to effectively implement affirmative action measures.301 In order to make sure 
that the affirmative action measures have an effect, the designated employer must be 
aware of and have information about the areas it is required to rectify. If the employer 
implements employment equity measures on an arbitrary basis, the measures will have no 
effect as they do not actually rectify the areas that need rectification. 
 
(b) Representivity and Non-Discrimination is More than Merely Hiring and 
Promoting 
The major focus of employers, the courts and academics seems to be on preferential 
treatment of designated groups with regards to the hiring of applicants and the promotion 
of employees. However, employers are also required to “identify possible reasons for 
such under-representation which are within the employer’s control.”302 The EEA sets out 
a variety of areas that are considered to be part of an ‘employment policy, practice or 
                                               
300 Section 19 of the EEA. 
301 See Thompson South African Labour at CC-1-B-14 for an extensive examination of analysis in the 
workplace. 
302 Du Toit Labour Relations Law 604. 
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procedure’ that employers are required to analyse when determining whether or not these 
areas are discriminatory and / or representative. The Act does this by giving a long list of 
different features that are included under the definition of ‘employment policy or 
practice’. The definition reads as follows: 
 
“employment policy or practice” includes, but is not limited to— 
(a) recruitment procedures, advertising and selection criteria; 
(b) appointments and the appointment process; 
(c) job classification and grading; 
(d) remuneration, employment benefits and terms and conditions of 
employment; 
(e) job assignments; 
(f) the working environment and facilities; 
(g) training and development; 
(h) performance evaluation systems; 
(i) promotion; 
(j) transfer; 
(k) demotion; 
(l) disciplinary measures other than dismissal; and 
(m)  dismissal. 303 
 
Although the definition is lengthy, the list is not exhaustive and “policies and practices 
not included in the list which may be implemented in a workplace should likewise be 
analysed.”304 By looking at this list, one can see that the EEA focuses on a variety of 
measures that an employer must analyse when determining whether or not his or her 
employment practices promote representivity and employment equity in the workplace. 
In other words, representivity and non-discrimination go far beyond the surface colour, 
gender or ability of the labour force. The concept requires an analysis of the underlying 
issues, for example, ensuring that the procedure and appointment panel take account of 
all types of cultures and people. 
 
 
                                               
303 Section 1 of the EEA. 
304 Du Toit Labour Relations Law 605. 
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3.5.4 Employment Equity Plans 
 
The affirmative action measures contained in section 15 of the EEA are not the end of the 
duties required of designated employers. Designated employers are also required to 
prepare and implement an employment equity plan.305 The goal of this plan is to achieve 
reasonable progress towards employment equity in the employer’s workforce. 
 
(a) The Goals of an Employment Equity Plan 
Employment Equity Plans must be developed, according to the EEA, in order to achieve 
‘reasonable progress’ towards employment equity. 
 
20.   Employment equity plan 
(1) A designated employer must prepare and implement an employment 
equity plan which will achieve reasonable progress towards 
employment equity in that employer's workforce.306 
 
Unlike the term ‘reasonable accommodation’, the term ‘reasonable progress’ is not 
defined in the provisions of the EEA. If one considers the goal of affirmative action and 
applies the definition for ‘reasonable accommodation’ mutatis mutandis to the term 
‘reasonable progress’, one could find a definition for this term. ‘Reasonable progress’ can 
be defined as: ‘Any modification or adjustment to a job or to the working environment 
that will allow for the progress of a person from a designated group with regards to 
employment and promotion in the workplace’. 
 
(b) Contents of the Plan 
The EEA sets out a long list of provisions and measures in section 20 (2) that a 
designated employer is required to include in its plan. 
 
                                               
305 The designated employer can refer to the Codes of Good Practice: Preparation, Implementation and 
Monitoring of Employment Equity Plans and other relevant codes, as per the 18 August 2006 Amendment 
of the EEA Regulations. The employment equity plan should be created after the consultation and analysis 
processes have been completed. Hereinafter referred to as the ‘plan’. 
306 Section 20 (1) of the EEA. 
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Objectives 
The first provision to be included in the plan is the objectives to be achieved in the plan, 
which must be broken down into yearly objectives.307 This is important since, if the plan 
has a goal, the plan can then be designed to achieve this goal and can be modified 
throughout the year in order to ensure the achievement of the goal. 
 
Measures and Strategies 
The plan must then set out the affirmative action measures to be implemented in terms of 
the requirements of section 15 of the EEA, as were discussed previously in this 
chapter.308 The plan must also include a more specific goal if under representation of 
people from designated groups has been identified as one of the problems regarding 
substantive equality in the analysis.309 If this is so, the plan must set a numerical goal310 it 
intends to achieve in order to attain the equitable representation of suitably qualified 
people from designated groups in the workforce. This goal must also have its own 
timetable and must include the strategies intended to achieve those goals. “Footnote 4 of 
the Act states that guidelines regarding the factors to be taken into account in determining 
numerical goals will be included in a Code of Good Practice, but that the factors listed in 
section 42 (a) as factors relevant to assessment of compliance by the Director-General of 
the Department of Labour are relevant to setting numerical goals in each organisation.”311 
 
Duration 
The plan is required to be a minimum of one year in length and a maximum of five years 
in duration.312 It is submitted that a reason for the maximum five year duration is that it is 
a period of time that is long enough to allow for growth, development and training but 
not so long to cause the goals to become obsolete and outdated. By keeping the time 
period to this length, a designated employer can assess its performance over the five year 
                                               
307 Section 20 (2) (a) of the EEA. 
308 Section 20 (2) (b) of the EEA. 
309 Section 20 (2) (c) of the EEA. 
310 See Partington and Van Der Walt (2005) 26 (3) Obiter 595 at 597 for a further information regarding the 
setting of numerical goals. 
311 Thompson Labour Law CC 1-B – 15 fn 69. 
312 Section 20 (2) (e) of the EEA. 
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period and determine which goals have been achieved. The designated employer can then 
create a new plan having learned from these past experiences. 
  
The plan must include a timetable for the achievement of any numerical goals. Other than 
the timetable for the achievement of numerical goals, the plan must set out a timetable for 
the achievement of all the goals and objectives included in the plan.313 
 
Procedures 
As well as setting out employment equity / substantive equality goals and measures and a 
timetable to achieve said goals, the designated employer must include procedures to 
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the plan.314 These are necessary in order to 
evaluate whether reasonable progress is being made towards implementing employment 
equity.315 This is a significant provision to include as a rigid plan does not allow for 
external factors that may influence the plan and its goals. By allowing for assessment, the 
designated employer is able to modify the plan in order to allow for the most efficient 
attainment of employment equity. For this reason, the plan must allow for flexibility in 
order to function properly. 
 
The designated employer must also set out internal dispute resolution procedures when 
disputes arise regarding the implementation and interpretation of the plan.316 The Act also 
requires that all “persons in the workforce, including senior managers, be responsible for 
monitoring and implementing the plan.”317 
 
Any Other Measure 
Section 20 (1) (i) sets out the all inclusive ‘any other measure’ clause found in several 
pieces of legislation. “This allows the employer to incorporate best practice local and 
international benchmarks, developed by other employers in the same economic sector.”318 
                                               
313 Section 20 (2) (d) of the EEA. 
314 Section 20 (2) (f) of the EEA. 
315 Section 20 (2) (f) of the EEA. 
316 Section 20 (2) (g) of the EEA. 
317 Section 20 (2) (h) of the EEA. 
318 Thompson Labour Law CC 1-B-16. 
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This also allows for innovative measures to be incorporated by one employer and 
followed by other employers. This helps the advancement of the goals of employment 
equity and prevents employment equity becoming stagnated by the implementation of the 
same measures year after year. Instead, the measures can constantly be adapted and 
changed to be kept in touch with the modern business world. 
  
(c) Successive Employment Equity Plans 
Employment equity plans, as stated above, have a minimum duration of one year and a 
maximum duration of five years. The end of the plan does not mean the designated 
employer is now free to continue business without regard to affirmative action measures. 
“Before the end of the term of its current employment equity plan, a designated employer 
must prepare a subsequent employment equity plan.”319 So, in terms of this section, an 
employer must prepare and have a further plan ready before the initial plan has come to 
an end. “The Act conceives of employment equity implementation as a long-term 
process.”320  This helps to ensure that affirmative action measures are given full effect 
until it is considered that affirmative action in South Africa is no longer necessary.321 
 
3.5.5 The Report 
 
Under the EEA and, specifically section 21, every designated employer must submit 
reports to the Director-General   
 
(a) What must be included in the Report? 
The EEA does not specifically state what content must be included in the report but 
merely states under section 13 (2) (d) that one of the duties of designated employers is to 
“report to the Director-General on progress made in implementing its employment equity 
plan, as required by section 21.”322 
                                               
319 Section 23 of the EEA. 
320 Thompson Labour Law CC 1-B-15 footnote 70. 
321 The fact that there is no contemplation or provision in the EEA for a time when affirmative action is no 
longer necessary is problematic due to the necessarily temporary nature of affirmative action. This will be 
discussed in further detail in chapter V of this work. 
322 Section 13 (2) (d) of the EEA. 
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(b) Who is required to Submit a Report and When? 
A designated employer that employs fewer than one hundred and fifty employees is 
required to submit its first report within twelve months of the commencement of the Act 
and must submit a subsequent report every two years on 1 October.323 According to the 
time frame set out, a “designated employer employing less that 150 employees had to file 
its first report on 1 December 2000 or within 12 months of becoming a designated 
employer.”324  
 
Designated employers employing more than one hundred and fifty employees are also 
required to submit a report. This report is required to be submitted within six months of 
the implementation of the EEA and every year subsequent to the first report on 1 
October.325 “A designated employer employing 150 or more employees had to file its first 
report on 1 June 2000 or within 12 months of becoming a designated employer.”326 
However, “a designated employer that submits its first report in the 12-month period 
preceding the first working day of October, should only submit its second report on the 
first working day of October in the following year.”327 Any employer who becomes a 
designated employer at any time subsequent to the enactment of the EEA must submit a 
report with the six or twelve month period depending on which category it falls into.328 
 
(c) Publication of the Reports 
The report that the designated employer sends to the Director-General must also publish a 
summary of said report in its annual financial report.329 When the designated employer is 
part of an organ of state, the respective Minister in charge of that organ of state must 
table the report in Parliament.330 
 
                                               
323 Section 21 (1) of the EEA. 
324 Thompson Labour Law CC 1-B- 19. 
325 Section 21 (2) of the EEA. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Section 21 (3) of the EEA. 
328 Section 21 (4) of the EEA. 
329 Section 22 (1) of the EEA. 
330 Section 22 (2) of the EEA. 
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3.5.6 Income differentials 
 
“The EEA introduces a new form of legislative inequity - income differentials. This 
refers to the ratio between the remuneration of employees at different levels and in 
different occupational categories.”331 Every designated employer must prepare a 
statement which contains a statement that sets out the remuneration and benefits received 
in each position and level of the workforce.332 “Section 27 was introduced into the Act as 
a result of various submissions, in particular, submissions made by Congress of SA Trade 
Unions (‘COSATU’) to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on the need for 
mechanisms to remedy the ‘apartheid wage gap’.”333 
 
Where there is a disparity between the income differentials of employees from their 
respective groups, for example, between a black manager and white manager, the 
employer is required to take measures that will reduce these differentials. This is seen as 
a vital tool in the attainment of employment equity to ensure that true substantive equality 
is achieved in the workplace. All groups are on an equal footing and are given an equal 
pay regardless of race, gender and ability and, therefore, a true sense of employment 
equity is reached, not merely ‘cosmetic’ employment equity.334 
 
3.5.7 Duty to Inform 
 
All employers must display a notice in a prominent position in the workplace to inform its 
employees of the provisions of the EEA.335 A designated employer is required to display 
the recent report, any compliance order, arbitration award or order of the Labour Court 
                                               
331 Grogan Workplace Law 311. With regards to international law, the Convention Concerning Equal 
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, of June 1951 of the International 
Labour Organisation “requires ratifying states to promote and, in so far as it is consistent, with the methods 
in operation for determining rates of remuneration, to ensure the application to all workers for work of 
equal value.” See Landman ‘The Anatomy of Disputes About Equal Pay for Equal Work’ (2002) 14 SA 
Merc LJ 341 at 342.  
332 Section 27 (a) of the EEA. 
333 Thompson Labour Law CC 1-B – 18 fn 84. 
334 See Louw v Golden Arrows Bus Service 2000 (3) BCLR 311 (LC); and Pieterse ‘Towards Comparable 
Worth?’ (2000) 118 SALJ 9 for a further discussion on the topic of Income Differentials and comparable 
worth. 
335 Section 25 (2) (1) of the EEA. 
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concerning provisions of the EEA; or any other document concerning the EEA in a 
prominent position.336 Designated employers are required to make a copy of its plan 
available to employees for copying and consultation.337 This duty to inform allows for all 
people, not just those implementing the employment equity provisions, to have some idea 
of what is happening in that workplace. It also allows for employees to know their rights 
regarding promotion and appointment to certain positions. In addition, the employer has a 
duty to keep records of the employment equity plan and any other records relevant to 
compliance with the EEA.338 
 
3.5.8  Enforcement of Affirmative Action 
 
The implementation of affirmative action and employment equity measures by designated 
employers would be meaningless if the measures were not enforced. The EEA, therefore, 
sets out certain provisions that enforce its affirmative action measures.  
 
One such measure is self-regulation. Designated employers must assign a senior manager 
who is responsible for monitoring and implementing the employment equity plan. This is 
important in that the Employment Equity Commission, it is submitted, does not have the 
time or resources to check up on each and every designated employer in South Africa to 
ensure compliance.   
 
The EEA also provides for a fine for designated employers who fail to comply “ranging 
from a maximum of R500 000 for the first contravention of the duties related to 
consultation over, drafting and implementation of, equity plans as well as the failure to 
publish prescribed details, to a maximum of R900 000 where there have been four 
previous contraventions of the same provision in three years.”339 Labour Inspectors may 
also issue compliance orders and matters may be dealt with by the Labour Court. 
 
                                               
336 Section 25 (2) (2) of the EEA. 
337 Section 25 (2) (3) of the EEA. 
338 Section 26 of the EEA. 
339 Grogan Workplace Law 313. 
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A current on-going case340 in KwaZulu-Natal sees textile companies being given ten days 
to prepare affidavits against charges of flouting sections of the EEA.341 If the companies 
are prosecuted, this would be the first successful prosecution under the EEA. Although 
the case is still pending, the Labour Department expects to use the companies as an 
example.342 The companies will be given “hefty fines of about R500 000 for each 
company, said department spokesman Mokgadi Pela.”343 
 
One way in which the EEA encourages compliance by a reward rather than fear of 
punishment is the awarding of State contracts. In terms of the EEA, State contracts will 
only be awarded to designated employers if they have complied with the provisions of 
Chapter II and III of the EEA and to non-designated employers if they have complied 
with Chapter II of the EEA.344 The designated employer is required to attach its 
certificate of compliance as issued by the Minister of Labour or attach a statement – 
which will be verified at a later stage – saying that it complies.345 
 
3.5.9  Limits to Affirmative Action 
 
(a) Rationality 
In order for affirmative action measures to be considered fair discrimination, they must 
be rational. In other words, their implementation must have a rational goal. The 
affirmative action measures cannot be arbitrary. In Public Servants of South Africa & 
Another v The Minister of Justice & Another,346 the High Court emphasised the fact that 
                                               
340 The following developments have occurred in this case as of printing: “Presiding Judge Themba 
Sangoni today reserved judgement against Jinghua Garments to an as yet to be announced date, after the 
company’s attorneys pleaded for a lesser fine, while the Department’s lawyers were arguing for much 
tougher punishment. The case against Wincool Industrial, on the other hand, has been postponed to 6 
February  next year. The Labour Department today reiterated its anticipation that the two would be the first 
to be successfully prosecuted under the country’s equity legislation – a move that could send a strong 
warning to other would-be law violators.” See www.labour.gov.za (accessed on 12 October 2006). 
341 Anonymous ‘Reprieve for Equity’ Accused’ LegalBriefs 20 April 2006. 
342 Anonymous ‘Reprieve for Equity’. 
343 Anonymous ‘Reprieve for Equity’. 
344 Section 53 of the EEA. 
345 Basson Individual Labour. 
346 (1997) 18 ILJ 241 (T). See Nel et al South African Employment Relations Theory and Practice 5th ed 
(2005) at 141 and Partington and Van Der Walt (2005) Obiter 595 at 602 for a further discussion of Public 
Servants of South Africa & Another v The Minister of Justice & Another. 
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the word ‘promote’ in the promotion of achieving equality, “implies that affirmative 
action programmes should be realistic in the sense that indiscriminate hiring, aimed at 
achieving equality overnight, will not be tolerated.”347 
 
(b) Fair Discrimination – The Ban on Absolute Barriers 
In order to pass the discrimination test and be considered as fair discrimination, as 
opposed to unfair discrimination, the affirmative action measures must promote 
employment equity but not to such an extent that it allows for “undue discrimination 
against fully able white men.”348 Section 15 (4) of the EEA creates some protection for 
persons from non-designated groups. This section states that although an employment 
policy or practice349 may be implemented to allow for preferential treatment of 
designated groups, it may not establish an absolute bar for the employment or 
advancement of persons not in those designated groups. 
 
The case of Coetzer & Others v Minister of Safety & Security & Others350 serves as a 
good example of this. In this case, certain inspectors in the bomb squad applied for 
available promotional posts. They were denied the positions because they did not fall into 
the designated groups. The South African Police Services351 employment equity plan 
“entailed reserving 70 per cent of vacant posts for black, female and disabled applicants 
and 30 per cent for able-bodied white males. White males could not apply for reserved 
posts, but designated officers were free to apply for non-designated posts.”352 The posts 
then stayed vacant as no appropriate candidates could be found. 
 
The SAPS argued that the inspectors were not unfairly discriminated against as they were 
merely following a policy implemented in terms of, and in accordance with, the measures 
                                               
347 Basson Individual Labour 325. 
348 Cediey ‘Getting Equality to Work: The South African Employment Equity Act’ (2001) 3 Jan The 
Journal al of SA and American Comparative Studies 1 at 9. 
349 Refer to 3.5.3 (b) of this work for a discussion of what is included in the concept of employment policy 
or practice. 
350 [2003] 2 BLLR 173 (LC). See Grogan ‘Affirmative Action Defused’ (2003) April Employment Law 
Journal 17 at 17 for a further discussion on the case of Coetzer & Others v Minister of Safety & Security & 
Others. 
351 Hereinafter referred to as the SAPS. 
352 Grogan (2003) April Employment Law Journal 17 at 17. 
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of the EEA. The applicants argued that the policy was, in fact, inconsistent with the EEA 
as it contravened section 15 (4) and created an absolute bar to their employment or 
promotion. The court found in favour of the applicants and held that to allow for 
understaffing merely on the hope that suitable designated candidates would apply 
amounted to the creation of an absolute barrier and, therefore, unfair discrimination. 
 
A recent example heard by the Equality Court has seen a judgment given in favour of a 
white magistrate who took action against the Port Elizabeth Magistrates’ Court after the 
Court appointed a black female candidate.353 The Equality Court concluded that the 
Magistrates’ Court short-listing procedures were unfairly discriminatory against white 
male applicants as they “made it impossible for a white male to be promoted over a black 
female, irrespective of experience or any other non-race factors.”354 The judge ordered 
the criteria used for recruitment to be struck down and the post of Regional Court 
magistrate was required to be re-advertised. 
 
(c) Suitably Qualified 
As discussed in further detail earlier in this chapter, one limit to the appointment of a 
candidate based on affirmative action is that the individual from a designated group must 
be suitably qualified. The question, however, “is how far the skills, experience or 
qualification gap must be extended before the appointment of a less qualified or 
experienced black candidate becomes ‘irrational’ and impeachable.”355 In the case of 
Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & others356 case, it was held that the requirement 
of rationality is essential in determining how big the skill can be.357 Any person who is 
                                               
353 Anonymous ‘Equality Court Rules in Favour of White Magistrate’ LegalBriefs 20 April 2006. 
354 Anonymous ‘Equality Court’. 
355 Grogan Workplace Law 289. 
356 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T). 
357 In Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & others it was held that the gap between the skills, 
experience or qualification of a candidate from a designated group and a white male candidate can be quite 
large. When considering whether or not candidates should be similarly qualified, it was held at 1033H that: 
“To allow considerations regarding representivity and affirmative action to play a role only on this very 
limited level would be too restrictive to give meaningful effect to the constitutional provision for such 
measures and the ideal of achieving equality. All it would mean is that, for example, race could then be 
taken into account rather than other preferences which are not related to qualifications or merits.” See 
Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practices (2005) for further commentary on the 
Stoman case and the differences between the qualifications of two applicants for a position. 
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“wholly unqualified or less than suitably qualified, or incapable in responsible position 
cannot be justified.”358 
 
(d) Affirmative Action: a Right or Defence? 
“South Africa's Constitutional Court has repeatedly affirmed the need for affirmative 
action to give weight to the country's constitutional guarantees of equality.”359 The issue 
of whether or not affirmative action measures give the right to preferential treatment to 
people from designated groups or is merely a defence for employers when a candidate 
claims they were discriminated against on the basis of race or gender is one that has 
conflicting court rulings.360 
 
In accordance with the 2003 decision of Harmse v City of Cape Town361, it would seem 
that designated employees have both the right not to be unfairly discriminated against as 
well as the right to be preferred for appointment and promotion if they are suitably 
qualified person for the post in question. However, the 2004 judgment of Dudley v City of 
Cape Town 362states that a designated employee only has the right not be discriminated 
against on the basis of race, sex or disability. Designated groups do not have the right to 
preferential treatment and the right to seek judicial assistance because they are not 
appointed and a non-designated person is appointed. The problem with the Dudley 
judgment is that it may have the effect of nullifying preferential treatment or, at least, 
taking away much of its prominence. This issue will be dealt with further in Chapter V of 
this work. 
 
 
                                               
358 Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & others 1021 D. 
359 Global Rights ‘Affirmative Action: A Global Perspective’ at 
www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/Affirmative_Action_Global_Perspecitves.pdf?docID=2623 (accessed 
on 13 March 2006) 25. 
360 See Abbott v Bargaining Council for the Motor Industry (Western Cape) (1999) 20 ILJ 330 (LC); 
TGWU & Another v Bayete Security Holdings (1999) 29 ILJ 1117 (LC); Mahlanyana v Cadbury (Pty) Ltd 
(2000)21 ILJ 2274 (LC); and Lagadien v University of Cape Town (2000) 21 ILJ 2469 (LC) for the pre-
EEA position on the ‘right’ to preferential treatment. See also Harmse v City of Cape Town [2003] 6 BLLR 
557 (LC) and Dudley v City of Cape Town [2004] JOL 12499 (LC) for such conflicting judgments in the 
EEA era. 
361 [2003] 6 BLLR 557 (LC). 
362 [2004] JOL 12499 (LC). 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter looked in some detail at the employment equity laws pertaining to 
South Africa. Chapter IV will be an analysis of three foreign legal systems as they relate 
to affirmative action. The foreign legal systems that will be discussed will be the 
affirmative action models of Brazil, Canada and Malaysia. The purpose of the 
comparison between the South African system and foreign systems is to find both 
possible areas of weakness in the South African system and strengths in the other 
systems. The purpose of comparing and contrasting the three systems is to make 
recommendations that may lead to a more effective affirmative action policy in South 
Africa. 
 
4.2 Affirmative Action in Brazil   
 
“After insisting for much of the twentieth century that Brazil neither had racial 
discrimination nor groups occupying subaltern positions, the Brazilian state 
remarkably reversed itself in September 2001 and adopted over 100 new 
federal, state and municipal affirmative action policies in higher education and 
public sector employment during the next two years.” 
– Seth Racusen363 
 
Although Brazil is a multicultural, mixed race community, the nation has “harboured [a] 
national myth that the country's various races live in harmony and equality - an untruth 
that has prevented the full incorporation of Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples, and 
members of other discriminated groups into society at large.”364 Until recently discussion 
                                               
363 Making the Impossible Determination (2004) at 
http://connecticutlawreview.org/archive/vol36/spring/Racusen.pdf (accessed on 25 April 2006). 
364 Global Rights: ‘Affirmative Action: A Global Perspective’ at 
www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/Affirmative_Action_Global_Perspecitves.pdf?docID=2623 (accessed 
on 22 March 2006) 18 – 19. “Repulsed by the extremity of Nazi ideology, the elites [wealthy white males] 
began to embrace the idea that Brazilians were a culture of mixed ethnicity, often contrasting the 
'harmonious race relations' in Brazil with the racial segregation in the Untied States. The distorted idea of 
harmonious race relations of that period was propagated in the research of noted Brazilian sociologist 
Gilberto Freyre.” See UNESCO ‘Studies on Human Rights 2004: Struggles Against Discrimination’ at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001397/139712e.pdf (accessed on 16 August 2006) 159 for a 
further discussion regarding the illusion of racial harmony in Brazil. 
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of race was forbidden. For example, Brazil’s national security-council “outlawed studies 
of racial discrimination as subversive”365 in 1969. 
 
4.2.1 Brazil: A Brief Historical Background 
 
Once again it is appropriate to offer a brief history in order to explain where the need for 
affirmative action arises from. Brazil was conquered and settled by the Portuguese in the 
sixteenth century and from then until the nineteenth century it was a colony of Portugal, 
exploited for its resources.366 Brazil was ruled by the Prince of Portugal, Pedro who had 
grown up in Brazil.367 It was Pedro who, “by May of that year [1822], he was speaking 
and writing of ‘We Brazilians’.”368 It was due to pressure in Brazil that, on 8 September 
1822, Dom Pedro declared Brazil to be an independent country with its own monarchy.369 
 
“Popular pressure in Brazil compelled his son, Dom Pedro, to declare Brazil independent 
in 1822, and so Brazil became an Empire with a monarchy, while the rest of North and 
South American became republics.”370 The political situation and the changes that ensued 
in Brazil in the early part of the nineteenth century were profound. 371 “A colony became 
a nation in which the Brazilians by stages took control of their own government.”372 
 
Since gaining independence and moving out from the under the ‘protection’, of Portugal 
in 1822 Brazil has suffered a series of military coups and political instability.373 The 
country only gained a sense of political stability in 1994, seventy-two years after 
achieving independence.374 Brazil, until recently, insisted that its people were in a state of 
substantive equality, regardless of race. After the Third World Conference against 
                                               
365 Marx Making Race and Nation (1998) 172. 
366 Burns A History of Brazil (1970). 
367 Burns Brazil. 
368 Burns Brazil 111. 
369 Deal ‘Brief History of Brazil’ at http://www.brazilbrazil.com/historia.html (accessed on 2 October 
2006). 
370 Deal ‘Brief History of Brazil’. 
371 Burns Brazil 132. 
372 Burns Brazil 132. 
373 Hasler et al ‘National Human Resource’ at http://adh.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/1/99.pdf (accessed on 
24 April 2006). 
374 Hasler ‘National Human Resource’. 
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Racism375, Brazil changed its stance on the equality levels in its country and “the 
Minister of Agrarian Development, Raul Jungmann, announced a 'Program of 
Affirmative Action for Black men and Women.'”376 
 
It seemed strange that Brazil maintained an air of equality when the statistics told a 
different story. The statistics377 showed that that Brazil has a population of one hundred 
and seventy million people, of whom, 43% are dark skinned.378 The social and economic 
differences between black and pardo (mixed race) people and white people showed an 
immense gap between the two groups. Some of the statistics under consideration showed 
that: 
 
- “More than 60 percent of the people living in poverty in Brazil are black. 
 
- Black men in Brazil earn on average 48 percent less than white men. 
 
- More than one quarter of all adult black Brazilians are illiterate compared to 
10 percent of adult whites. 
 
- Blacks in Brazil have on average two fewer years of school than do whites. 
 
- Only 2.2 percent of university students in Brazil are black, 80 percent are 
white, and 18 percent are of mixed race. 
 
- Not one of Brazil's 21 cabinet ministers or 11 Supreme Court justices is black 
in the national legislature, there are 12 blacks in the 513-member Chamber of 
Deputies.”379 
 
                                               
375 The Third World Conference against Racial Discrimination was held in Durban during September 2001. 
376 Carvalho (ed) ‘Human Rights in Brazil’ at www.global.org.br (accessed on 27 April 2006) 92. 
377 These statistics were taken in 2001, when affirmative action policies began to find their way into 
Brazilian law. 
378 The black and pardo (mixed race) people of Brazil are often classed into one group of ‘dark skinned’ 
people for the ease of referring to the two previously discriminated against and currently disadvantaged 
groups. 
379 Author Unknown ‘Full Steam Ahead for Black Preferences at Brazilian Universities’ (2001) 33 The 
Journal of Blacks in Higher Education 43 at 43. 
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It is against the background of these kinds of figures that the Brazilian government has 
instituted its affirmative action policies under the guidance of President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso in 2001. 
 
4.2.2 Affirmative Action in Brazil 
 
(a) Objectives of Affirmative Action 
The foremost objectives of affirmative action in Brazil are to correct the racial 
discrimination of the past and to create a Brazilian society that can live up to their 
harmonious multicultural reputation. Rio de Janeiro's program might have had two 
possible objectives: “First, it is possible that the Legislature intended to correct existing 
inequalities, and second, the intention might have been to compensate for past 
discrimination.”380 This is demonstrated by the fact that the programme reserves places 
for dark skinned people and poor people. By focussing on these two groups, it sets out to 
achieve a substantive equality not for only people who are dark skinned but also for the 
poor.381 
 
The best answer as to what the principal objective of affirmative action in Brazil is, was 
proposed by Pedro Kemp, a sponsor of affirmative action legislation in Mato Grasso do 
Sul. Kemp indicated “that he was ‘seeking to invert the structure of opportunity’. A 
statement that suggests the programme was designed to correct previous discrimination 
and inequality.”382 
 
(b) Constitutionality of Affirmative Action 
As will be shown below, affirmative action in Brazil has been met with several 
challenges regarding its constitutionality and, as such, has faced many stumbling blocks 
in being set up. In explaining “the adoption of a twenty percent quota the [Federal 
                                               
380 Brooks ‘Efficient Affirmative Action’ at 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/sela/SELA%202005/Richard%20Brooks%20(Final%20English%20Version)%2
0v1.0.pdf (accessed 24 April 2006) 23. 
381 Although the Brazilian affirmative action, in effect, focuses on two different groups of people, the 
statistics show that dark skinned and poor people are more or less the same people. Therefore, it can be 
argued that Brazilian affirmative action focuses predominantly on dark skinned people. 
382 Brooks ‘Efficient Affirmative Action’ 24. 
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Supreme Court] President, Marcio Aurelio reasoned that the adoption of affirmative 
action was not only constitutionally valid, but also necessary to achieve the constitutional 
principle of equality.”383 Following the views of Aurelio, it can be seen that affirmative 
action in Brazil passes the constitutional muster and does not infringe on the Brazilian 
Constitution.384 
 
(c)  Employment Equity Measures 
Brazil has slowly been implementing affirmative action policies into the economic and 
educational sectors since 2001. The majority of these policies set up quota systems that 
require the target employers or institutions to meet in order to comply with the new 
laws.385 The implementation of affirmative action in Brazil has been quite staggered and 
widespread with no real consistency. This can be shown by the following extract: 
 
“In 2000 and 2001, the state legislature of Rio de Janeiro passed laws 
mandating that two public universities which it had jurisdiction set aside 50 
percent of their seats for applicants from public high schools, 40 percent for 
students who identified themselves as black or pardo (mixed race) and 10 
percent for students with disabilities … Elsewhere, the state of Mato Grosso 
do Sul has adopted its own affirmative action policy. Other state universities 
have adopted their own quota systems as well. On January 13, 2005, Brazil 
adopted a law that will provide private universities tax breaks if they reserve 
as many as 20 percent of their seats for poor students. In September 2001, 
Brazil's Minister of Agriculture issued an order mandating that 20 percent of 
his staff be black and that firms with which his agency had contracts be made 
up of 20 percent African descendants and another 20 percent women. The 
federal Supreme Court soon followed, establishing a similar affirmative action 
hiring target.”386 
 
                                               
383 Brooks ‘Efficient Affirmative Action’ 20. 
384 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988. 
385 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
386 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’ 19 – 20. 
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Later in the year,387 the then President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso instituted affirmative 
action measures mandating that twenty percent of positions not requiring a civil service 
exam were to be made available to dark skinned people only.388 
 
The Labour Ministry’s answer to the call for government to institute affirmative action 
measures within itself was to reserve twenty percent of its job-training budget for dark 
skinned people. Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Relations created a scholarship for 
black students at the Instituto Rio Branco diplomatic training school instead of creating a 
quota system as with the rest of government.389 
 
It is submitted that the Brazilian implementation of affirmative action in the government 
is poor one. An analysis of this system shows that it creates no sense of uniformity or 
consistency. It is submitted that, under this system, no applicant for a position in 
government can be sure whether or not affirmative action measures would apply to them 
or not with the non-uniform measures. Finally, “in 2003, President Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva established a National Policy for the Promotion of Racial Equality, which has set 
out to establish quotas for certain government jobs.”390 This helps to create a sense of 
uniformity and consistency in the application of affirmative action at the government 
level whereas it had previously been implemented in an ad hoc fashion. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
387 “On 13 May 2001, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso signed a decree initiating the ‘National 
Programme for Affirmative Action’, which promotes diversity in government agencies and federal public 
administration.” See UNESCO ‘Studies on Human Rights’ 162. 
388 “A complicating feature is that in Brazil, there are over 300 different classifications of race, and each of 
these various shades of brown is used to describe skin colour and ancestry. Because of this, opponents of 
affirmative action in Brazil say that ‘free-riders’ or opportunists will exploit the system and reap all 
benefits from the programme.” See UNESCO ‘Studies on Human Rights’ at 163 for a further discussion on 
the argument revolving around ‘free-riders’ in Brazil. The ‘free-rider’ argument can be compared with a 
problem in South African affirmative action that has been raised in chapter III. In 3.5.1 (b), it was pointed 
out that certain parts of the designated groups in South Africa will benefit from affirmative action even 
though they have no personal history of discrimination and that the Courts have failed to give a satisfactory 
answer to this question. This potential problem will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5 of this work. 
389 Hasler ‘National Human Resource’  
390 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’ 21. 
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(d) Education 
However, one of the main – and most contentious - arenas of government measures to 
institute affirmative action was higher education.391 In 2001, the Rio de Janeiro state 
legislature passed affirmative action measures which were applicable to all universities 
over which it had jurisdiction to be implemented from 2002 onwards.392 These measures 
required the universities to “set aside 50 percent of their seats for applicants from public 
high schools, 40 percent for students who identified themselves as black or pardo and 10 
percent for students with disabilities.”393  
 
These measures resulted in widespread unrest and mass law suits. Due to this, and before 
the cases were decided, in 2003, the legislature amended the quotas to require universities 
to reserve “20 percent [of its places] for people who identified themselves as black, 20 
percent for those who went to public schools and 5 percent for disabled persons or ‘other 
minorities.’ All students admitted to these seats were further required to have a family 
income that fell below a certain maximum.”394 
 
Although the quotas were reduced, several groups have already filed challenges to the 
new laws. However, despite some groups resenting the implementation of affirmative 
action, several organisations have jointly filed to be amicus curiae and are defending the 
practice of affirmative action.395 
 
It is submitted that the requirement that all students admitted to these seats are required to 
meet a maximum income criteria is a good requirement. This submission is based on the 
fact that the requirement it ensures that people who would not normally have access to 
university are given an equal opportunity to attend university. This aims to ensure that it 
                                               
391 “Ricardo Henriques, Executive Secretary, Brazilian Ministry of Education, underscored the extent to 
which income gaps reflect levels of education, further asserting that an educational quota system is 
necessary in Brazil. This is particularly true for Afro-Brazilians, who account for an estimated 45% of 
Brazil's population but only 2% of its university students.” WWICS ‘Race, Inequality and Education: 
Challenges for Affirmative Action in Brazil and the United States’ at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Update17.pdf (accessed on 16 August 2006) at 1. 
392 WWICS ‘Race, Inequality and Education’. 
393 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’ 19. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
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is the poor people from the designated groups who are the recipients of the benefits of 
affirmative action and not people who do not needs the measures.396 It is submitted that 
this ensures that all people from the designated group benefit from affirmative action 
measures giving them place in universities.397 
 
The State of Mato Gross do Sul has also instituted its own affirmative action policies for 
universities which “sets aside 20 percent of the incoming public university spaces for 
blacks and 10 percent for Indians.”398 The Mato Gross do Sul provisions, however, have 
the requirement that the applicants must prove that they are Black or Indian.399 The 
problem with this is that it has the potential of causing causes intra-racial division. 
Various public universities around the country have implemented similar quota systems 
around the country, including; the State University of Bahia, the Federal University of 
Brasilia and the University of Paraná.400 
 
Following the implementation of affirmative action quota measures for public 
universities in 2005, Brazil adopted a law which gave private universities tax concessions 
if they implemented quotas systems with twenty percent of places being reserved for poor 
students.401 The private universities, therefore, have the option whether to implement 
affirmative action measures or not. This voluntary option, with a tax concession 
incentive, avoids further dissatisfaction and challenges to the measures.402 Thus 
universities are increasingly absorbing the remaining students, although their education 
comes at a price many cannot afford.403 
 
                                               
396 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
397 The one problem that can be noted regarding this approach is that the standard of university graduates 
may drop if people from low quality educational backgrounds who would not otherwise qualify for 
university are the only people benefiting from affirmative action. 
398 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’ 19. 
399 Indian in this context implies person’s native to South America. 
400 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
401 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
402 Paschel ‘Experts Discuss Affirmative Action in Brazil’ at 
http://thedialogue.org/summaries/sept04/affirmative.asp (accessed on 27 July 2006). 
403 Paschel Affirmative Action in Brazil. 
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It has been claimed that the Brazilian government focused on education out of the 
widely-held, mistaken belief that educational differences explain income gaps (for 
everyone, not just blacks and whites).404 Mala Htun of the New School for Social 
Research and Notre Dame University questions whether quotas are the correct solution to 
closing the racial gap, given that educational differences account for less than half of the 
black-white income gap.405 She questions “whether quotas are the correct solution to 
closing the racial gap, given that educational differences account for less than half of the 
black-white income gap … Htun hypothesized that quotas may be a temporary solution to 
avoid the more costly and risky undertaking of overhauling secondary and higher 
education.”406 
 
4.2.3 Lessons for South Africa 
 
It is probably too early in its operation to consider whether or not affirmative action in 
Brazil has been successful or not. However, there are certain issues that are relevant to 
how South Africa might amend or develop its own affirmative action policies.  
 
(a) Inconsistency 
It is submitted that the most glaring deficiency of affirmative action in Brazil is its 
inconsistency and patchy implementation created by the different systems in the 
respective states. This submission is based on the fact that it seems a strong likelihood 
that anything will be achieved on a national scale is low. What seems to be needed is a 
consistent and strong national initiative implemented at macro-level. This would operate 
as an initial, starter programme that can then be adopted and implemented at state level. 
 
It is therefore submitted that the present Brazilian system should be reconstructed in 
order to achieve far-reaching national success. However, South Africa could adopt the 
                                               
404 Paschel ‘Affirmative Action in Brazil’. 
405 Paschel ‘Affirmative Action in Brazil’. 
406 Paschel ‘Affirmative Action in Brazil’. 
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state / provincial structures once national affirmative action measures have made a 
significant difference nation-wide.407 
 
(b) Quotas 
The issue of quotas has proved to be a very contentious one in Brazil, especially as they 
relate to education measures. The South African measures have specifically excluded any 
quota system and for good reason.408 The quota system is not an active implementation of 
affirmative action; it merely sets up a required number and leaves it at that. It is, as 
demonstrated in Brazil potentially provocative. It is submitted that this system merely 
creates a cosmetic equality and will have a detrimental effect on the economy. This 
submission is made on the belief that it is likely that the standard of performance in all 
arenas will be low since there may be a tendency for people to be used as tokens to make 
up the quotas. 
 
As an example of how the Brazilian quota system fails to achieve true educational 
equality,  “in 2002, of the 20 scholarship recipients, only one student, a black woman, 
passed the last of the three-stage selection process.”409 Nor does it necessarily improve 
the overall capacity of undergraduates and graduates thus improving their value to the 
economy. This illustrates well how quotas can end up having an adverse effect. It is, 
                                               
407 After affirmative action has run its course in South Africa, the South African government can analyse 
the effectiveness of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. The government can then implement a new 
policy aimed at achieving the goals that were not achieved under the EEA. They could use the state / 
provincial model, for example. In Malaysia, for example, the New Economic Policy was used as a nation 
wide policy to bring about substantive equality with specific goals. At the end of this policy, the Malaysian 
government analysed the success of the policy and created a new policy aimed at achieving those goals that 
were not achieved under the first policy. See Emsley The Malaysian Experience (1997). 
408 In the United States of America for example, in of California Regents v Bakke 438 US 265 (1978) “The 
Supreme Court issued its decision in 1978 that ruled out the use of quotas in admissions.” See Deshpande 
‘Equity and Development: World Development Report 2006’ at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Affirmative_Action_
India_Ashwini.pdf#search=%22%22Affirmative%20Action%20in%20India%20and%20the%20United%2
0States%22%22 (accessed on 7 May 2006) 17 for a further discussion of the Bakke case. More recently, in 
the USA, in 1995, “In Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena [515 US 200, 217 (1995)], the Court held that all 
federal affirmative action policies will now be examined under the same level of strict scrutiny as their state 
and local counterparts. To pass judicial muster, benign racial legislation must now be 'narrowly tailored' to 
address 'compelling governmental interests'. Specifically set aside quotas, set-asides, or other rigid 
numerical requirements must be avoided.” See Torys Effect of Supreme Court's Ruling on Affirmative 
Action Policies at www.torys.com (accessed on 7 May 2006) for a further discussion of the Adarand case. 
409 Global A ‘Global Perspective’ 21. 
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therefore, submitted that the South African system of achieving substantive equality and 
employment equity far outweighs the Brazilian system and the Brazilian system could 
learn a lot from South Africa. 
 
(c) Private Education 
It is submitted that the system in Brazil of offering rewards to private schools could be 
adopted with success in South Africa. If the government were to offer an incentive to 
private schools and colleges with effective transformation policies – beyond the Brazilian 
quota system – this would encourage higher enrolment of people from designated groups 
to schools around the country. South Africa offers State contracts410 and other such 
rewards to businesses for compliance with affirmative action measures with regards to 
employment equity, be they required to or not. At present, however, unlike voluntary 
employers, there is no incentive system for private educational institutions to make an 
effort to transform with regards to educational equity. 
 
4.3 Employment Equity in Canada 
 
“The goal is not to compensate past victims or even to provide new 
opportunities for specific individuals who have been unfairly refused jobs or 
promotion in the past, although some such individuals may be beneficiaries of 
an employment equity scheme. Rather, an employment equity program is an 
attempt to ensure that future applicants and workers from the affected group 
will not face the same insidious barriers that blocked their forbears.” 
– Mr. Justice Dilks411 
 
4.3.1 The Right to Equality: Formal and Substantive Equality 
 
The Canadian model and experience of employment equity412 serves as a good example 
                                               
410 Section 53 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. The South African Employment Equity Act will 
hereinafter be referred to as the SAEEA. 
411 Action Travail des Femmes v Canadian National Railways Co [1987] 1 SCR 1114 at 1143 
412 Although the Canadian model of ‘affirmative action’ never explicitly uses the term affirmative action, 
employment equity and affirmative action synonymous terms. This will be discussed in further detail at a 
later stage in 4.3. 
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for South Africa with regards to the implementation of affirmative action. This is due to 
the strong similarity between the Canadian Employment Equity Act413 and the South 
African Employment Equity Act. The Canadian Charter of Human Rights414 and the 
South African Constitution415 also have much in common. A comparison of the right to 
equality in section 15 of the Canadian Constitution and the right to equality in section 9 
(1) and (2) of the South African Constitution shows identical provisions. “Section 15 
guarantees equality of rights, and also deals with affirmative action programs to help 
reverse the discrimination process”416 and reads as follows: 
 
(1) Every individual is equal before the and under the law and has the right 
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or 
physical disability. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has 
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals 
or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or 
physical disability. 
 
Section 15 (1) of the Canadian Constitution is a combination of section 9 (1) of the South 
African Constitution - the right to formal equality - and section 9 (3) of the South African 
Constitution - the grounds of prohibition of discrimination. The only difference is that the 
Canadian Constitution prohibits all forms of discrimination whereas the South African 
Constitution prohibits unfair discrimination. It is submitted that the South African 
approach is better in that it prevents the possibility of section 9 (2) contradicting section 9 
(1), as discussed in chapter III under 3.2.4 of this work. Section 15 (2) promotes the right 
to substantive equality and, in the Canadian case, seems to contradict section 15 (1) and 
seems to be merely an exception to section 15 (1). This is in contrast to section 9 (2), 
                                               
413 Act c44 of 1995. The Canadian Employment Equity Act will hereinafter be referred to as the CEEA. 
414 Act c H-6 of 1985. 
415 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
416 Mooney and Moffatt (eds) Discrimination Law (2005) 237. 
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which is part of the holistic approach to the right to equality. The goal of section 15 (2) is 
to allow for legislation that will create measures that can bring about employment equity. 
 
4.3.2 The Constitutionality of Employment Equity417 
 
“By protecting affirmative action programs in this way, the Charter closes off an 
important avenue of attack used with considerable success by opponents of affirmative 
action elsewhere.”418 This protection aims to prevent situations such as happened in the 
United States of America. In the case of University of California Regents v Bakke,419 it 
was held that affirmative action violated the constitutional right to equality as there was 
no exception clause as in the Canadian Constitution. Affirmative action, in this case, was 
held to violate the equal rights provisions of the United States constitution. 
 
By contrast, the Canadian courts have held that section 15 (2) of the Canadian Charter of 
Human Rights validates any affirmative action measures and grants them 
constitutionality. In the case of Canadian National Railways v Canadian Human Rights 
Commission (sometimes cited as Montreal Women's Group (Action Travail des Femmes) 
v Canadian National Railways )420, the tribunal before whom the case was heard ordered 
that one in four of the blue collar positions that were filled in the future were to be filled 
by women until the workforce was representative and thirteen per cent of the blue collar 
positions were filled by women. Although the Federal Court of Appeal overturned this 
ruling, “the Supreme Court of Canada in an 8 - 0 decision reversed the ruling by the 
Appeal Court, and affirmed the tribunal's order that CNR institute quotas in its hiring.”421 
                                               
417 See Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (2002) for a further discussion of constitutional 
law in Canada. 
418 Fletcher and Chalmers ‘Attitudes of Canadians toward Affirmative Action: Opposition, Value Pluralism, 
and Non-Attitudes’ (1991) 13 Political Behaviour 67 at 68. 
419 438 US 298. 
420 (1984) 5 CHRR D/2327 (Can HR Trib). 
421 Fletcher ‘Attitudes of Canadians’ 69 – 70. Some confusion may arise due to the back and forth nature of 
the decisions of the different courts. The first judgment (held by the tribunal) held and the third and final 
judgment (held by the Supreme Court) set the precedent with the order that one in four of the blue collar 
positions that were filled in the future were to be filled by women until the workforce was representative 
and thirteen per cent of the blue collar positions were filled by women. The dissenting judgment by the 
Federal Court of Appeal (the second judgment) was overturned by the third judgment and, therefore, has no 
effect on the case. 
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4.3.3 Canada: A Brief Historical Background 
 
(a) Inequality in Canada422 
“As of 1996, people of aboriginal ancestry made up two percent of Canada’s population, 
and visible minorities comprised another 11 percent.”423  The Canadian government has 
responded to inequity with regards to these groups in three major ways. The first was the 
removal of all forms of unfair discrimination in the Canadian Human Rights Act (formal 
equality). The second was the enactment of employment equity legislation in 1986, 
amended in October 1995 contained in the CEEA (formal and substantive equality). The 
third was “introduction of administrative policy (as opposed to legislation) that requires 
organisations with 100 or more employees who bid on federal government contracts of 
$200,000 or more to effect employment equity programmes”424 (formal and substantive 
equality). Although the CEEA is the legislation governing the entire country, most 
provinces and territories have their own forms of human rights legislation which prevent 
discrimination and promote preferential treatment of designated groups.425 
 
 
(b) Development of the Employment Equity Act 
The Employment Equity Act is an Act based on a thirty year history of experience with 
anti-discrimination programmes.426 Although the current Act promotes preferential 
                                               
422 In Canada, visible minorities earn about 9% less than the white population and have a 16% earnings 
disadvantage. See Hum and Simpson ‘Revisiting Visible Minorities and Immigration Adjustment in 
Canada's Labour Markets’ at 
http://www.umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/economics/simpson/CERF%20Paper%20Montreal.pdf (accessed on 
14 August 2006) at 4. 
423 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’ at 26. 
424 Thomas ‘Employment Equity in South Africa: Lessons from the Global School’ (2002) 3 International 
Journal of Manpower at 248. 
425 PSAC ‘Employment Equity Legislation’ at http://www.psac-
afpc.org/what/empequity/EE_Employment_Equity_Legislation-
e.shtml#3.%20%20What%20Are%20the%20Main%20Steps%20of%20Employment%20Equity%20Work. 
426 “Issues surrounding employment equity became prominent in Canadian public policy discussions during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, at the same time that affirmative action issues were established in the 
United States. Canada's official response was the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, 
established in 1983 with Judge Rosalie Abella as Commissioner.” See Bakan and Kobayashi ‘Employment 
Equity Policy in Canada: An Interprovincial Comparison’ at http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/ (accessed on 14 
August 2006) at 13-15 for further details on the Abella Commission. 
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treatment and the notion of substantive equality or employment equity, the initial aims of 
employment equity was merely to remove all barriers to employment.427 However, it 
soon “became apparent that exclusion could result not only from conscious bias, but also 
from unintentional practices or systems.”428 
 
For this reason, in 1978, a voluntary affirmative action program began that focused on the 
private industry, federal contractors and Crown Corporations.429 In 1984, this was 
extended to all departments of the federal public service. “At this time the program was 
directed at women, Aboriginal peoples and persons with disabilities. Members of visible 
minorities were included in 1985.”430 The legal basis for these programmes was the 
equality provisions contained in the Canadian Human Rights Act as it is today.431 
 
Although affirmative action measures were being put in place, “the status of the 
designated groups in the labour force continued to be poor. So in 1983, the federal 
government created a Royal Commission whose mandate was to study equal employment 
opportunities.”432 The commission suggested the Employment Equity Act, which came 
into force in 1986.433 This Act required a review of the Act after five years and this 
review found that progress was being made very slowly.434 Despite the findings of the 
review, it was only after the 1993 elections that the CEEA was re-visited.435 Finally, in 
1995, the current CEEA was developed and the Act came into force in 1996.436 
 
                                               
427 Lamarche ‘Retaining Employment Equity Measures in Trade Agreements’ at http://www.swc-
cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/066238931X/200502_066238931X_e.pdf (accessed on 14 August 2006). 
428 Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC), ‘Overview of Employment Equity’ at 
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/lp/lo/lswe/we/legislation/guidelines/doc1.doc (accessed on 7 May 2006) 12. 
429 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
430 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
431 Marleau ‘The Role of the Law in Achieving Equality: A Canadian Point of View’ at 
http://www.canadanet.or.jp/political/marleau24jun03.pdf (accessed on 14 August 2006). 
432 HRDC ‘Overview of Employment Equity’ 13 – 14. 
433 Bakan and Kobayashi ‘Affirmative Action and Employment Equity: Policy and Ideology in Canadian 
Context’ at http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Bakan.pdf (accessed 7 May 2006) 5. 
434 Bakan ‘Policy in Canada’. 
435 Bakan ‘Policy in Canada’. 
436 “Revision of the Act had been part of the Liberal Party platform stated in their Red Book, although plans 
for revision were already well under way before the 1993 election.” See Bakan Policy in Canada at 20 for 
further details in this regard. 
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The 1995 Act does not refer to the term ‘affirmative action’ in its text preferring to use 
the term ‘employment equity practice or policies’. Although the terms are different, the 
CEEA does indeed contain affirmative action provisions. “The [Royal] Commission [on 
Equality] was told again and again that the phrase ‘affirmative action’ was ambiguous 
and confusing ... The Commission notes this in order to propose that a new term, 
‘employment equity’, be adopted to describe programmes of positive remedy for 
discrimination in the Canadian workplace.437 
 
(c) Differences between the 1986 and 1995 Act 
Although the purpose of the 1986 CEEA is carried through to the 1995 Act, the 1995 Act 
is far more detailed in its approach, especially with regards to the obligations imposed 
employers to ensure employment equity. One of the two most significant differences 
between the two Acts is the inclusion of ‘seniority rights’ as a relevant characteristic 
when considering persons for a position in the workforce, as will be discussed further 
later in this chapter. The second major change is that “the federal public service is 
included in the Act and so is subject to the equivalent program requirements as private 
sector employers.”438 
 
The new Act also contains some changes which help clarify certain points, for example, 
the “new Act clearly provides the Canadian Human Rights Commission with the mandate 
to conduct on-site compliance reviews in order to monitor compliance.”439 A second 
example of clarification is the attempt to clarify the myth that employment equity is 
detrimental to all people from non-designated groups by stipulating that no employment 
equity measure should be implemented if the effects are detrimental.440 The Act then 
stipulates that quotas are not part of the Act and process of employment equity.441 
 
 
 
                                               
437 Bakan and Kobayashi ‘Policy in Canada’. 
438 HRDC ‘Overview of Employment Equity’ 16. 
439 HRDC ‘Overview of Employment Equity’ 16.  
440 Section 5 and 6 of the CEEA list certain grounds that are detrimental and will be discussed in 3.2.5 (c). 
441 HRDC ‘Overview of Employment Equity’. 
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4.3.4  The Purpose of the Canadian Employment Equity Act 
 
The function of the CEEA is set out in the Act as follows:  
 
“The purpose of this Act is to achieve equality in the workplace so that no 
person shall be denied employment opportunities or benefits for reasons 
unrelated to ability and, in the fulfilment of that goal, to correct the conditions 
of disadvantage in employment experienced by women, aboriginal peoples, 
persons with disabilities and members of visible minorities by giving effect to 
the principle that employment equity means more than treating persons in the 
same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of 
differences.”442 
 
As can be seen, the purpose of the CEEA parallels the SAEEA. Whereas South African 
affirmative action aims to achieve equality in the workplace for black people, women and 
people with disabilities; the Canadian model is for women, aboriginal people, people 
from visible minorities and people who have disabilities. “In Canada, affirmative action 
programs have become an important policy tool for governments in promoting greater 
equality for women and minorities in both the public and private sectors of the 
economy.”443 It is for this reason that the CEEA serves as such a good example to South 
Africa. 
 
4.3.5 The Canadian Employment Equity Act Part 1: Employment Equity 
 
(a) Beneficiaries of the Employment Equity Act 
The CEEA bestows benefits on people falling into ‘designated groups’. ‘Designated 
groups’ includes women, aboriginal peoples, people with disabilities and people who are 
members of visible minorities.444 The concept ‘members of visible minorities’ includes 
any person who is ‘non-Caucasian’ in race or non-white in colour other than aboriginal 
                                               
442 Section 2 of the CEEA. See Lamarche ‘Retaining Employment Equity’ at 9 for an in depth discussion 
on the purpose of Employment Equity in Canada. 
443 Fletcher ‘Attitudes of Canadians’ 67. 
444 Section 1 of the CEEA. 
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peoples.445 The term ‘aboriginal people’ refers to Indians, Inuit or Métis people (these 
people are now referred to as the First People).446 
 
A person with a disability, according to the Act, is a person who has a long-term or 
recurring disability, be it physical, mental, sensory, psychological or a learning 
impairment.447 That person must “(a) consider themselves to be disadvantaged in 
employment by reason of that impairment; or (b) believe that a employer or potential 
employer is likely to consider them to be disadvantaged in employment by reason of that 
impairment.”448 This also includes people who have functional limitations due to their 
disability and have been accommodated at their current place of work. The one additional 
requirement to be a beneficiary of affirmative action in Canada is, according to section 9 
(2), only employees who identify themselves or agree to be identified by an employer as 
a person falling into the category of ‘designated group’ will be considered as members of 
that designated group. 
 
(b) Deemed Employer 
The CEEA does not apply to all employers in Canada. It is focused on imposing 
obligations regarding employment equity on ‘deemed employers’. The applicability of 
the CEEA and its employment equity provisions is set out in the Act as follows: 
 
(4) (1) This Act applies to: 
(a)  Private sector employers; 
(b)  The portions of the federal public administration set out in 
Schedule I or IV to the Financial Administration Act; 
(c)  The portions of the federal public administration set out in of 
Schedule V to the Financial Administration Act that employ one 
hundred or more employees; and 
                                               
445 Ibid. 
446 Ibid. See Americans.net ‘Native Americans’ at http://www.nativeamericans.com/ (accessed on 29 
August 2006) for a discussion on the history of the First People. 
447 Section 1 of the CEEA. 
448 Section 3 of the CEEA. 
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(d)  Such other portion of the public sector employing one hundred or 
more employees, including the Canadian Forces and the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, as may be specified by order of the 
Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Treasury 
Board, in consultation with the minister responsible for the 
specified portion.449 
 
Private Sector Employers 
The application of the Act to the ‘private’ sector means, firstly, any person who employs 
one hundred or more employees and, secondly, any person “in connection with a federal 
work, undertaking or business as defined in section 2 of the Canada Labour Code and 
includes any corporation established to perform any function or duty on behalf of the 
Government of Canada that employs one hundred or more employees.”450 The definition 
also excludes any departmental corporation.451 
 
Public Administration 
The CEEA applies to certain specific areas of the public sector, as set out in the Financial 
Administration Act.452 The definition of public sector excludes employees employed in 
an area for which the Public Service Commission “exercises any power or performs any 
function under the Public Service Employment Act453, the Public Service Commission 
and that portion are responsible for carrying out the obligations of an employer under this 
Act.”454 The ‘public sector deemed employers’ also incorporates any other portion of the 
public sector which employs one hundred or more employees.455 In creating these 
provisions, the “federal public service joined approximately 350 federally regulated 
                                               
449 Section 4 of the CEEA. 
450 Section 3 of the CEEA. Section 3 (a): “The definition of ‘private sector’ excludes employers with 
businesses of a local or private nature in the districts of Yukon, the Northwest Territories or Nunavut.” 
451 “departmental corporation” means a corporation named in Schedule II. See Canadian Financial 
Administration Act CF – 11 of 1985. 
452 See Schedule 4 of the Financial Administration Act. 
453 Act c. 22 of 2003. 
454 Section 3 of the CEEA. 
455 PSAC ‘Employment Equity Legislation’. 
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employers with 100 or more employees who have been covered since 1986.”456 The 
CEEA also applies to the Canadian Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
 
(c) Employment Equity Measures 
Section 5 of the CEEA sets out the duty’s of ‘every employer’ with regards to 
employment equity. By reading the text as a whole, one can interpret this to mean that 
only deemed employers are obliged to follow the duties of ‘every employer’ as set out in 
Part 1 of the Act. Accordingly, this work will proceed in the understanding that the term 
‘every employer’ is intended to mean deemed employers only. 
 
Section 5 of the Act requires every employer (deemed employers) to implement 
employment equity in two main ways. The first is by identifying and eliminating 
employment barriers against persons in designated groups that are caused by employment 
practices, policies and systems not authorised by law.457 This is very much like the 
requirement for South African employers to remove all formal barriers to equality in the 
workplace. The second measure required by the CEEA is that “employers [must] take 
positive steps to ensure that people in the designated groups are represented in the 
workplace in proportion to their representation in the Canadian workforce.”458 The 
employer is required to implement ‘positive policies and practices’ to ensure that a 
designated group’s members are reasonably accommodated in the workplace as well as 
ensuring that these groups attain a measures of representation at all levels in the 
respective employer’s workforce.459 This section, rather superfluously, goes on to say that 
all levels of the workplace includes the entire Canadian workforce and, even more 
superfluously, skilled jobs in the Canadian workforce. 
 
The Act then makes specific stipulations that the employer need not implement the above 
mentioned employment equity measures if it were to cause the employer undue 
                                               
456 PSAC ‘Employment Equity Legislation’. 
457 Section 5 (a) of the CEEA. 
458 Global rights ‘Global Perspective’ 27. 
459 Section 5 (b) of the CEEA. 
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hardship;460 if the applicant does not have the requisite qualifications to perform the 
job;461 or, in the public sector, where the Publics Service Employment Act requires hiring 
or promotion to be based on merit.462 
 
It is submitted that employers not needing to implement employment equity measures if 
those measures cause the employer undue hardship is an essential provision to include. 
Although the measures are unconstitutional if they are more detrimental than beneficial 
as they fail the proportionality test; it is important to emphasise that the employment 
equity measures cannot be detrimental to non-designated group members. This gives 
people not falling into the designated groups some comfort and, therefore, will help the 
CEEA gain more support. As the majority of the country does not fall into the 
‘designated groups’ category, their support is needed for the CEEA to be accepted. 
Without majority support, the affirmative action measures can never truly and efficiently 
be implemented. 
 
An additional preferential treatment section in the CEEA is that a private sector person 
who is engaged in promoting or serving the interests of aboriginal peoples may give 
preference to aboriginal peoples or employ only aboriginal peoples over all other 
peoples.463 The exception to this practice is that the preference or employment is not 
allowed to constitute a practice that would be considered discriminatory under the 
Canadian Human Rights Act.464 This can be interpreted to mean that the aboriginal 
peoples are now at the top of the hierarchy in the designated group if the employer is 
engaged in promoting or serving the interests of aboriginal peoples. 
 
                                               
460 Section 6 (a) of the CEEA. 
461 Section 6 (b) of the CEEA. 
462 Section 6 (c) of the CEEA. 
463 Section 7 of the CEEA: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, where a private sector 
employer is engaged primarily in promoting or serving the interests of aboriginal peoples, the employer 
may give preference in employment to aboriginal peoples or employ only aboriginal peoples, unless that 
preference or employment would constitute a discriminatory practice under the Canadian Human Rights 
Act.” 
464 Section 7 of the CEEA. 
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The CEEA deems the consideration of seniority rights to not amount to discrimination if 
a person from a non-designated group is preferred for a position over a person from a 
designated group, even if the unsuccessful applicant is better qualified.465 The preference 
of senior employees or granting of seniority rights must be part of a collective agreement 
or an established practice of the employer. This situation applies to the CEEA, only if a 
collective agreement or established practice of the employer is to layoff or recall 
employees by seniority. This will not be considered discriminatory if non-designated 
group members are favoured.466 Seniority rights are also not employment barriers within 
the meaning of the CEEA if the employer is downsizing or restructuring and the 
collective agreement or established practice exists.467 
 
4.3.6 Analysis and Review 
 
The CEEA requires every employer to collect information and conduct a workforce 
analysis to determine the degree of under-representation of people from designated 
groups in all areas of its workforce.468 This analysis “compares the numbers of each 
designated group in each occupational group of the employer’s workforce to the 
Canadian workforce.”469 The employer is also required to review employment systems, 
policies and practices to identify any employment barriers against persons from 
designated groups.470 The review “refers to both existing and new systems, policies, 
practices. The employment systems review (ESR) is to examine the following in order to 
identify employment barriers against the designated groups: recruitment, selection & 
hiring; development & training; promotion; retention & termination; and reasonable 
accommodation of the designated groups.”471 
 
It is submitted that the conducting of both the analysis and review is an essential first step 
if one intends to implement measures to rectify any problems identified and implement 
                                               
465 Section 8 of the CEEA. 
466 Section 8 (1) of the CEEA. 
467 Section 8 (2) of the CEEA. 
468 Section 9 (1) (a) of the CEEA. 
469 PSAC ‘Employment Equity Legislation’. 
470 Section 9 (1) (b) of the CEEA. 
471 PSAC ‘Employment Equity Legislation’. 
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an employment equity plan according to those weaknesses. This ensures the most 
effective employment equity plan possible. All information obtained in the analysis and 
review is strictly confidential.472 
 
4.3.7 Consultation 
 
The CEEA requires a deemed employer to consult with employees in order to ensure the 
best possible implementation of employment equity measures.473 A reading of the CEEA 
shows that the provisions regarding consultation are situated after the employment equity 
plan provisions. Although the provisions are ordered in this manner – the employment 
equity plan before consultation, – one can only assume that deemed employers carry out 
the consultation before creating their employment equity plan. 
 
The purpose of the consultation474 with employees’ representatives is to invite them to 
provide their views on certain issues475 and to collaborate in the preparation, 
implementation and revision of the employment equity plan.476 If the employees are 
represented by a bargaining agent, then that bargaining agent is required to participate in 
the consultation. The views provided by the employees’ representatives include: 
 
(a) The assistance that the representatives could provide to the employer to 
facilitate the implementation of employment equity in its workplace 
and the communication to its employees of matters relating to 
employment equity; and 
 
(b) The preparation, implementation and revision of the employer’s 
employment equity plan.477 
 
 
                                               
472 Section 9 (3) of the CEEA. 
473 Section 15 of the CEEA. 
474 In accordance with section 15 (4) of the CEEA, “Consultation under subsection (1) and collaboration 
under subsection (3) are not forms of co-management.” 
475 Section 15 (1) of the CEEA. 
476 Section 15 (3) of the CEEA. 
477 Section 15 (1) of the CEEA. 
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4.3.8 Employment Equity Plans 
 
The CEEA contains several provisions relating to the implementation of employment 
equity plans478 by the deemed employers. The first measure that the plan must implement 
is to specify the positive policies and practices (affirmative action measures) that it will 
implement in the short term479 with regards to hiring, training, promoting and retaining 
persons from designated groups as well as making reasonable accommodations.480 This 
measure causes deemed employers to implement active measures in the pursuance of 
substantive equality. 
 
The second measure to be included in the plan is aimed at pursuing formal equality.481 
The plan must set out a timetable for the implementation of these two goals (the 
implementation of formal and equality and employment equity).482 An employer is 
required to set out and longer term goals that have the goal of increasing representation in 
the workforce. Furthermore, any “finding [made during the analysis stage] that certain 
groups are underrepresented should lead to the use of ‘short term numerical goals for the 
hiring and promotion of persons in designated groups in order to increase their 
representation in each occupational group in the workforce.’” 483 An employer is required 
to set out and longer term goals that have the goal of increasing representation in the 
workforce.484 The employer can also include any other matter that may be prescribed.485 
 
The mere creation of the plan does not achieve employment equity. “The employer must 
make all reasonable efforts to implement the employment equity plan and monitor the 
                                               
478 Employment equity plans will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the plan’ or ‘a plan’. 
479 In this section, “short term” means a period of not less than one year and not more than three years, and 
“longer term” means a period of more than three years. See Section 10 (3) of the CEEA. 
480 Section 10 (a) of the CEEA. 
481 Section 10 (1) of the CEEA: “The employer shall prepare an employment equity plan that (b) Specifies 
the measures to be taken by the employer in the short term for the elimination of any employment barriers 
identified by the review under paragraph 9(1)(b).” 
482 Section 10 (c) of the CEEA. 
483 Global Rights A ‘Global Perspective’ 27. 
484 Section 10 (e) of the CEEA. 
485 Section 10 (f) of the CEEA. 
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implementation on a regular basis.”486 The employer is also required to review the 
employment equity plan at least once during ‘short term’ period if numerical goals have 
been set.487 If the numerical goals are not being achieved or the measures being used to 
achieve the numerical goals are not efficient and effective enough, they can be changed 
during the short term period.488 It is submitted that this provision is an effective one as it 
allows for flexibility. By including such a provision, allowance is made for the best use 
of employment equity measures that have been put into operation and a deemed employer 
is able to institute employment equity measures that work within its workforce. 
 
4.3.9 The Report 
  
The provisions of the CEEA require deemed employers to submit reports on their 
implementation and to establish and maintain ‘employment equity records’ regarding its 
workforce, the plan and the implementation of the plan. With regards to the actual report 
itself, all private sector employers are required to make their report on or before 1 June 
each year.489 “Private sector employers are to provide yearly statistical reports to Human 
Resources Development Canada (HRDC) which compare the representation of 
designated group employees to the workplace population in the areas of representation, 
hires, promotions and terminations.”490 
 
4.3.10 The Duty to Inform 
 
Under the CEEA, every employer has a duty to inform employees about certain aspects 
of employment equity.491 These include the purpose of employment equity; any measures 
taken or plans to take to implement employment equity as well as the progress made in 
implementing such employment equity measures. 
 
                                               
486 PSAC ‘Employment Equity Legislation’. 
487 Section 13 of the CEEA. 
488 Bakan ‘Policy in Canada’. 
489 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
490 PSAC Employment Equity Legislation. 
491 Section 14 of the CEEA. 
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4.3.11 Enforcement of Employment Equity Measures 
 
Part II and III of the CEEA contain provisions for the policing of employment equity 
measures. “The Canadian Human Rights Commission492, established under section 26 of 
the Canadian Human Rights Act, is charged with enforcing the Employment Equity 
Act.”493 In ensuring compliance, the CHRC carries out ‘compliance audits’ to ensure that 
the obligations imposed on a deemed employer by sections 5, 9 to 15 and 17 of the CEEA 
are being carried out.494 “In cases of non-compliance (which is specifically defined in the 
[Canadian] Employment Equity Act) and where the CHRC is unable to obtain a written 
undertaking to remedy the non-compliance, the CHRC may issue a direction requiring 
the employer to take actions to remedy the non-compliance and may subsequently apply 
to the President of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal for a further order.”495 However, 
one can only assume that no order can be made if it causes the employer to take any 
action that would contradict section 5 and 6 of the CEEA, as discussed earlier in this 
section.496 
 
4.3.12 Lessons for South Africa 
 
The CEEA accepts the fact, like the SAEEA, that merely removing all discriminatory 
boundaries is insufficient to bring about a state where people are substantively equal. It 
accepts that the law must go beyond merely giving formal equality and be proactive in 
achieving substantive equality. The only difference between the two Acts, the EEA and 
the South African CEEA, is that the SAEEA also sets out to remove all formal 
boundaries to the right to equality. The main legislation requiring the removal of formal 
boundaries to equality in the workplace (discrimination in the workplace) in Canada can 
                                               
492 Hereinafter referred to as the CHRC. 
493 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’ 27. 
494 Section 22 (1) of the CEEA. In terms of section 34 (1) (c) of the CEEA, all information obtained during 
the compliance audit is considered privileged, unless the written consent is given by the person from whom 
the information was obtained. 
495 PSAC ‘Employment Equity Legislation’. 
496 “The Act then goes on to stipulate specifically that the employer need not implement the above 
mentioned employment equity measures if it were to cause the employer undue hardship; if the applicant 
does not have the requisite qualifications to perform the job; or, in the public sector, where the Publics 
Service Employment Act requires hiring or promotion to be based on merit.” See 4.2.5 (c) of this work. 
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be found in Part I of the Canadian Human Rights Act. However, the employer’s duties 
under the CEEA also require the removal of such barriers to equality, as discussed in 
further detail earlier in this section. 
 
The CEEA, as it stands, is very similar to the SAEEA and may well have been used as a 
model. It would therefore be a learning experience for the implementation of affirmative 
action in South Africa to monitor the Canadian system in action. Any weaknesses that 
show up in the Canadian system, for example, may be a signal to South African 
legislators to amend the South African system. Despite the strong similarity between the 
two Acts, a number of differences are worthy of comment. 
 
(a) General 
The CEEA has one weakness compared with the SAEEA. This weakness does not apply 
to any specific provision, but in the Act as a whole. This weakness is that the CEEA does 
not flow as well as the SAEEA. It is as though the Canadian EEA was released as the 
first draft and then the South African drafters took the Act, polished it and released a 
second, ‘cleaner’ version. This submission is based on the manner in which several of the 
provisions of the Act are written. 
 
An example of this is the use of the term ‘designated employee’ and ‘deemed employer’. 
This lack of consistency creates a sense of dis-ease. By using two different terms, the Act 
almost distinguishes between the two groups and creating a hierarchy. It makes the two 
unequal. The consistent use of ‘designated’ in South Africa makes the Act read better and 
the consistency brings about a sense of equality between the two parties. It creates a sense 
of sameness and togetherness rather than creating a sense of adversary. 
 
A second example of this relates to the ordering of the provisions and the structure of the 
CEAA. The provisions regarding consultation are situated after the provisions regarding 
the employment equity plan. This seems a strange ordering as it is necessary to consult 
and investigate all possible information about the workforce and the employees before 
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making a plan that will impact on said workforce and employees. It is submitted that the 
SAEEA is more logically structured and therefore easier to implement.  
  
A further example of the loose wording is in section 5 of the CEEA, which sets out the 
duties of ‘every employer’ with regards to employment equity. This section is ambiguous 
as to whether or not the affirmative action measures contained under Part 1: Employment 
Equity – Employer’s Obligations, refers to every employer in Canada or merely the 
deemed employers as per the application provisions of the Act. In reading the Act as a 
whole for interpretation purposes, it is possible to interpret this to mean that these 
provisions apply to deemed employers only. Having to read the entire Act in order to 
understand one provision, serves to illustrates that the CEEA is loosely worded compared 
with the SAEEA. 
 
A final example of the SAEEA being a more tightly constructed version of the CEEA 
relates to the provisions of the CEEA specifying that employment equity measures may 
be disregarded if they are likely to cause the employer undue hardship;497 if the applicant 
does not have the requisite qualifications to perform the job;498 or, in the public sector, 
where the Publics Service Employment Act requires hiring or promotion to be based on 
merit.499 These are similar to the exceptions in the South African CEEA. In the SAEEA, 
the applicant must be a ‘suitably qualified from a designated group’. Instead of saying 
that the beneficiaries are a ‘suitably qualified person from a designated group’, the CEEA 
states that all persons fall into the designated group regardless of qualification but then 
includes of an exception clause stating that the preferential treatment of designated 
groups only needs to occur of those persons are suitably qualified. Having an exception 
clause makes the process somewhat superfluous.500 It is submitted that the South African 
approach is preferable as it states exactly who is part of a designated group straight away. 
 
                                               
497 Section 6 (a) of the CEEA. 
498 Section 6 (b) of the CEEA. 
499 Section 6 (c) of the CEEA. 
500 A simple example can be used to illustrate this point. The CEEA would read: ‘You may paint the house 
your favourite colour, except if that colour is not yellow,’ whereas the SAEEA would read: ‘You must 
paint the house yellow’. 
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(b) Armed Forces 
Both the SAEEA and the CEEA apply to both the public and private sectors. The 
provisions of the CEEA also apply to the Canadian Forces and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police. The provisions of the SAEEA, on the other hand, do not apply to the 
National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret 
Service. It is submitted that the South African army and police services should not need 
any transformation at a lower level and, so, are rightfully excluded from employment 
equity provisions at this level. However, it is the higher levels of seniority that should 
require employment equity appointments to be used.501 
 
(c) Enforcement 
The CEEA contains two rather long and explicit parts on penalising those deemed 
employers who do not comply with the provisions of the Act. However, the CEEA 
contains no incentives or rewards for deemed employers or even voluntary employers to 
comply with employment equity. If the Canadian government wants to ensure the best 
possible or even better than expected compliance with the Act, they should offer rewards 
as South Africa does. There is no better way in getting a business to comply with the 
CEEA than by offering it the chance of earning money by doing so. By having State 
contracts as an incentive to comply with the CEEA, it causes not only the party who wins 
the State contract but also those who are unsuccessful in the bid for the State contract to 
implement good employment equity practices. By not offering incentives, voluntary 
employers have no reason to implement employment equity measures in their workplace. 
However, if they were rewarded for voluntary compliance, these employers would 
probably implement employment equity procedures in the hopes of earning a reward. 
 
It is submitted that the Canadian system of the ‘stick’ may not be as effective as South 
Africa’s system of ‘the stick and the carrot’. Punitive measures may force all employers 
to implement the sub-minimum required by the SAEEA. However, by offering 
incentives, employers implementing minimal affirmative action measures may be 
                                               
501 It is submitted that this will ensure that it is not white males that are in the upper echelons of these forces 
but they are led by a body that is representative of the country they are protecting. 
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encouraged to increase their implementation. The carrot also encourages voluntary 
compliance with the SAEEA. A further benefit of incentives and rewards is that people 
may engage with employment equity voluntarily and positively rather than complying 
unwillingly and negatively.  
 
This submission is supported by the effectiveness of the Canadian employment equity 
measures. At the current stage, data shows that the number of people from designated 
groups that have been employed has increased during the period of 1987 to the year 
2000.502 However, the majority of employer’s who took part in a survey “indicated that 
while they did not believe they met the Act's requirements when it was enacted, 36 
percent say they now feel that they do and 5 percent say they have come to exceed the set 
standards. Despite these positive reports, 59 percent of employers surveyed said 
improvement in this area was still needed.”503 
 
(d) Seniority rights 
The one provision of the CEEA that the SAEEA does not include is the concept 
preferential treatment of senior members, i.e. seniority rights.504 The inclusion of 
seniority rights gives protection for senior employees. These employees should be valued 
members of the workplace and deserve some preferential treatment. A second reason that 
this provision validates affirmative action is that it demonstrates that affirmative action is 
not merely helping designated groups to the detriment of everyone else but also makes 
measures for the protection of people from non-designated groups. This helps create 
support for affirmative action so that people will accept it more readily. 
 
(e) Conclusion 
As a result of the above submissions, it would appear that  South Africa has very little to 
learn from the present CEEA with the exception of the seniority rights issue referred to 
above.  When one compares the two Acts the South African system is a better, more 
                                               
502 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
503 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’ 27. 
504 This does not mean that people cannot be dismissed due to their senior status. It means that if a black, 
female or disabled candidate and white male candidate with ten-years of service in the company apply for 
the same job, for example, the white male should be given preferential treatment due to his senior status. 
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polished version of employment equity or affirmative action than the Canadian version. It 
is submitted; therefore that South Africa has learned its lesson from Canada. Overall, 
Canadian affirmative action has been shown to be working.505 This is a good sign for 
South Africa and employment equity legislation. However, this does not mean that South 
Africa has nothing left to learn from the Canadian model. Since both Acts are compatible, 
any amendments made by Canada or any areas where Canadian affirmative action excels 
should be considered by South Africa law makers. 
 
 
4.4 Affirmative Action in Malaysia 
 
“The Malaysian case brings into clear focus the fact that dispossessed status is 
not consonant with minority status.” 
– William Darity Jr506 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
This section will examine the Malaysian experiences of affirmative action. A comparison 
will also be made between the Malaysian affirmative action system and the South African 
model. This comparison will attempt to show how South Africa can learn from the 
Malaysian system to ensure the best possible affirmative action system in South Africa.  
 
4.4.2 Malaysia: A Brief Historical Background  
 
In order to understand affirmative action in Malaysia, it is appropriate to offer a brief 
history of the country. This will serve to explain both the necessity of affirmative action 
in Malaysia and why the particular measures were put in place. As will be shown in the 
                                               
505 See Ng, Burke and Jain ‘Legislation, Contract Compliance and Diversity Practices: Do these Matter?’ at 
http://luxor.acadiau.ca/library/ASAC/v26/11/26_11_p108.pdf (accessed on 14 August 2006) at 118. A 
survey was conducted in the writing of this article and it was concluded by the authors that: “The study 
demonstrated that to a large extent, employment equity remains to be the most effective tool at promoting 
equity and diversity in Canadian organisations.” 
506 ‘Affirmative Action in Comparative Perspective: Strategies to Combat Ethnic and Racial 
Exclusion Internationally’ at http://pubpol.duke.edu/centers/upv/readings/sandy_darity.pdf 
(accessed on 1 August 2006). 
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discussion in this section, Malaysia suffered under an oppressive system where a 
minority government oppressed a majority on the basis of race.507 
 
Since the nineteenth century the majority of Malaya508 was a British colony with all states 
of Malaya falling under British control by 1909.509 Under the British rule, there was a 
mass immigration of Chinese and Indian peoples to such an extent that the Malay people 
became a minority in their own country.510 The Malay remained a minority until the mid 
1960s. “In the 1963 state elections the pro-Malaysia Sabah (North Borneo) Alliance and 
Sarawak Alliance won decisively, giving them the mandate to negotiate terms of entry 
into the Federation [of Malaysia].”511 Furthermore, on 19 August 1965, Singapore, with 
its majority Chinese population, was excluded from Malaysia.512 This significantly 
altered population ratios in the country with Malay people to becoming the majority. 513 
 
The British dominance of Malaya ended in 1942 during World War II when the Japanese 
invaded and overturned the British government, seizing control for themselves.514 “The 
Japanese occupation of Malaya, Singapore, and the British Borneo territories lasted for 
3½ years.”515 The British regained temporary power after the allies were victorious and, 
after regaining power, the British government proposed a constitution to the people of 
Malaya.516 Although this seemed like a grand gesture from a now benevolent former 
ruler, it was an attempt to prevent the spread of communism which, at that point in time, 
seemed to be an attractive option due to power of communist China.517 It was, in fact, 
                                               
507 Abdullah ‘Affirmative Action Policy in Malaysia: To Restructure Society, to Eradicate Poverty’ (1997) 
XV (2) Ethnic Studies Report 190. 
508 Malaya was the predecessor of Malaysia. The country was known as Malaya until independence, at 
which point the country was renamed Malaysia. 
509 Abdullah (1997) XV (2) Ethnic Studies Report 190. 
510 Abdullah (1997) XV (2) Ethnic Studies Report 190. 
511 Andaya and Andaya A History of Malaysia (1987) 272 
512 Kaur and Metcalfe (eds) The Shaping of Malaysia (1999). See UNDP ‘Malaysia International Trade, 
Growth, Poverty Reduction and Human Development’ at 
http://www.undp.org.my/uploads/UNDP%20Booklet%20PDF%20FORMAT%20.pdf (accessed 14 August 
2006) for further information on the changes in the borders and boundaries of Malaysia. 
513 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
514 Miller The Story of Malaysia (1965). 
515 Miller The Story of Malaysia 155. 
516 Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1997). 
517 Emsley Malaysian Experience. 
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“only the presence of three divisions of Allied troops stopped the Malayan Communist 
party from launching an immediate revolt against the British.”518 
 
After the British had handed over administration of Malaysia, the three major factions 
making up the Alliance Party formed a coalition, and so began the period under which the 
Alliance Party ruled Malaya under what was known as ‘the bargain’.519 This bargain was 
only an informal agreement between the Malay elites and Chinese businessmen in 
Malaysia.520 Under the terms of the bargain, “the non-Malay parties accepted Malay 
political hegemony in exchange for citizenship rights.”521 
 
“This agreement was encapsulated in a consociational agreement and formalised in the 
Alliance Party.”522 The Alliance Party began when the United Malays National 
Organisation, the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress 
struck a bargain in 1995.523 As stated earlier, the Malay people were a minority in their 
own country until the mid 1960s.524 Even after the leadership was decided democratically 
the Malay people were forced to share the governing of their country in order to have 
some power say.525 The Alliance party was successful in the 1955 elections and took 
control of Malaysia.526 
 
“On the morning of 31st August the Duke of Gloucester, as the Queen’s representative, 
presented Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of independent Malaya, with 
the constitutional instruments that made the Federation a free country.” 527At 
                                               
518 Miller The Story of Malaysia 160. 
519 Kaur Shaping of Malaysia. 
520 Boikhutso ‘Qualitative Analysis of the Perceptions of Affirmative Action Beneficiaries in South African 
Parastatals’ at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-03162005-143810/unrestricted/00dissertation.pdf 
(accessed on 14 August 2006). 
521 Kaur Shaping of Malaysia 105. “The Malays were granted control of government, Islam would be the 
national religion, the national language would be Malay and the Malays would dominate the military and 
senior civil service [in return,] non-Malays would be awarded citizenship and that the Chinese business 
community would be assured freedom of enterprise.” See Esman ‘Contrary Consequences’ 27. 
522 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences’ 27. 
523 Kaur Shaping of Malaysia. These parties will be referred to as the UMNO, MCA and MIC respectively. 
524 UNDP ‘Malaysia’. 
525 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences’ . 
526 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences’ . 
527 Miller The Story of Malaysia 201. 
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independence on 31 August 1957, the Bumiputera528 were not very well off in their 
homeland and were economically far behind the Chinese only owning about 10% of 
businesses registered in Malaysia and 1.5% of invested capital in the country.529 “In 
general, prior to 1969, the economic conditions of the Malays were backward. To observe 
this, one only needs to travel to the rural areas and see the standard of living and life style 
of the Malays. The contrast with the Chinese was overwhelming.”530  
 
After reviewing the history of Malaysia and South Africa, it is submitted that the two 
nation’s respective histories can be seen in a similar light. The extreme social and 
economic disparities and imbalances in Malaysia were based along racial differences.531 
As shown in the discussion earlier in this section, like South Africa, the minority in 
Malaysia who had come into the country were the privileged whilst the indigenous 
people suffered and were left behind. This created tension and instabilities that could only 
be resolved by revolution.532 
 
Although the first elections in Malaya had been held in 1951, the first elections to be held 
in the independent nation of Malaysia were held in 1959.533 The Alliance Party was 
victorious in these elections. The bargain struck between these three parties and their 
power over Malaysia continued until 1969 “when in a general election the Alliance Party 
suffered a setback and the system broke down. The collapse resulted in civil violence ... 
and a dictatorship was temporarily established by the Malay elite.”534 
 
Social and economic disparities between the Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera became 
disproportionately high by the late 1960s and this development “of social and economic 
imbalances along racial lines, as brought about by colonialism, became an increasingly 
                                               
528 The indigenous people of Malaysia were known as the Bumiputera and the Chinese and Indians were 
referred to as the non-Bumiputera. 
529 Human Development Report ‘Bringing Multicultural Societies Together’ 70. 
530 Abdullah (1997) XV (2) Ethnic Studies Report 190 at 198. 
531 Emsley Malaysian Experience. 
532 Ghee ‘Social and Economic Integration of Different Ethnic Groups in South-East Asia, with Special 
Reference to Malaysia: A Review of the Literature and Empirical Matter’ at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/dp8295.pdf (accessed on 23 March 2006). 
533 Abdullah (1997) XV (2) Ethnic Studies Report 190 at 198. 
534 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences’ . 
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potential explosive phenomenon.”535 This untenable situation eventually erupted on 13 
May 1969.536 On this day, riots along racial lines broke out in Malaysia, specifically in 
Kuala Lumpur and resulted in over two hundred deaths and left six thousand people 
homeless.537 “The response of the government was to declare a state of emergency and to 
prorogue Parliament. The country was governed through a National Operations Council 
(NOC) composed of the heads of security forces, the domestic and foreign civil service 
and the heads of UMNO, the MCA and the MIC.”538 
 
4.4.3 Affirmative Action in Malaysia: The New Economic Policy 
 
It is probably more appropriate to compare Malaysia and South Africa in a social and 
economic context than South Africa and Canada. This is because, when it began its 
affirmative action policies, Malaysia was a developing economy and, like South Africa, 
did not have the resources of first world countries to rely on in order to implement an 
effective, practical and functional.539 
 
(a) Establishing Affirmative Action 
“It was against this background that Malaysia's ambitious ‘affirmative action’ policy was 
promulgated in 1971. It was called the New Economic Policy540.”541 Esman542 describes 
three alternatives that faced the Malay elite looking for a solution: 
 
“First, it could have simply confiscated foreign and non-Malay properties and 
nationalised them or distributed them among the Malays ... Secondly, other 
groups argued for a policy of uplifting the 'have-nots' of all Malaysian ethnic 
                                               
535 FW de Klerk Foundation ‘Affirmative Action in Malaysia’at www.fwdklerk.org.za/ 1. 
536 De Klerk ‘Affirmative Action in Malaysia’. 
537 Abdullah (1997) XV (2) Ethnic Studies Report 190. 
538 Emsley Malaysian Experience 20. 
539 Emsley Malaysian Experience. 
540 The New Economic Policy is callsed the Dasar Ekonomi Baru (DEB) in Malay. Hereinafter referred to 
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541 Abdullah (1997) XV (2) Ethnic Studies Report 190 at 201. 
542 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences of 'Affirmative Action In Malaysia in Conflict: Policy Interactions in 
the Pacific Basin CSIA Discussion Paper, Harvard’ (1991) at 
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groups by reaching out to the poorest regardless of 'race' to insure that their 
basic needs were met. 
 
A third alternative that was finally decided upon and implemented was to 
emphasise overall economic growth, but to use the increments of economic 
growth to address inter-ethnic inequities by distributing these increments 
differentially among the various ethnic communities.”543 
 
In September 1970, Tan Razak was appointed Prime Minister of Malaysia and he played 
a major role in setting up two of the most important institutions544 facilitating the creation 
of the NEP.545 “All the major opposition parties, except the DAP (Democratic Action 
Party), were persuaded to become partners in the grand national coalition, and the 
‘National Alliance’ became the ‘National Front’.”546 This large political base, like the 
large party support of South African affirmative action, gave Malaysia the power and 
legitimacy to start the NEP. 
 
The non-Bumiputera were encouraged to support the NEP by amendments to the 
Constitution which gave them citizenship as shown by the fact that, “although the UMNO 
leadership kept Chinese input in the formulation of the NEP to a minimum, the EUP (the 
Economic Planning Unit) allowed senior Chinese bureaucrats to make changes to the 
original NEP document.”547  
 
This was another important step to ensure support for the legitimacy of the NEP amongst 
the non-Bumiputera. Thus, the New Economic Policy and affirmative action measures 
were established in Malaysian law. Unlike the South African EEA, the NEP had a set 
time in which it would operate. The NEP was put in place in 1970 and would continue to 
function until 1990, as stipulated by the Second Malaysia Plan.548 
                                               
543 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences’ 26. 
544 “These institutions were the National Consultative Council, which was a ‘substitute’ to the suspended 
Parliament although it was consultative (not legislative) in functions and the National Consultative Council, 
which was a 'substitute' to the suspended Parliament although it was consultative (not legislative) in 
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545 De Klerk ‘Affirmative Action in Malaysia’. 
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(b) The Function of the New Economic Policy 
Like the South African Employment Equity Act, the NEP had two major goals. 549The 
first goal “aimed at reducing and eventually [eradicating] poverty by raising income 
levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of 
race.”550 The second goal was to bring about a sense of substantive equality for the 
Bumiputera people.551 The second goal of the NEP is completely in line with the second 
goal of the SAEEA – to bring about a sense of substantive equality for the respective 
designated groups.552 It is the first goal, however, that contrasts with the SAEEA. The 
first goal of the SAEEA is “ensure fair treatment of all employees by eliminating unfair 
discrimination”553 and, thus, aims at treating all people equally in the formal sense. 
  
(c) Affirmative Action Measures under the NEP 
The NEP set out very stringent and well articulated goals for its aim to bring about 
substantive equality in commercial and industrial activities. “Specifically, the goal was to 
increase Malay share ownership from 3 per cent in 1971 to 30 percent over a 20-year 
period; decrease the foreign share from 63 per cent to 30 per cent; and increase the non-
Malay share from 34 per cent to 40 per cent.”554 In addition to these commercial 
requirements, 30% of all government construction contracts were required to be given to 
firms owned by Bumiputera people.555 Banks were also required to increase their loans to 
the Bumiputera population of Malaysia.556 
 
The Malaysian system is flexible since it sets out specific goals at the outset.557 Thus, 
when the goal is achieved, the success of the NEP can be measured and that goal can be 
                                               
549 “The NEP targets were to be attained under the Second to Fifth Malaysia Plans.” See Drabble An 
Economic History of Malaysia, c. 1800 – 1990: The transition to Modern Economic Growth (2000) 197. 
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removed from the agenda. The focus of the NEP can then be moved elsewhere rather than 
be distracted by unnecessary, already fulfilled goals. 
  
To achieve these goals, the Malaysian government began acquiring economic assets in 
the modern sectors of the economy by means of negotiation or stock purchase558 in order 
to reserve such assets for the Bumiputera people. The government acted as a trustee for 
the Bumiputera people until these assets could be privatised.559 To increase loans to the 
Bumiputera people, the Malaysian government set up financial institutions, most notably 
the Bank of Bumiputera. The government established and operated “a series of public 
sector enterprises, the leading one being the National Petroleum Corporation ... these 
government enterprises provided that opportunity and ethnic Malays were given 
preference in hiring for positions within these public sector firms.”560 These measures 
that aimed at greater ownership in business, “appear to have been quite successful in at 
least ensuring a Bumiputera business presence … with Bumiputera employers [rising] 
from 14.2% in 1973 to 32.7% in 1987.”561 
 
The government also set out specific education and health goals.562 One of the major 
drives to achieve this was the establishment of clinics for the rural population as well as 
providing them with safe drinking water.563 The Malaysian government was extremely 
successful in these goals. “In 1970 the IMR (Infant Mortality Rate) stood at 45 per 
thousand, which was not particularly good even by developing country standards. By 
1988 the IMR had fallen to 14.2 in 1970 only six countries in the world had a rate lower 
than 14.2.”564 The safe drinking water provision was achieved for two-thirds of people in 
the rural areas by 1987. 
 
Government involvement and the aim of bringing about substantive equality for the 
Bumiputera people can also be seen in the education sector: Before the advent of the 
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NEP, the Bumiputera “suffered a relative disadvantage in access to education that the 
[first goal of the NEP] would not rectify. As a result of their regional and rural location 
and family background and constraints, Malays obtained a shorter and inferior education 
than the Chinese and Indians.”565 
 
In order to promote substantive equality in the education sector, the government began by 
providing a higher number and a better standard of teachers in the rural areas566 with the 
aim of promoting a far better education, and thus employment opportunities, for the rural 
population. The Malaysian government also set about a successful campaign for 
secondary school education. During the 1960s, “secondary school enrolment was only 34 
percent [and] great efforts were made in the course of the 70s and 80s to bring this closer 
to universal coverage … Enrolment increased to 72 per cent in 1985, which is higher than 
in nearly any other comparable middle-income country.”567  
 
Another aspect of the education reform for the Bumiputera people “was the enforcement 
of the indigenous language, Bahasa Malaysia, as the medium of instruction … permission 
was refused to the Chinese community when they attempted to set up their own Chinese 
language Merdeka University.”568 The NEP also implemented a policy which gave a 
substantial preference to Bumiputera applicants to universities. Although this achieved 
good results in allowing for better education for the Bumiputera people, it also resulted in 
about sixty thousand Chinese students being forced to study overseas by 1985.569 
Malaysia did rectify this at a later stage by offering university education in a more 
languages than Malay.570 
 
A problem that arose from the education reforms was that it was claimed that the 
education standards dropped as a result of reducing requirement standards for admission 
to university. “Three years ago, Malaysia's affirmative action came under attack when the 
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country's minister of education announced that few ethnic Malays had met the minimum 
academic standards needed to gain university admission, a claim he would later take 
back.”571 Despite this claim being refuted, Malaysian universities stopped the affirmative 
action programmes in 2003 and admissions are no longer considered on ethnic lines572 
 
4.4.4  Affirmative Action and Economic Growth  
 
The key to the continued existence and prosperity of any economy in the world is 
economic growth.573 The continued existence and success of affirmative action measures 
go hand in hand with economic growth.574 If the affirmative action measures cause the 
economy to decline, they are, obviously, having a detrimental effect and need to be 
changed. The links between affirmative action and economic growth are multi-
factorial:575 Firstly, that the reduction of poverty is impossible in the absence of a 
growing income since incomes, overall, can only grow in a buoyant economy.576 
Secondly, in order to achieve equity ownership, government revenues had to be high in 
order to pay for the assets to distribute to the Bumiputera people.577 The third and final 
factor is that one needs growth in order to gain the resources to increase educational and 
health care levels and opportunities.578 
 
“Malaysia inherited, as did other ex-colonies, a stable macroeconomic position at 
independence. Unlike most ex-colonies, it maintained this stability.”579 This was 
achieved despite the implementation of wide-reaching affirmative action policies for two 
major reasons. Firstly, although affirmative action was aimed at specific groups, they 
were not detrimental to the rest of the population. Secondly, flexibility was built into the 
programmes. Although the NEP implemented stringent affirmative action measures, the 
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government was flexible in the enforcement of these measures when it saw that they were 
not working.580 A good example of this was the ‘growth pause’ suffered by the Malaysian 
economy in the early 1980s.581 “The government confronted this situation realistically, 
and modified Malay preference policies in such a way as to emphasise the overall priority 
of promoting economic growth.”582 Thus the government put economic growth, which is 
important for the whole population, above helping one group to the detriment of others. 
 
The influence of the NEP on the Malaysian economy during the 1980s can be divided   
into three periods as shown by the following table:583 
 
Period Growth Rate NEP 
1980 – 84 High Growth (6.7 per cent p.a.) 
 
Strong NEP 
1985 – 87 Low Growth (1.8 per cent p.a.) 
 
Reduced NEP 
1988 – 91 High Growth (8.8 per cent p.a.) Reformed NEP 
 
As can be seen, the government responded to certain problems in the economy and acted   
by amending their affirmative action measures in order to ensure that the beneficial 
effects affirmative action had on the Bumiputera people were not detrimental to the 
economy as a whole. Even though “the bases of the NEP, strong economic growth 
combined with redistribution, contained a potential conflict, since the first required a high 
degree of allocative efficiency … and the second a distribution of wealth and 
employment .. which could slow growth,” 584the Malaysian economy managed to grow 
during the period in which affirmative action was in place. As a result the Malaysian 
economy experienced an average of 7% growth during the NEP period of 1970 – 1990.585 
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4.4.5 Success of the New Economic Policy 
 
If South Africa is to base itself on the Malaysian model of affirmative action or even just 
be influenced by the Malaysian model, then the Malaysian model would have to be 
successful. For this reason, the success of the Malaysian affirmative action system and 
the NEP must be addressed. In 1970, the NEP was instituted with two major goals. The 
first goal was to eradicate poverty and increase education levels.586 The second was to 
bring about a sense of substantive equality between the Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera 
people.587 
 
(a) Substantive Equality 
The achievement of the second goal of the NEP was the true success story of the 
programme. This was to achieve a 30% ownership of economic assets by the Bumiputera 
people.588 At the end of the twenty year period, 22% of the economic assets in the 
modern sectors of the economy were owned by the Bumiputera peoples.589 Although this 
falls short of the target of 30% by nearly one-third, it is submitted that this is a significant 
achievement for a twenty year period. The only problem with this is that the “the largest 
block of assets nominally in the hands of Malays, in fact remains under government 
control. The state is having difficulty attracting Malays to invest in these assets.”590 
Although these assets are in the control of the government and not the people, it is 
submitted that it is merely a matter of time before these assets can be transferred as the 
Malays are the only ones who are entitled to purchase them.591 
  
A second goal was to have more Bumiputera people involved in management roles. This 
has also been successful.592 A good example is that of the National Petroleum 
Corporation. “The National Petroleum Corporation is in the hands of Malays, and its 
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officers and staff are comfortable and competent as managers - nearly impossible to 
imagine twenty years ago.”593 
 
The NEP has also successfully improved the socio-economic position of the Bumiputera 
people as a whole and has eliminated the “identification of ethnic groups with economic 
function.”594 Political stability has also been achieved through the NEP – something that 
seemed a foreign concept during the ethnic riots of 1969 only twenty-one years earlier.595 
One needs only look at the statistic discussed quoted earlier in this section, of 70% of the 
Bumiputera people now having qualified with undergraduate degrees to see the success 
of NEP in education – and by extrapolation – employment opportunities. 
 
One major problem remains. Although the Bumiputera as a whole seem to now be 
substantially equal, “income inequality within groups has risen the late 1980s, especially 
among the Bumiputera, where the gap between rich and poor has widened 
substantially.”596 Although one may say that this is a failure of the NEP, it is submitted 
that the NEP has in fact succeeded and that this is necessary side effect. This will be 
discussed below.  
 
The NEP has achieved its overall goals. Substantive equality is well on its way to being 
achieved.597 The Malaysian government has now undertaken the task pf bringing about 
substantive equality for all people, regardless of race with a new policy - the National 
Development Policy – which replaced the NEP in 1991. This places “a larger focus on 
eradicating hardcore poverty, rather than on poverty between races, as undertaken by the 
NDP.”598 
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(b) Eradication of Poverty 
As mentioned earlier in this section, the first goal of the NEP was the eradication of 
poverty in Malaysia as a whole. Although the access to health care and water has been 
significantly increased, the NEP has not completely achieved its goal in these areas.599 
The Malaysian government set itself a twenty year time table to achieve the goals of the 
NEP.600 At the end of this period the NEP’s performance was audited.601 This audit 
revealed a shortfall in this goal and, therefore, the government has drafted and is 
implementing the National Development Policy as mentioned above.602 
 
(c) Public Sentiment 
Although public sentiment and public approval were not a goal of the NEP, it is arguable 
that public sentiment and public approval helped the NEP to be established and continue 
its existence.603 It was strong public feeling that caused the 1969 ethnic riots and a similar 
response could have hijacked the NEP.604 It is therefore appropriate to examine public 
response to the NEP in the twenty years during which the programme was implemented 
and enforced. 
 
Under the NEP, no assets were forcefully taken away from non-Bumiputera.605 They 
were taken by negotiation and a fair and reasonable price was paid.606 The income and 
wealth of the non-Bumiputera people of Malaysia have also benefited from the prosperity 
of the Malaysian economy.607 However, despite the fact that the non-Bumiputera people 
of Malaysia have been rewarded by the success of the NEP, “many non-Malays feel that 
they are now politically powerless, second-class citizens.”608 There is a sense of 
dissatisfaction and dis-ease amongst these groups.609 They feel they have been unfairly 
                                               
599 UNDP ‘Malaysia’. 
600 The NEP began in 1970 and had an end date in 1990. 
601 UNDP ‘Malaysia’. 
602 UNDP ‘Malaysia’. 
603 Emsley Policy in Malaysia. 
604 Ghee ‘Social and Economic Integration’. 
605 Emsley Policy in Malaysia. 
606 Emsley Policy in Malaysia. 
607 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences’ . 
608 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences’ 30. 
609 Ghee ‘Social and Economic Integration’. 
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discriminated against and that they are now obliged to compete against the government to 
achieve anything in the economy rather than work with the government to attain 
economic growth.610 Although the NEP was an overall success, “the same success, 
however, cannot be claimed for the objective of creating a harmonious and unified 
society.”611 The disintegration of ethnic disparities has brought about a sense of ethnic 
resentment and suspicion between the Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera people.612 
 
4.4.6 Lessons for South Africa 
 
The overall success of the Malaysian NEP, as well as similarities between the historical 
and economic backgrounds of both countries, makes it an interesting model for South 
African legislators to study. There are a number of issues that are worthy of further 
comment in this section. 
 
(a) Goals of the New Economic Policy 
It is submitted that the Malaysian approach is far too wide and ambitious. The NEP 
aimed to achieve substantive equality for all people within its country through focussing 
on one group of people. It is submitted that this optimistic goal was not entirely 
successful.613 South Africa, on the other hand, aims to bring about substantive equality 
for a limited group of people.614 It is submitted that South Africa has taken a more 
focused and manageable approach by aiming to bring about formal equality. 
 
(b) Health, Water and Education 
Given its limited economic and human resources the Malaysian government was very 
successful in this aspect of the NEP. The South African Constitution grants all people the 
right to sufficient health care services and water.615 Malaysia has managed to improve its 
                                               
610 Ghee ‘Social and Economic Integration’. 
611 Ghee ‘Social and Economic Integration’16. 
612 Human Development Report ‘Bringing Multicultural’. 
613 The failure of the NEP to achieve its goal of eradicating poverty for all people in Malaysia was 
discussed under 4.4.5 (b) of this work. 
614 The NEP was successful in its goal to achieve substantive equality for a limited, designated group of 
people – the Bumiputera people. 
615 Section 27 (1) (a) and (b) of the South African Constitution. 
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IMR dramatically over a period of ten years and to provide two-thirds of the people in the 
rural area with water in a period of seventeen years.616 Accordingly, it is submitted that 
South Africa should take cognisance of the Malaysian approach and implement it in order 
to give full effect to rights in the Constitution. Although this form of development does 
not fall under the current ambit of the EEA, the Malaysian model serves as a good 
example for South Africa in eradicating poverty amongst all people. 
 
It is certainly arguable that education is highly relevant to employment equity – as 
Malaysia has demonstrated.617 Many rural communities throughout South Africa still lack 
satisfactory educational facilities.618 The professed goal of bringing about a sense of 
substantive equality for black people – the predominant group in the rural areas – cannot 
be achieved if the majority of this designated group is under-educated and thus cannot 
take on skilled or professional jobs. 
 
The educational reforms in Malaysia were not without problems. The mass exit of 
Chinese people in Malaysia caused a huge drain on the economy. Although the 
designated group is being educated therefore, the NEP was – to a degree - successful, but 
valuable human resources left the country. It is submitted that if applicants to universities 
are forced to study overseas, it is likely they will not return and, therefore, the skills they 
have to offer and the investment in the country they have to offer will be lost. This is a 
salutary lesson for South African education reformers. Although Malaysia suffered 
several problems in the implementation of affirmative action measures in education, 
“fewer than 10 percent of university undergraduates in the 1970s were ethnic Malay and 
approximately 70 percent were Chinese; today the percentages are reversed.”619 This 
serves as a lesson to South Africa as it demonstrates shows that one can turn around the 
education statistics. The statistics quoted above are taken from 2005 and it is therefore 
                                               
616 Emsley Policy in Malaysia. 
617 “Secondary school enrolment was only 34 percent [and] great efforts were made in the course of the 70s 
and 80s to bring this closer to universal coverage … Enrolment increased to 72 per cent in 1985, which is 
higher than in nearly any other comparable middle-income country.” See Emsley Policy in Malaysia 39. 
618 “The conditions under which hundreds of thousands of rural children are expected to learn.” See 
Furlonger ‘Ignorance Is No Bliss For SA's 'Afterthought' Children’ at 
http://free.financialmail.co.za/rallytoread/rally2006/mar06.htm (accessed on 24 August 2006). 
619 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’ 28. 
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possible that - in a period of thirty five years - 70 percent of black people in South Africa 
could be qualified with degrees. 
 
(c) Flexibility 
It is submitted that the most vital lesson South Africa should learn from the Malaysian 
experience of affirmative action is its flexibility. In this regard the NEP is far stronger 
system than the EEA which does not set out goals as well articulated as the NEP and, 
therefore, has no set goal or time table that must be met. The South African government 
affirmative action measures need a degree of flexibility built in so that if the affirmative 
action measures or any other measures of the EEA are having a detrimental effect on the 
economic growth rate, the government can respond. Built into the NEP was the 
establishment of specific and time-related goals, which included an auditing system and a 
mechanism for the removal of systems once the goals were achieved. 620 This allowed for 
a review of successes and failures and for further reforms in the shape of the National 
Development Policy. As a result of the flexible and responsive nature of the NEP, the 
Malaysian economy experienced an average of 7% growth during the NEP period of 
1970 – 1990.621 South Africa can take a valuable lesson from this in the hope of 
achieving employment equity as well as economic growth. 
 
(d)  Conclusion 
Although post-apartheid South Africa was a potential powder keg of inequality, no 
explosion took place. It is submitted that speedy establishment of a Constitution and the 
affirmative action measures was a pre-emptive strike against this very real possibility. 
The Malaysian government’s reform programme was a reaction to the 1960 riots and 
bloodshed.622 It is submitted that the South African leaders saw the possible outcome if 
people were left in a society with such immense social and economic imbalances and 
learned from the Malaysian experience. For this reason, affirmative action measures were 
implemented four years after ‘independence’ in an attempt to redress the imbalances as 
speedily as possible. Nevertheless, there are lessons to learn.  
                                               
620 Emsley Policy in Malaysia. 
621 Emsley Policy in Malaysia. 
622 Abdullah (1997) XV (2) Ethnic Studies Report 190. 
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The Malaysian model of affirmative action and the NEP is a fine example for South 
Africa. One can only hope that the EEA is to achieve as much as the NEP. In summary, 
the South African government can learn three important lessons from Malaysia. Firstly, it 
must be flexible in its implementation of the EEA. If the EEA is not as successful as it 
should be, then it must be amended appropriately. Secondly, that economic growth is 
vital to the continued existence of not only affirmative action, but the economy as a 
whole. Thirdly, many South Africans have an extremely negative – and uninformed – 
view of affirmative action and employment equity. It is recommended that the South 
African programmes should be accompanied by propaganda that will win public support. 
This can only be effective if all sections of the public perceive that the policies benefit 
them. If growth in the economy is linked to government policies without such perceptions 
public morale and trust in the policies will diminish and suspicion and pain along racial 
lines may resurface. Although affirmative action policies are necessary, they must be 
imposed in such a way that all sections of society feel empowered rather than 
disadvantaged. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter III of this work examined the employment equity measures in South Africa. The 
chapter also highlighted certain inadequacies and / or unanswered questions revolving 
around these problematic areas. These problems were: 
 
- Problems regarding the beneficiaries of affirmative action in South Africa 
(a) Should affirmative action benefit groups or individuals? 
(b) Is confining affirmative action measures to South African citizens fair? 
 
- Is there a right to preferential treatment? 
 
- Is there, or should there be a race classification and racial hierarchy of 
designated groups? and 
 
- Does affirmative action require an end clause to be valid and what manner 
of end clause should be included? 
 
Chapter V will examine these questions in further detail and propose solutions to these 
problems. 
 
5.2  Beneficiaries of Affirmative Action 
 
 “What would the situation be if the applicant is a black women who grew up 
in another African country and who was not subject to South African policies 
and practices? Would it make any difference if the last mentioned fictitious 
candidate was also subjected to discriminatory practices because of the 
colonial history of that country? These and more examples may well show 
that intention of the legislature with the constitutional recognition of measures 
designed to protect and advance previously disadvantaged persons or 
categories of persons could not have been to make such measures dependent 
on the individual circumstance of each particular case.” 
- Van der Westhuizen J623 
                                               
623 (2002) 23 ILJ 1020 (T) at 1035E. 
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In the case of George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd,624 the court considered 
who the beneficiaries of affirmative action should be. They determined that the 
beneficiaries of affirmative action are determined by the purpose of affirmative action. 
As the purpose of affirmative action is to redress the imbalances of the past, the 
beneficiaries should be those people who were disadvantaged in the past. The court 
concluded that disadvantaged groups were linked to the categories of race (black people), 
gender (women) and the ability of people (disabled people). 
 
The court, however, found this approach somewhat problematic: 
 
“One of the main criticisms of affirmative action in the United States has been 
that it has primarily benefited middle-class women and black people who 
were well able to look after their own interests and less deserving assistance 
than those trapped in the under class. 
 
It is considerations like these which have promoted some to debate the 
question whether affirmative action programmes should not be based on racial 
criteria, but on other, temporary and non-racial criteria, for example aimed at 
persons who were educated under the segregated educational system.”625 
 
The extract above shows the courts analysis of the problems of the American approach to 
affirmative action and the American group based system. This shows that the court 
accepted the problems of the American approach. However, when answering the question 
whether or not these problems would make their way into South African law, the courts 
gave a somewhat nebulous answer:  
 
 
                                               
624 [1996] 8 BLLR 985 (IC). 
625 George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 1007 D – G. See also Johnson ‘The Last Twenty-Five 
Years of Affirmative Action’ at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=577283  (accessed on 
21 August 2006); and Andrews ‘Unfair Discrimination’ at  http://www.wlce.co.za/advocacy/seminar1.php 
(accessed on 21 August 2006), where it is stated that “there have been limited gains for women through 
affirmative action in the States. The States has not achieved race and gender intersectionality in affirmative 
action programmes. White middle class women are still the major beneficiaries of affirmative action.” 
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“In my opinion this court would accept that an employer who applies 
affirmative action i.e. by preferring in the case of a transfer or promotion a 
candidate who has personally been historically unfairly discriminated against 
does not commit an unfair labour practice as regards a person who has not 
suffered such a deprivation.”626 
 
As can be seen, this statement by the Court does not answer the question at all. In this 
response, the court has limited itself to answering the issue at hand in the case alone and 
not the larger question. 627The larger question is: should previous disadvantage be a 
requirement? The answer currently available is that preferring someone who was 
previously disadvantaged in a personal capacity does not amount to discrimination. The 
court is, therefore, only saying that it is not unfair to prefer that individual. It gives no 
opinion on whether preferring people with no personal previous disadvantage does or 
does not amount to unfair discrimination. 
 
This question was finally answered in South Africa eight years later in the 2002 judgment 
of Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & others. In this case, Van der Westhuizen J 
concluded that: 
 
 “The emphasis is certainly on the group or category of persons, of which the 
particular individual happens to be a member, or more starkly put in the 
negative, of which specific person such as the applicant in this case is not a 
member. This group has been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.”628  
 
The Court highlighted a number of examples of when the approach of benefiting groups 
rather than individuals would, in fact, defeat the aim of achieving substantive equality for 
all people. Nevertheless, the Court did not give any recommendations of what could be 
done to resolve this. Instead the Van der Westhuizen J merely reiterated the point that: 
 
                                               
626 George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 1007 G – H. 
627 When referring to this judgment, it has been said that “the notion of ‘individual disadvantage’ as a 
prerequisite for affirmative action has received scant judicial or arbitral support.” See Dupper ‘Affirmative 
Action and Substantive Equality’ (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 275 at 286. 
628 Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & others 1035 E. 
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 “The aim [of affirmative action] is not to punish or otherwise prejudice the 
applicant as an individual, but to diminish the over-representation which his 
group has been enjoying as a result of previous unfair discrimination.”629 
  
A second issue that has been left open by the courts regarding the beneficiaries of 
affirmative action is the question of whether affirmative action criteria apply to non-
South African citizens. In the case of Auf der Heyde v University of Cape Town630 the 
court touched on the issue of whether or not affirmative action should be focused on 
people who are black, female or disabled or whether it should just focus on black, female 
or disabled regardless of nationality. The court, however, did not give a definitive answer 
to this issue. A definitive answer was only given by the passing of the Amended 
Employment Equity Regulations631 which limited the category of “designated groups” to 
South African citizens. It can be argued, however, that many foreign nationals suffered 
under apartheid and should, therefore, be included as beneficiaries of affirmative action. 
 
These two issues remain unresolved. The purpose of this 5.2, therefore, is to attempt to 
answer these two points of law that the courts have left unanswered. These are: firstly, 
5.2.1 which will address the issue left open by the George and Stoman632 decisions; and 
secondly, 5.2.2 which will address the issue left open by the Auf der Heyde v University 
of Cape Town633 judgment and the Amended Employment Equity Regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
629 Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & others 1035 I – J. 
630 (2000) 21 ILJ 1758 (LC). 
631 GN R480, Government Gazette 28858 of 26 May 2006. 
632 “In George v Liberty Life the Court touched on, without deciding, the issue whether the individual who 
benefits from affirmative action should have been personally disadvantaged, or whether it is sufficient for 
the individual to belong to a previously disadvantaged group.” See R & W Traders ‘Equality Goes to the 
Root of the South African Interim and Final Constitutions’ at 
http://www.roothwessels.co.za/affirmativeaction-south-africa.html (accessed on 18 August 2006). 
633 (2000) 21 ILJ 1758 (LC). Although they provide no answer to this issue, this issue is commented on 
briefly in Partington and Van Der Walt ‘The Development of Defences in Unfair Discrimination Cases Part 
2’ (2005) 26 (3) Obiter 595. 
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5.2.1 Groups v Individuals 
 
(a) The Problem 
The purpose of affirmative action is section 9 (2) of the Constitution634, the Employment 
Equity Act635 and, in particular, affirmative action, is: 
 
“Implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their 
equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the 
workforce.”636 
 
One can interpret this to mean that affirmative action sets out to redress the 
discrimination of the past and to give those people who have been disadvantaged an equal 
opportunity. This creates possible a loophole in the law. In specified groups there are 
individuals who, by virtue of their personal history, have never been disadvantaged. If 
they belong to a group that has been identified as disadvantaged it would be unfair of the 
individual to claim advantage by virtue of his or her group identity. A good 
demonstration of the problem of addressing affirmative action at groups can be shown by 
the following example: 
 
Person X is a black male who was born in England after his 
father moved to England in 1970, studied at an English 
university and became a successful doctor. He obtained South 
African citizenship through his father. His father returned to 
South Africa in 1993 after making a considerable amount of 
money. Person X started high school in South Africa at the most 
expensive and prestigious high school in the country. When 
starting university, he was given a house and a car; all his 
textbooks and all his needs were catered for. He then qualified 
                                               
634 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
635 Act 55 of 1998. Hereinafter referred to as the EEA. 
636 Section 9 (2) (b) of the EEA. 
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from university with reasonably good results and applied for a 
job. 
 
Person Y, a white male, has taken out a student loan and is now 
in debt. He has qualified with results no different to those of 
person X. 
 
Person Z’s father was arrested during apartheid without trial and 
killed in prison. Z’s mother could not inherit any money from his 
late father or obtain money for maintenance as they were married 
under customary law and, therefore, the marriage was not 
recognised. His mother raised him and his three siblings in a 
single room of the home in which she was a maid. Z travelled 
thirty kilometres to a school ravaged by the effects of the Bantu 
Education Act everyday as he was not allowed to attend the 
whites’ only school nearer to him. He managed to earn himself a 
place at university. Z took out a student loan to pay for his 
studies and working in the evenings to pay for his living 
expenses. By working, he reduces the time available for 
studying. He is also not able to afford any of his textbooks and 
needs to borrow from friends when he gets the chance. He then 
qualified with semi-decent results but not as good as person X or 
Y. 
 
Person X, Y and Z all apply for the same job. On paper, Person 
X and Y are very similar. On paper, however, they both stand out 
when compared to person Z who has not done nearly as well in 
the same degree as person X and Y. Person Z is, therefore, 
automatically disqualified from the job application as he does not 
meet the requirements. Person X, on paper, is completely equal 
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to person Y yet as a black male; person X would be preferred 
over person Y. 
 
By looking at this example, one can see that preferring person X over person Y is the 
equitable solution when comparing two candidates of equal merit. This is because the 
appointment follows the purpose of affirmative action: to make jobs available to black 
males with the aim of bringing about substantive equality. However, a certain amount of 
concern must rise about the disqualification of person Z. This is a person who has 
actually suffered from the oppression of the past. He is a previously disadvantaged 
person.637 Person A has never been disadvantaged but is preferred as he falls within the 
group that qualifies for affirmative action according to South African laws.   
 
Themba Sono gives a real example of the hypothetical problem that has been put forward 
above.638 He discusses the priority of empowering black women and the fact that it was 
not always disadvantaged black women who succeeded from the priority to employ black 
women. “In no time, socially prominent and well-connected black women became 
extremely wealthy – if only on paper. In one instance, barely 24 months after they had 
established a company, a handful of such women raised more than R500m from big 
business.”639 
 
He argues further that the “it is not enterprising individuals such as [wealthy black 
women] who should win empowerment support; it is the chosen groups … Businesses 
                                               
637 “In the Western Cape, for example, the overwhelming majority of shack dwellers - with no running 
water, poor sanitation, no electricity - are Africans. Equally, the principal beneficiaries of affirmative action 
have been the coloured working class and white women.” See ANC ‘Unity And Diversity In The ANC 
Overview Of The ANC’s Experience’ at www.anc.org.za (accessed on 21 August 2006). See also Habib 
‘State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa’‘at 
http://www.sangonet.org.za/snsite/images/stories/AdamHabibPresentation.doc (accessed on 21 August 
2006), where it is stated that “economic liberalization has benefited the upper classes of all racial groups, 
and in particular, the black political, economic and professional elites who are the primary beneficiaries of 
affirmative action policies and black economic empowerment deals. But GEAR has had a devastating 
effect on the lives of millions of poor and low-income families.” 
638 Sono ‘Empower Individuals, Not Groups’ (15 January 1999) Finance Week 21. 
639 Sono ‘Empower Individuals’ 21. 
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say: ‘We do not want to empower individuals, only communities or groups.’ But only if 
these groups are black, of course.”640 
 
This highlights a problem. Affirmative action is deemed to be fair discrimination and, 
therefore, constitutional. It passes the constitutional muster only because the end goal is 
to redress the imbalances of the past and to give those people disadvantaged by apartheid. 
The problem is that affirmative action has a side effect – as exemplified in the scenario 
above – in promoting job reservation for women and black people who do not, in fact, 
require assistance. The question must then be posed, should affirmative action have a 
second criterion – should a person from the designated group also actually have been 
discriminated against or disadvantaged by practices of the past in order for affirmative 
action to be truly constitutional? 
 
As Sono points out, affirmative action also has the side effect of creating a greater 
economic disparity between members within the designated groups.641 In other words, 
part of the black and female group become richer while the rest remain in poverty. This is 
not a situation which is unique to South Africa, as “studies of countries with extensive 
recorded data and a long history of affirmative action - India, Malaysia and the United 
States and, over a shorter period, South Africa - show that inequalities between 
individuals (vertical inequalities) as opposed to inequalities between groups (horizontal 
inequalities) have either increased or remained stable.”642 
 
(b) Current Commentary on the Issue 
It has been argued that affirmative action is not compensating black people or women per 
se but compensating people who have been discriminated against on the basis of the fact 
that they were black or female. “For if [benefit] in the form of extra opportunities is 
extended to a black man on the basis of past discrimination against blacks, the basis for 
this [benefit] is not that he is a black man, but that he was previously subject to unfair 
                                               
640 Sono ‘Empower Individuals’ 21. 
641 Sono ‘Empower Individuals’. 
642 Human Development Report ‘Building Multicultural Democracies’ (2004) at 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04_chapter_3.pdf at 69. 
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treatment because he was black.”643 Nickel, it would seem, is attempting to argue that all 
black people (which would includes women and people with disabilities in the South 
African context) should be given compensatory treatment due to their race but they are 
not, in fact, being given special dispensation due to their race. 
 
Nickel, it is submitted, does not put forward any justification for his argument and his 
argument is merely based in semantics and circular reasoning to argue his point. Cowan 
concludes similarly and states that “special advantages to them as a group are both out of 
the question, since in the moral context there is no such group.”644 However, Cowan 
gives no justification for the conclusion at which he arrives. It is merely a statement that 
giving benefits to a group would amount to injustice as it allows for discrimination to 
continue based on a ‘morally irrelevant’ characteristic and, thus, continue the type of 
discrimination that happened in the past. 
 
Taylor puts forward an argument which seems to have far better reasoning.645 He argues 
that being discriminated against on the basis of a human characteristic was discrimination 
on a ‘morally irrelevant’ basis. However, that characteristic has now become a ‘morally 
relevant’ characteristic in order to redress the imbalances of the past. Accordingly, in 
terms of the principle of compensatory justice, that characteristic (the one previously 
used to discriminate) is morally relevant at the current time. 
 
This posits that it is not unfair to give a group of people special dispensation due to one 
of their characteristics. Having said this, Taylor still not does not answer the question of 
whether giving special dispensation to a group - which would allow for people who had 
never been discriminated against to be favoured - is a practical and fair way of dispensing 
affirmative action measures. This opinion can be found in his argument regarding 
‘institutionalised injustice’ found in the following extract: 
 
                                               
643 Nickel ‘Discrimination and Morally Relevant Characteristics’ in Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action: 
Social Justice or Reverse Discrimination? (1997) 3. 
644 Cowan ‘Inverse Discrimination’ 7. 
645 Taylor ‘Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice’ in Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action: 
Social Justice or Reverse Discrimination? (1997). 
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“For even if the individual C-person who now enjoys the favourable 
compensatory treatment was not himself one of those who suffered injustice 
as result of the past social practice, he nevertheless has a right (based on his 
being a member of the class of C-persons) to receive the benefits extended to 
all C-persons as such. This follows from our premise that the policy of reverse 
discrimination, directed toward anyone who is C because he is C, is justified 
by the principle of compensatory justice.”646 
 
Taylor, it is submitted, puts forward the best argument so far. By applying his work to the 
South African context, he has pointed that apartheid was not an individual discriminatory 
programme.647Apartheid was focused on groups of people due to certain characteristics 
and, therefore, to redress the policies of apartheid, one needs to turn them round. To 
redress discrimination aimed at a collective target – black people, women and people 
with disabilities – it is necessary to give special dispensation to the same targets in order 
to be completely just. The argument put forward by Taylor has found support from 
Bayles when she states that “by using the characteristic of being black as an identifying 
characteristic to discriminate against people, a person has wronged the group, blacks. He 
thus has an obligation to make reparations to the group.”648 
 
A further problem with targeting individuals rather than groups is, it is submitted, that it 
would be an infringement of the right to dignity.649 A person’s dignity would be infringed 
if, when completing a job application, an individual has to completely lay bear his or her 
past to prove a history of discrimination. This would not only be a degrading experience 
but it would also be painful one. It would be up to each individual to prove their worth to 
be regarded as ‘previously disadvantaged’. At this point in time, a conclusion can be 
drawn that directing affirmative action measures to a group is not only the constitutional 
method but also the humane method. It was as groups that blacks and women were 
discriminated against. It is therefore as groups that they should receive the benefits of 
affirmative action and employment equity measures.   
                                               
646 Taylor ‘Reverse Discrimination’ 13. 
647 Taylor ‘Reverse Discrimination’. 
648 Bayles ‘Reparations to Wronged Groups’ in Beckwith and Jones Affirmative Action: Social Justice or 
Reverse Discrimination? (1997) at 15. 
649 Section 10 of the Constitution. 
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(c)  Poverty Indicators 
One justification for deciding whether or not affirmative action should benefit groups or 
individuals is to look at the different groups’ standing in society as a whole. By analysing 
the groups’ situations as a whole, one can glean an insight as to which groups in South 
Africa require assistance as a whole. In order to do this, one needs to assess the poverty 
indicators as shown in the following table: 
 
“The Human Sciences Research Council [HSRC] has used the Gini 
coefficient650 to measure inequality. In the case of a highly even distribution 
of income this can vary from 0 to 1. South Africa’s Gini coefficient rose from 
0.69 in 1996 to 0.77 in 2001. While historically South Africa has had one of 
the most unequal distributions of income in the world, this rise is likely to 
place it at the top of the world rankings.” 651 
GINI COEFFICIENT652 
TABLE 1 
Province No. of 
poor 
persons 
(million) 
% of 
populati
on in 
poverty 
Poverty 
gap (R 
billion) 
Share of 
poverty gap 
Eastern Cape 4.6 72% 14.8 18.2% 
Free State 1.8 68% 5.9 7.2% 
Gauteng 3.7 42% 12.1 14.9% 
KwaZulu-Natal 5.7 61% 18.3 22.5% 
Limpopo 4.1 77% 11.5 14.1% 
Mpumalanga 1.8 57% 7.1 8.7% 
North West 1.9 52% 6.1 7.5% 
Northern Cape 0.5 61% 1.5 1.8% 
Western Cape 1.4 32% 4.1 5.0% 
South Africa 25.7 57% 81.3 100.0% 
                                               
650 “The ‘Gini coefficient’ is a measurement of inequality in society. A coefficient of nought means that 
everyone is equal and a coefficient of one represents complete inequality. Therefore, the lower the Gini 
coefficient, the better.” See Ziehl Introduction to Sociology: Population Studies (2002) at 64. See also 
Haralambos and Holborn Sociology: Themes and Perspectives 5th ed (2000) at 305 for a further discussion 
on poverty statistics of foreign nations. 
651 Human Sciences Research Council ‘Fact Sheet: Poverty in South Africa’ at 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000990/index.php (accessed 18 May 2006). 
652 Human Sciences ‘Fact Sheet’. 
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“The poverty gap measures the difference between each poor household’s 
income and the poverty line. Thus, it measures the depth of poverty of each 
poor household. The aggregate poverty gap is calculated by summing the 
poverty gaps of each poor household. Therefore, it is equivalent to the total 
amount by which the incomes of poor households need to be raised each year 
to bring all households up to the poverty line and, hence, out of poverty.  
 
The poverty line varies according to household size, the larger the household 
the larger the income required to keep its members out of poverty. The 
poverty lines used were based on the Bureau of Market Research’s Minimum 
Living Level.”653 
 
POVERTY GAP654 
TABLE 2 
  1991 1996 2001 
African 0.62 0.66 0.72 
White 0.46 0.50 0.60 
Coloured 0.52 0.56 0.64 
Asian 0.49 0.52 0.60 
Total 0.68 0.69 0.77 
 
 
These statistics are included to highlight the disparity between the white population and 
the ‘black’655 population. As can be seen from Table 2, the black population as a whole is 
worse off than the white population.656 For this reason, it would seem that in order to 
bring about a balance, it is the entire group that must be the focus of measures to reduce 
poverty. If the whole group is the focus there is the risk that those people who are already 
                                               
653 Human Sciences ‘Fact Sheet’. 
654 Human Sciences ‘Fact Sheet’. 
655 ‘Black’ refers to African, coloured and Asian people as per the EEA. See Section 1 of the EEA. 
656 It was pointed out in the discussion on affirmative action in Brazil that an argument has been put 
forward that many people in Brazil may become ‘free-riders’ due to affirmative action. “Proponents of 
affirmative action dismiss the argument ... because Afro-Brazilians make up more that 70% of those below 
the poverty line.” See UNESCO ‘Studies on Human Rights 2004: Struggles Against Discrimination’ at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001397/139712e.pdf (accessed on 16 August 2006) at 164. This 
argument can be used in a South African context as the majority of people below the poverty line with 
regards to race are also black people. 
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poverty stricken may not gain any significant rise in affluence whilst the benefits accrue 
to those who are currently advantaged. 
 
(d) A Solution 
It can hardly disputable that there should be a solution for those people who have been 
discriminated against in the past. It is submitted, however, that the EEA should remain 
directed at groups, following the argument put forward by Taylor that when the 
discrimination (apartheid in South Africa) was directed at groups as a whole, to balance 
this out, special dispensation should be given to groups as a whole.657 Although the 
argument could then be raised that individuals can open actions against the government 
for past discrimination but this could open the flood gates for litigation. It would have too 
far reaching consequences in that the majority of the black, female and disabled 
population of the country could probably prove some form of discrimination and, 
therefore, the courts would be constantly blocked and bogged down with these actions.  
 
One side effect of the group approach is that it may result in intra-racial or gender 
inequality as has been identified in Malaysia: “Intra-ethnic inequality, particularly intra-
Malay inequality, has emerged as a new dimension of inequality in Malaysia. Intra-Malay 
inequality can therefore only be addressed by a larger focus on eradicating hardcore 
poverty, rather than on poverty between races, as undertaken by the NDP.”658 A similar 
‘larger focus’ can be adopted in South Africa by further legislation to eliminate the 
anomalous intra-group inequalities after the EEA has run its course in its current form. 
 
Although the group model may result in some people benefiting from affirmative action 
when they should not, the statistics themselves show that the black population, women 
and people with disabilities as a whole are still worse off than the white population as a 
whole. Thus it remains the designated groups as a whole that needs assistance. This may 
                                               
657 See Sheet Metal Workers v EEOC 478 US 421 (1986), an American case where it was held by Justice 
Brennan AJ at para 44 that: “The purpose of affirmative action is not to make identified victims whole, but 
rather to dismantle prior patterns of employment discrimination and to prevent discrimination in the future. 
Such relief is provided to the class as a whole rather than to individual members; no individual is entitled to 
relief, and beneficiaries need not show that they were themselves victims of discrimination.” 
658 FW de Klerk Foundation ‘Affirmative Action in Malaysia’ (2004) at www.fwdklerk.org.za/ 3 (accessed 
on 26 March 2006). 
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be a problem in the mean time but, it is submitted, that people benefiting from affirmative 
action when they need no benefits are merely ‘casualties of war’ (or, in this instance, 
casualties of peace). They are the unavoidable side effect of the goal of bringing about 
substantive equality for black people, women and people with disabilities.659 
 
This does not mean that no special provisions should be made to individuals who were 
disadvantaged by the previous regime. If that disadvantage can be demonstrated to be 
present, that individual is deserving of special consideration. This means giving 
individuals within a designated preference over other people from the same group. In 
other words, the person who has a history of personal discrimination must be given 
further consideration in the other facets of ‘suitably qualified’ contained in the EEA and 
should not merely be disregarded because their formal qualifications are lower than other 
applicants. 
 
5.2.2   South African Citizens or All Disadvantaged Peoples? 
 
If the group model of affirmative action is validated, the answer to the question left open 
by the case of Auf der Heyde must now be considered. In this case, the court touched on 
the issue of whether or not affirmative action should be focused on South African citizens 
who are black, female or disabled or whether it should just focus on black, female or 
disabled regardless of nationality.660 Despite touching on the issue, the court at no point 
gave a definitive answer to the issue. The Amended Employment Equity Regulations, 
however, limited the concept of ‘designated groups’ to South African citizens in 2006.661 
                                               
659 If the legislature were to include a provision requiring that the beneficiaries of affirmative action have 
suffered in individual disadvantage, this work agrees with Partington and Van der Walt that, “disadvantage 
should be presumed with rebuttal strictly limited to cases where the suppressive consequences of apartheid 
have no relevance (for example, in the case of a black South African born after the end of the apartheid 
struggle).” See Partington and Van Der Walt (2005) 26 (3) Obiter 595 at 600. 
660 Before the Amended Employment Equity Regulations, the Department of Labour allowed designated 
employers to include foreign nationals as part of the designated groups in the reports these employers are 
required to submit in terms of section 21 of the EEA. See Partington and Van Der Walt (2005) 26 (3) 
Obiter 595 at 601. 
661 “In terms of the Amended Employment Equity Regulations (GN R480, Government Gazette 28858 of 
26 May 2006), ‘designated groups’ are restricted to natural persons who are citizens of the Republic of 
South Africa by birth or descent; or are citizens of the Republic of South Africa by naturalisation before the 
commencement date of the 1993 Constitution; or became citizens after that date and would have been 
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 In response to this limitation on designated groups is the argument that it was not just 
South African people who were discriminated against during apartheid. In terms of the 
group model argued above, it would seem that if one wishes to focus affirmative action 
on as a group model, one cannot bring in the individual focus of nationality or 
citizenship. However, this, it is submitted, is a separate and distinct argument. South 
Africa needs to focus on helping its own people for the time being. Once South Africa is 
a substantively equal society, then the government can attempt to help all peoples in 
South Africa, regardless of their country of origin. This may seem harsh, but, I would 
submit, the government is elected to represent the people of South Africa and must, 
therefore, ensure that the interests of South African people are looked after as a priority. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the Amended Employment Equity Regulations are a good 
inclusion in the EEA and the concept of ‘designated groups’ should only include South 
African citizens for the time being. 
 
5.3 Race Classification and Racial Hierarchy: Apartheid Revisited? 
 
“One of the gravest omissions of the EE Act was the failure to provide 
guidelines on how to approach the various designated groups when it comes to 
recruitment; selection; promotion and so on. The EE Act gives indirect 
guidelines in the form of section 42 which refers, among others, to the 
demographic profile of the national and regional economically active 
population.” 
– Loyiso Mbabane662 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
“On 17 June 1991, the South African government introduced the Population Registration 
Repeal Act663, which finally abolished the 1950 Population Registration Act664. The 
                                                                                                                                            
entitled to acquire such citizenship by naturalisation before that date had it not been for the apartheid policy 
then in place.” See Pretorius et al Employment Equity Law (2006) 8-7. 
662 Black Economic Empowerment, The Lifeline For Employment Equity (2005) at 
http://www.lexisnexis.co.za/ServicesProducts/presentations/17th/LoyisoMbabane.doc 
(accessed on 30 May 2006). 
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move was heralded by the press as removing the last vestiges of apartheid.”665 This 
statement was extremely optimistic about the prospect of race and racial classification no 
longer being used in South Africa in the post-apartheid era. Unfortunately, this has not 
proved to be the case. Not only does South Africa continue to classify people into race 
groups, the courts have determined that creating affirmative action policies that allow for 
the implementation of a racial hierarchy is a legitimate process.666 In other words, under 
affirmative action measures, there is now a recurrence of the racial hierarchy of 
apartheid, though this time the hierarchy has been reversed to: Africans, Indians, 
Coloureds and then Whites. 
 
5.3.2 Race Classification: Who is Black? 
 
The issue of race classification will be dealt with first, since without specific classes there 
can be no question of a racial hierarchy. The EEA designates groups which consist of 
black people, women and people with disabilities as the beneficiaries of affirmative 
action.667 The EEA loosely defines a black person as being a person who is African, 
Coloured or Indian. The EEA does not, however, set out the criteria for such 
classifications. This means that an employer may find it genuinely difficult to include 
certain employees in its EEP as it may have a problem ascertaining which race they come 
from. In practice, the employer is likely to ask the employee which race they come from 
and put that into their report on employment equity transformation. However, this leaves 
certain grey areas that can be exploited since the EEA and Courts seem to have accepted 
that a racial hierarchy exists in affirmative action.668 Accordingly the EEA, it can be 
                                                                                                                                            
663 Act 114 of 1991. 
664 Act 30 of 1950. 
665 Smythe Race Classification: The ‘Implications of the Repeal of the Population Registration Act’ (1992) 
3 South African Human Rights Yearbook 241 at 241. 
666 See Motala v University of Natal 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D); Public Service Association – Gerhard Koorts 
v Free State Provincial Administration Unreported CCMA FS3915 21 May 1998; McInnes v Technikon 
Natal (2000) 21 ILJ 1138 (LC); NEHAWU on behalf of Thomas v Department of Justice (2001) 22 ILJ 306 
(BCA)and Crotz v Worcester Transitional Local Council (2001) 22 ILJ 750 (CCMA) for examples of 
affirmative action hierarchies based both on race and gender. 
667 Section 1 of the EEA. 
668 Although the majority of court decisions support racial hierarchies, the courts have not always accepted 
this to be the correct. See IMAWU v Greater Louis Trichardt City Council 2000 (21) ILJ 1119 (LC) for 
example. 
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argued, has left a serious gap in the provisions relating to the identification of who the 
beneficiaries of affirmative action are. Racial classification criteria have still to be 
decided but with classification comes the assumption of giving priority to one group over 
another as demonstrated in the case law examples in 5.3.3 below. 
 
5.3.3  The Concept of a Racial Hierarchy 
 
(a) Racial Hierarchy in Education 
 The hierarchical nature of affirmative action first arose in the of Motala v University of 
Natal. The case revolved around a dispute about applications to the University of Natal 
medical school. In casu, a female Indian applicant (F) was denied admission into the 
school of medicine at the University of Natal despite the fact that she met all the 
requirements for entry into the school. Despite rejecting the applicant, the University 
accepted African applicants who were not as suitable for acceptance as F. The university 
argued that as apartheid allowed for a racial hierarchy when it discriminated, so 
affirmative action should allow for a racial hierarchy to rectify that discrimination and 
redress the disadvantage of the past. 
 
Due to the legacy of apartheid, the University set a lower standard for admissions of 
black applicants than it did for Indian applicants. In terms of its affirmative action policy, 
the University had reserved a certain number of places for different race groups.669 The 
                                               
669 “The Dean of the respondent's Faculty of Medicine stated that the respondent endeavoured to 
circumvent this difficulty by means of an ‘affirmative-action programme’ to the following effect – 
(a) The programme is an attempt to take into account the educational disadvantages to which certain 
students have been subjected and is directed at determining the true potential of each aspirant 
student. 
(b) The faculty evaluates the performance at school of African students in a way which is different 
from that employed in relation to students schooled under other education departments. 
(c) The matriculation results of accepted African applicants will in almost all cases be lower than 
those of other applicants who are accepted, and indeed lower than those of other applicants who 
are not accepted. 
(d) By these means it is possible to identify a pool of African students who satisfy the University's 
requirements for admission to the Medical Faculty. 
(e) The principal difficulty then becomes a matter of comparing students who have been assessed on 
different bases, and it is almost impossible to do this. A policy decision has to be made. 
(f) It is safe for the respondent to assume that there is no question of the selection process being 
unfair for so long as the numbers chosen from a particular cultural group, expressed as a 
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forty places reserved for Indians students had been filled and, therefore, F could not be 
accepted even though students who did not have as strong an application as F could be 
accepted as they were African. The applicants (the parents of F) contended that F had 
been unfairly discriminated against and that the University’s affirmative action policy 
was unconstitutional. 
 
The court, however, gave the following answer in its rejection of the applicant’s 
contention: 
 
“The contention by the counsel for the applicants appears to be based upon the 
premise that there were no degrees of disadvantage. While there is no doubt 
whatsoever that the Indian group was decidedly disadvantaged by the 
apartheid system, the evidence before me establishes clearly that the degree of 
disadvantage to which African pupils were subjected under the ‘four tier’ 
system of education was significantly greater than that suffered by their Indian 
counterparts. I do not consider that a selection system which compensates for 
this discrepancy runs counter to the provisions of section 8 (1).”670 
 
(b) Racial Hierarchy in Employment 
In the case of Public Service Association – Gerhard Koorts v Free State Provincial 
Administration671, it was claimed by the applicant that she - a white woman - should also 
enjoy the benefits bestowed upon designated groups by affirmative action. The case arose 
as the respondent had been unsuccessful in an application to a position which was given 
to a black person. In this case, the Court agreed with the contention put forward by the 
employer that “white women did not suffer discrimination ‘nearly to the same extent’ as 
that experienced by blacks.”672 Although this case revolves around a hierarchy between 
gender and race, it still serves to illustrate the hierarchical nature of affirmative action. 
                                                                                                                                            
percentage of the total admission, did not exceed the representation that cultural groups has in 
society.”  
Motala v University of Natal 375G-J. See also Mbao ‘The Province of the South African Bill of Rights 
Determined and Re-determined’ (1996) 113 SALJ 33 at 37 for a further discussion in this on the University 
of Natal’s admissions policy and the Motala case. 
670 Motala v University of Natal 283 C–E. 
671 Unreported CCMA Ruling FS3915 21 May 1998. 
672 Dupper et al Essential Employment Discrimination Law (2004) 265. 
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It was similarly held in the case of McInnes v Technikon Natal by Penzhorn AJ that: 
 
“The Technikon defines affirmative action as the upliftment and advancement 
of all previously disadvantaged communities by seeking to redress the 
imbalances of the past. The first disadvantaged community to be considered at 
Technikon Natal is the African community (indigenous people who were here 
before European colonisation). Other disadvantaged communities include, 
amongst others, Indians, coloureds, women and disabled people.’”673 
 
A third relevant case arose in the April 2006 private arbitration award in the case of 
Christiaans v Eskom.674 The Applicant in casu was a Coloured male (Christiaans) who 
applied for a post advertised by Eskom (the Respondent). Although nine applications 
were received for the post only two of the applicants were shortlisted and interviewed. 
The two applicants shortlisted and interviewed were Christiaans and Mashigo, an African 
male. Both applicants were subjected to the same test and Christiaans scored far higher 
than Mashingo.675 Despite being recommended for the available post by the interview 
and assessment panel, Christiaans was not appointed to the position. Instead, senior 
management preferred Mashingo because he was African and Christiaans was Coloured. 
Christiaans’ first contention was that the Respondent unfairly discriminated against him 
and that the Respondent had committed an unfair labour practice. 
 
On reference to the issue of unfair discrimination, the arbitrator responded as follows: 
 
“Evidence reflected that although Coloured and Black [African] employees 
were underrepresented within Respondent on the particular level, the level of 
under representation of Africans were markedly higher than that of Coloured. 
Hence [the] decision to appoint Mashingo… I am of the view that the 
Applicant failed to show any prima facie discrimination. Even if I am wrong 
in that assessment, Respondent’s evidence showed that the appointment of 
                                               
673 McInnes v Technikon Natal 1148 D–E. Emphasis on the word first put in by author. 
674 Private Arbitration Proceedings held at Bellville: Western Cape. A full report of the ruling is available at 
www.sunsite.wits.ac.za/osall/docs/hotdocs/SOLIDARITY_OBO_CHRISTIAANS_V_ESKOM.pdfs. 
675 “Christiaans attained the highest score according to the key dimensions set by the panel. He attained a 
total mark of 73.6 against the 61 of Mashigo.” Christiaans v Eskom 2. 
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Mashigo was contemplated by Section 9 (2) of the Constitution in that it 
targeted a person that was disadvantaged by unfair… discrimination, that it 
was designed to advance such person and that it promoted the achievement of 
equality, as is mandated by the EEA… The undisputed evidence was that 
African males were the second priority for appointment in the Respondent’s 
Western Region, whilst coloured males were the fourth priority. On evidence 
submitted and assessed against the prevailing legal standards, I cannot find 
that Respondent was discriminated against Applicant.”676 
 
Similarly, on the issue of whether or not an unfair labour practice had occurred, the 
arbitrator dismissed the Applicant’s contention. It was decided that there was no evidence 
of frivolous, capricious or unreasonable action on the part of senior management in 
appointing Mashigo and, therefore, it was impossible to come to a finding that 
Respondent had committed an unfair labour practice. 
 
5.3.4  Racial Hierarchies and Race Classification: A Pernicious Practice  
  
(a)  The Problem of Racial Classification 
Race classification is an important issue that has not really been addressed. One   
beneficiary group of affirmative action is ‘black people’ and that term has not been given 
an absolute definition. The problem here is that black people are not a people in South 
Africa that are finitely defined. This has left it up to the courts on a case by case basis to 
make judgments and, as can be seen, most of these judgements have broken down the 
designated group and established a racial hierarchy. In order to avoid these seemingly 
random precedents, it might be necessary to institute a classification of people into 
different race groups. This can be done to allow for employment equity to be properly 
implemented. A racial classification could be done by following one of two approaches. 
A general approach would be to place people into a certain race class by the 
circumstances and facts of their life. The specific approach could be a medical test to 
classify each person into their own race.  
 
                                               
676 Christiaans v Eskom 17 – 24. 
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This raises enormous political and social problems. Using either the general or specific 
approach, two people from one family may end up being considered to be of a different 
race – as happened during apartheid.677 Race classification, and the two tests, also bring 
up an extremely sensitive and contentious topic and digs up the grave of apartheid. Race 
classification and segregation was a major ideal in apartheid and by allowing for race 
classification, one merely perpetuates the cycle of compartmentalising people rather than 
bringing them together. Not only does race testing invoke the horrors of the past but, it is 
submitted, that being forced to endure such a test will infringe on a person’s right to 
dignity. 
 
(b) Racial Hierarchies 
Having a racial classification system can only be for one reason – to allow for 
prioritisation of one race over another – another legacy from South Africa’s history.  
As can be seen, in the cases described previously,678 a racial hierarchy was used in the 
implementation of affirmative action policies. Such a reading of the EEA opens the door 
to the reintroduction of racial hierarchy in South Africa. The question now arises as to 
whether or not judicial precedent should be followed to allow for the continuation of 
racial hierarchies and the inevitable comparisons with an apartheid ideology. On the 
surface, the allowing of racial hierarchies seems to be valid in terms of the justification 
                                               
677 Using either the general or specific approach, two people from one family may end up being considered 
to be of a different race – as happened during apartheid. Desmond Tutu puts the infringement on dignity 
and the disgrace caused by race classification tests well in a speech at the Nelson Mandela Foundation 
Lecture on 23 November 2004: “And oh the humiliation and awfulness of race classification with its crude 
tests – sticking a pin suddenly into one and depending on whether you yelped, ‘Aina’ or ‘Aitsho’ you were 
classified ‘coloured’ or ‘Bantu’ and the havoc it all played with family life when siblings could be assigned 
to different race groups because some were more swarthy than others and do you remember that people 
committed suicide because of race classification; others played white and would avoid members of their 
families who were less Caucasian-looking.” See 
http://www.safm.co.za/webfeatures/featureItemDetail.jsp?featureID=12&itemID=23 for the full text of the 
speech by Desmond Tutu. 
678 Motala v University of Natal; Public Service Association – Gerhard Koorts v Free State Provincial 
Administration; and McInnes v Technikon Natal have been cited as examples. See MWU obo Van Coller v 
Eskom [1999] 9 BLLR 1089 (IMSSA); Department of Correctional Services v Van Vuuren (1999) 20 ILJ 
2297 (LAC) Eskom v Hiemstra NO & others (1999) 20 ILJ 2362 (LC); Walters v Transitional Local 
Council of Port Elizabeth & Another (2000) 21 ILJ 2723 (LC); Germishuys v Upington Municipality 
(2000) 21 ILJ 2439 (LC); NEHAWU on behalf of Thomas v Department of Justice (2001) 22 ILJ 306 
(BCA); Crotz v Worcester Transitional Local Council (2001) 22 ILJ 750 (CCMA); and Fourie v Provincial 
Commissioner, SAPS (North West Province) [2004] 9 BLLR 895 (LC) for further examples of actions 
arising out of one designated group being ranked higher than another. 
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given for allowing affirmative action to be focused on groups rather than individuals 
above under 5.2.1 If one wishes to validate the group model of affirmative action by 
attempting to rectify the past group discrimination679, then one would assume that the 
group affirmative action necessarily includes a racial hierarchy.  
 
The problem with this approach, however, is that it proliferates the differentiation 
between groups in South Africa. This segregation defeats the purpose of the South 
African concept of the value of equality as it has the effect of dividing groups rather than 
bringing them together to be one people, one nation.680 The re-introduction of racial 
hierarchy inevitably conflicts with this oft-stated ideal of the new democratic South 
Africa. 
 
5.3.5 Possible Solutions 
 
The questions remain: how far will affirmative action go on the road of racial 
classification and racial hierarchy? How can this be justified as bringing about 
substantive equality? Is it acceptable to reverse the apartheid hierarchy until equality is 
achieved? Is it more important to rectify the effects of apartheid than to treat South 
Africans as people, regardless of race, gender or ability? I would submit that there are 
incipient dangers for the stability and harmony of the country if this cycle is perpetuated. 
 
As can be seen from 5.3, there are arguments for and against race classification and a 
racial hierarchy. So then, the issue still remains open as to whether or not race 
classification and race hierarchies should be accepted into employment equity law in 
                                               
679 It was argued earlier in this chapter under 5.2.1 that the group model of affirmative action was justified 
due to the fact that it was groups who were discriminated against during apartheid. If one were to follow 
this line of reasoning, the only conclusion that can be drawn regarding racial hierarchies is that they should 
exist in affirmative action because they existed in apartheid. However, this is a problematic approach as 
will be discussed in further detail. 
680 The distaste for racial hierarchies can be shown by the following statement made by a male Indian 
constable: “All of a sudden we have become too white because Indians are completely discriminated 
against. In terms of equity, Indians and coloureds are supposed to benefit, but it seems only blacks are 
considered for promotion. I have been at this station for four years and I am still doing what I was doing 
four years ago.” See Newham et al ‘Diversity and Transformation in the South African Police Service’ at 
http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papgntm.pdf#search=%22%22Beneficiaries%20of%20Affirmative%20Acti
on%22%22 (accessed on 21 August 2006). 
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South Africa. The problem with finding a solution to this issue is that there cannot be a 
compromise, there has to be either a racial classification and racial hierarchy system or 
not. If a race classification and hierarchy system are used, it is a full measure and not a 
half measure. 
 
(a) Race Classification 
Despite the fact several arguments have been put forward criticising race classification681 
in this work, there is still an important need for race classification in South Africa. This 
classification is necessary in order to allow for a true implementation of the EEA. It will 
enable designated employers to be able to be able to correctly define the representivity of 
its workforce rather than merely guess as to who would be included as ‘black’ for 
affirmative action purposes. 
 
The proposed solution to this problem is to follow the Canadian model of race 
classification. The Canadian Employment Equity Act682 bestows benefits on people 
falling into ‘designated groups’. According to the CEEA, the designated group includes 
women, aboriginal peoples, people with disabilities and people who are members of 
visible minorities. There is, however, one additional requirement to be a beneficiary of 
affirmative action in Canada. According to section 9 (2) of the CEEA, only employees 
who identify themselves or agree to be identified by an employer as a person falling into 
the category of ‘designated group’ will be considered as members of that designated 
group. 
 
                                               
681 An example of anti-race classification sentiment is the legal campaign being waged by AfriForum: “In 
the first campaign, AfriForum will assist senior citizens in residences which receive State subsidies, as well 
as all other people who make use of State subsidised social services, to refuse on legal grounds to be 
classified according to race. In addition, AfriForum has already instructed its legal team to explore the 
viability of a class action, if the State were to continue classifying the people who refuse thereto, according 
to race.” See Kriel ‘AfriForum Launches Defiance Campaign Against Racial Classification’ at 
http://www.solidaritysa.co.za/Home/wmview.php?ArtID=451 (accessed 18 August 2006). A further 
argument against race classification has arisen around the fact that race classification has been dropped by 
South Africa’s Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF). “‘It's a double-edged sword,’ says Modise 
Makhene, MD of advertising agency Creativity. ‘Marketers have been asking for it (to be dropped) for 
some time. I'm not sure it should be dropped for research purposes. But if you use it the way it has often 
been used up to now, you end up stereotyping people.’” See Mahabane ‘A Double Edged Sword’ at 
http://free.financialmail.co.za/report/adfocus2002/marketing/mark1.htm (accessed 20 August 2006). 
682 Act c44 of 1995. 
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Although this approach allows for the separation of different people into different 
categories and perpetuates the labelling of people. South Africa will not have a 
governmentally implemented race classification scheme but a voluntary system that 
allows individuals to assign themselves to a race group. This gives the people of South 
Africa a choice and the chance to choose their own destiny.683 This approach may have 
the unfortunate effect of perpetuating race classification in South Africa but it is 
submitted that for the purposes of employment equity, it is arguably necessary for the 
time being. 684 
 
(b)  Racial Hierarchies 
I submit that a formal racial hierarchy is fundamentally pernicious and cannot be 
justified. It invalidates affirmative action when the stated goal of the EEA is to bring 
about substantive equality. This is because it perpetuates inequality between groups by 
allowing discrimination on the basis of race to continue. However, this does not mean 
that there should not be any notion of preferring one race over another within the generic 
‘black’ umbrella. The approach that should be followed, it is submitted, is the approach 
used in the Christiaans case with regards to representivity.685 
 
Although the Christiaans case cited the Motala case in its judgment, one interpretation of 
the case, it can be argued, is that it does not establish a precedent for a blanket racial 
hierarchy on a national level. Instead, it proposes the creation of priorities at a local level. 
In other words, there must be an analysis of each region and market sector at a micro 
                                               
683 A further problem with a third party race classification and not a ‘self-classification system’ is that: 
“Personnel at institutions as diverse as hospitals recording births and universities recording admissions, as 
well as equity and line managers in companies, often ‘classify’ individuals on the basis of surnames, 
language spoken, appearance, accent, place of residence and the like.” See Lehohla ‘Race is Just One 
Variable in Monitoring Change’ at http://www.statssa.gov.za/news_archive/12may2005_1.asp (accessed on 
18 August 2006) for a further discussion on the concept of ‘self-classification’ and the prejudices involved 
with ‘third-party classification’ systems. 
684 This seems to happen in everyday practical examples when a person fills in their race on an application 
form, for example, without having to give proof of their race group. Obviously this cannot be an arbitrary 
choice with no substantial reason for choosing a particular race group. A person must have some substantial 
reason to be part of that race group. For example, an individual with an African mother and Coloured father 
could choose to be African or Coloured but could not choose to be White or Indian. 
685 Christiaans v Eskom 22. 
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level. This may create a heavy administrative burden but it will help create a fully 
functional, just and more efficient employment equity scheme. 
 
Although the Christiaans case was the first case to propose and support the idea of 
proportionate representivity and prioritising under the provisions of the EEA, the Durban 
City Council (Electricity Department) v Kalichuran686 proposed the idea in 1995 under 
the respective provisions of the time.687 In Durban City Council, the court held that due 
to the fact 23% of the positions available in middle management were held by Indian 
people, “a percentage corresponding to their representation in the labour market … the 
specific job category in question (manager area construction electricity) could therefore 
not be one in respect of which affirmative action in favour of Indian candidates should 
apply.”688 This case serves as a good example of the use of prioritising and proportionate 
representivity even though it was not decided under the provisions of the EEA. It is 
submitted that this case has the important function of providing persuasive value to any 
rulings or interpretations of the EEA. 
 
The EEA in fact, fully supports the notion of drawing up a profile of the workforce in the 
employment equity plan creation. “The purpose of drawing up a profile is to establish 
whether people from designated groups are under-represented in any occupational 
category or at any level within the organisation.”689 This means that an employer should 
be aware of the levels of representivity in his or her workplace.690 Accordingly, it would 
be a fairly simple task to assess which group of people are underrepresented and, 
therefore, create a priority to employ women for example, rather than black people.  
 
                                               
686 (1995) 4 ARB 6.9.23 at http://www.irnet.co.za. 
687 Although this case was not decided under the provisions of the EEA as they stand today, it serves as a 
good example for the courts and may have persuasive value in any decision of the court. 
688 Pretorius Employment Equity Law 9-12 – 9-13. 
689 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 4th ed (2003) 604. 
690 In NEHAWU on behalf of Thomas v Department of Justice (2001) 22 ILJ 306 (BCA) it was successfully 
argued by the Department of Justice that “section 195 (1)(i) of the Constitution, which requires the public 
administration to be broadly representative of the South African people” allowed for them to prefer a 
similarly qualified Indian female candidate over a Coloured male candidate. 
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Although this may seem that the concept of quotas is being adopted, quotas have no place 
in employment equity. “The reason why the Act does not insist on quotas is, presumably, 
to enable employers and their consulting partners to take account of market realities and 
other factors relevant to the employment of persons from designated groups in various 
occupational areas.”691 It would seem, therefore, that the Act intends a system that allows 
for micro-level representivity schemes and the promotion of representivity rather than 
creating a quota system that is unrealistic and has no real effect. Instead, one should aim 
to achieve a representative workforce in relation to the representivity of the society in 
which that workforce is based.  
 
5.4 The Shield and the Sword: The Dudley – Harmse Debate 
 
“But does this mean then that affirmative action is then merely a shield for an 
enlightened employer or does it serve as a sword for a disadvantaged person?” 
– Landman P692 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
This section examines the shield and sword debate693, revolving around the cases of 
Harmse v City of Cape Town694, decided in 2003, and Dudley v City of Cape Town695, 
decided in 2004. The conflict between the two cases arises between the ‘shield and 
                                               
691 Du Toit Labour Relations Law 608. 
692 Abbot v Bargaining Council for the Motor Industry (Western Cape) (1999) 20 ILJ 330 (LC) 334 A-B. 
693 “Affirmative action’s main aim is generally to ensure that the previously disadvantaged groups are fairly 
represented in the workforce of a particular employer. It must therefore be borne in mind that affirmative 
action is said to be a shield in the hands of an employer, and not a sword to be used by individuals. This 
means that as a rule, an applicant for employment or promotion cannot rely on affirmative action in order to 
compel the employer to appoint or promote him. Affirmative action exists as a justification group for 
employers against allegations of discrimination.” See Author Unknown ‘The Regulation of Affirmative 
Action and Discrimination in South Africa’ at http://etd.unisa.ac.za/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-
08112006-
145645/unrestricted/07chapter6.pdf#search=%22affirmative%2Baction%2Bsword%2Bshield%22 
(accessed on 21 August 2006). 
694 [2003] 6 BLLR 557 (LC). 
695 [2004] JOL 12499 (LC). See also Ntai & others v SA Breweries Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 214 (LC) at 218-219 
where it was held that an “‘anti-discrimination clause’ such as item 2(1)(a) of schedule 7 to the LRA can be 
interpreted as awarding a victim of discrimination the right to affirmative action. On the contrary, a 
legislative measure such as chapter 2 of the EEA is needed to provide possible remedies in this regard.” 
 167 
sword’ theory.696 The sword and the shield debate relates to the issue of whether or not 
members of designated groups have the right to preferential treatment. The original case 
of Harmse held that there was a right to preferential treatment (a sword) for beneficiaries 
of affirmative action. In the Dudley case, on the other hand, the Court declined to follow 
the Harmse precedent and said that there was no right to preferential treatment and, 
therefore, no grounds for a cause of action if an application is unsuccessful.  
 
In the case of Abbott v Bargaining Council for the Motor Industry (Western Cape)697 it 
was held by Landman P that: 
  
“Affirmative action of persons belonging to disadvantaged groups or 
categories is a defence against the principal injunction not to discriminate in 
employment. But does this mean that affirmative action is then merely a 
shield for an enlightened employer or does it serve as a sword for a 
disadvantaged person? … An applicant for employment derives no right from 
a contractual or negotiated affirmative action policy.”698 
 
Although this case, heard in 1999, deals with the issue of whether or not designated 
groups have a right to affirmative action, the case was decided under the now defunct 
provisions of the Labour Relations Act699, which were repealed to make way for the 
provisions of the Employment Equity Act. Accordingly, the case does not have a great 
effect on the law as it stands today. Therefore, the significant decisions revolving around 
the shield and the sword debate arise from the Harmse and Dudley cases. 
                                               
696 It was held in Harmse v City of Cape Town at para 44 that: “One of the ways in which this issue has 
been posed by the Respondent is that affirmative action may only serve as a defence. In part this is correct. 
The real answer, however, lies in the determination of who is making the claim of affirmative action. It 
may find a cause of action in the hands of one and a defence in the hands of the other. … However, having 
regard to the fact that the Act requires an employer to take measures to eliminate discrimination in the 
workplace, it also serves as a sword.” It was later held in Dudley v City of Cape Town at para 75 that: “I 
regret that I am unable to follow [the Harmse] result. In my respectful view the learned Judge has not 
sufficiently maintained the distinction between Chapters 2 and 3 that the interpretation of the Act requires.” 
697 See TGWU & Another v Bayete Security Holdings (1999) 29 ILJ 1117 (LC); Mahlanyana v Cadbury 
(Pty) Ltd (2000)21 ILJ 2274 (LC); and Lagadien v University of Cape Town (2000) 21 ILJ 2469 (LC) for 
further examples of cases brought before the existence of the EEA that discuss the issue of whether or not 
affirmative action acts as a shield or sword. See Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour 
Practices (2005) at 93 for a further discussion of these cases and the pre-EEA position regarding the sword 
and shield debate 
698 Abbott v Bargaining Council for the Motor Industry (Western Cape) 334 A–B. 
699 Act 66 of 1995. 
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5.4.2 Harmse v City of Cape Town 
 
The first case to discuss the issue of whether or not persons belonging to designated 
groups have a right to affirmative action under the law as set down by the EEA was the 
case of Harmse v City of Cape Town in 2003. 
 
(a) The Background 
In this case, the applicant, Mr Harmse - a ‘black person’ in terms of the EEA - applied for 
three posts with the City of Cape Town. He was not short-listed for any of the posts for 
which he applied. Following his unsuccessful application, Harmse took the matter to 
Court as he felt that he had been unfairly denied a place on the shortlists for the posts. 
Harmse alleged that he had been denied these positions because the employer “had 
unfairly discriminated against him by not short listing him for three posts for which he 
had applied … because he was coloured, lacked relevant experience and because of his 
political beliefs.”700 
 
The employer’s contentions in this case were: firstly, the statement of the claim submitted 
by Harmse in support of his action, as per rule 6 of the labour court rules, did not disclose 
a cause of action. The employer, in essence, argued that affirmative action was a defence 
(shield) and not a cause of action or right (sword). Secondly, “the employer’s exception 
to the ‘lack of relevant experience’ claim forced the court to consider the existence of 
such a claim in law and to enter the realm of affirmative action.”701 
 
(b)  The Judgment 
The crux of the judgment of the Labour Court in this case was that affirmative action is 
not just a shield for employers but is also a sword for employees. This is shown by the 
judgment of Waglay J through the following commentary: 
 
                                               
700 Michael ‘Affirmative Action – Shield or Sword?’ at http://www.wylie.co.za/Site/CMS/Article-
Body.asp?articleID=89 (accessed 30 May 2006). 
701 Dupper et al Essential Employment Discrimination Law (2004) 279. 
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“If an employer fails to promote the achievement of equality through taking 
affirmative action measures, then it may properly be said that the employer 
has violated the right of an employee who falls within one of the designated 
groups not to be unfairly discriminated against. Similarly, if an employer 
discriminates against an employee in the non-designated group by 
preferring an employee from the designated group who is not ‘suitably 
qualified’ as contemplated in sections 20 (3) to (5) of the Act, then the 
employer has violated the right of such an employee not to be discriminated 
against unfairly. In either case, the issue is whether the employer has 
violated the employee’s right not to be discriminated against. To this extent, 
affirmative action can found a basis for a cause of action. 
 
On an analysis of the Constitution and the [EEA] I am satisfied that the Act 
and specifically sections 20 (3) to (5) read with Chapter II do indeed 
provide for a right to affirmative action. The exact scope or boundaries of 
such a right is a matter that will have to be developed out of the facts of 
each case.”702 
 
The judgment was, therefore, ground breaking in its conclusion.703 This judgment created 
a strong and pronounced affirmative action system in South Africa. By giving employees 
‘the sword’, employees now had the power to litigate if the employer does not correctly 
implement or carry out affirmative action. One of the key considerations when coming to 
the conclusion that equated an “absence of affirmative action with unfair discrimination, 
was the view that ss 20 (3) – (5) of the EEA applied for purposes of the whole of the 
EEA.”704 
 
(c) Commentary on the Harmse Judgment 
Although the Harmse judgment has been met with much criticism and the Dudley case 
                                               
702 Harmse v City of Cape Town 571 E–J. 
703 “The Judge in the Harmse case found that the protection and advancement of persons disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination is recognised by the Constitution as part of the right to equality. In this sense, The 
Judge was of the view that affirmative action is more than just a shield otherwise it would only be available 
to employers.” See Maeso ‘Is Affirmative Action a Right?’ at 
http://www.wylie.co.za/%7DUploads/Docs/ir.pdf#search=%22Harmse%2BDudley%22 (accessed on 21 
August 2006).  
704 Garbers ‘Is there a Right to Affirmative Action Appointment?’ (2004) 13 (7) CLL 61 at 65. 
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has been given much credit,705 the Harmse judgment is still of great importance. The 
major strength of this judgment is the power it gives to employees. When critiquing the 
judgment one needs to take note what the Court wanted to achieve when coming to its 
judgment as well as the ramifications of the judgment. “After all – if our society is 
serious about substantive equality (inclusive of affirmative action as a measure to 
contribute to the achievement of substantive equality), it seems to follow logically that 
the notion of unfair discrimination (as a violation of the right to equality) has to be 
expanded to include infringements by an employer of substantive equality.”706 
 
The greatest strength with this is that employees have the power to ensure that the EEA is 
given full effect. By giving employees the sword, they can take employers to court if they 
have not fulfilled their obligations as set out by the EEA. Essentially, it ensures that 
employers do not have a lacklustre attitude toward preferential treatment and the 
implementation of affirmative action as they may suffer litigation. It can be compared to 
the right to strike and the recourse to lock-out.707 These two processes give the employer 
and employee a certain amount of power over each other to ensure that the other 
performs their duties and obligations in the proper manner.708 
 
The major problem with the Harmse judgment, it is submitted, is that it may give rise to a 
rush of litigation. Any unsuccessful applicant could approach the courts claiming that 
their ‘right to preferential treatment’ has been infringed. This will create a huge workload 
for the courts, slowing down the court process and causing major administrative and 
procedural problems. A second problem that is submitted is that the fear of litigation may 
force employers to appoint designated groups candidates for positions even though the 
applicants may not be suitably qualified. It is further submitted that this will have the 
                                               
705 See Grogan Workplace Law at 295; Wilken ‘Affirmative Action Case Law Developments’; and Garbers 
(2004) 13 (7) CLL 61 at 65 for examples of criticising the Harmse judgment and promoting the Dudley 
judgment. 
706 Garbers (2004) 13 (7) CLL 61 at 63. 
707 The right to strike can be found in section 23 (2) (c) of the Constitution and section 64 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995. The recourse to lock-out, however, can be found only in section 64 of the Labour 
Relations Act. 
708 See Wallis Labour and Employment Law (1995) at para 47; and Brassy Commentary on the Labour 
Relations Act (1999) at chapter IV for a further discussion on strikes and lock-outs. 
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effect of reducing the quality of work produced by the employer as the new employee is 
not as efficient in the position as other applicants or employees. 
 
A further problem relates to the concept of equality in the Constitution where it is stated 
that, “legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories 
of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”709 As can be seen, 
legislative measures may be taken, not must. The fact that the section refers to ‘legislative 
and other measures’, highlights the fact that affirmative action is a means to an end.710 
Following this, one must “remain wary of simply equating a measure (such as affirmative 
action) with a value (such as equality). Measures, by definition, are pragmatic and 
temporary. Values, by definition and by way of contrast, are eternal.” 711Accordingly, by 
giving the right to affirmative action (which was intended to be a measure), one gives it a 
sense of permanency.712 
 
Moreover, the judgment arises around the fact that its main focus was based on an 
interpretation of the EEA that created, or discovered, a link between Chapters II and III 
of the EEA.713 “The establishment of such a link is, of course, necessary if one wants to 
recognise a duty on all employers to implement affirmative action, and that all members 
of designated groups have a right to affirmative action and that the absence of affirmative 
action can constitute unfair discrimination (again, by all employers).”714  
 
The difficulty with this reasoning is that it goes too far. If one allows for a link to be 
made between Chapter II and III that creates the right to affirmative action under the 
guise of the protections against unfair discrimination contained in Chapter II of the EEA, 
one extends the duty to implement affirmative action to all employers. The EEA was not 
created to focus on all employers with regards to affirmative action. It was created to 
focus on designated employers and create obligations on set employers to implement 
                                               
709 Section 9 (2) of the Constitution. Emphasis has been added on the word may by author. 
710 George v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 999J – 1000G. 
711 Dupper Essential Employment 282 
712 The fact that affirmative action is only valid if it is of a temporary nature will be discussed in further 
detail under 5.5 of this work. 
713 Dupper Essential Discrimination. 
714 Dupper Essential Discrimination 283. 
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affirmative action. This is why the two chapters are divided and affirmative action 
measures are specifically focused on designated employers not all employers. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the creation of this link makes the concept of a 
‘designated employer’ a frivolous notion that lacks any real impact. This submission is 
based on the belief that the link causes the notion of designated employers to become 
obsolete as it causes the affirmative action obligations to fall on all employers. 
 
The Harmse judgment has also been criticised in that it ignores the facts and, is   
“inconsistent with the fact that there are enforcement procedures in existence in the EEA 
and that this is not one of them.”715 The issue of whether or not there was a cause of 
action arising out of not being preferentially treated could have arisen in the drafting of 
the EEA and been turned down. The EEA, instead, put power in its own hands and made 
itself a self-regulating Act, giving power to the Commission for Employment Equity, 
labour inspectors, State contracts and various other enforcement provisions to ensure its 
goals were achieved. 
 
5.4.3 Dudley v City of Cape Town 
 
(a) The Background 
In this case, Dr Dudley – a black woman – unsuccessfully applied for a more senior 
position within the City of Cape Town. The position was given to the second respondent 
in the case, Dr Toms – a white male.716 Dudley contended that the City of Cape Town 
had unfairly discriminated against her and reflected bias in favour of white persons or 
males over black persons and women. She further contended that the decision to appoint 
the second respondent, Toms, violated the obligation to implement affirmative action in 
terms of the EEA. She then contended that the City of Cape Town violated its 
constitutional obligation to implement “affirmative action measures as this infringed her 
                                               
715 Grogan Workplace Law 296. 
716 “After having referred the case to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration, Dudley 
brought an application in the Labour Court seeking, inter alia, an order to set aside the appointment of the 
white male candidate and appointing her in that position.” See Motalti ‘Affirmative Action In South Africa: 
An Enforceable Right Or A Defence?’ at 
http://law.sun.ac.za/equityexecsummary.pdf#search=%22Harmse%2BDudley%22 (accessed on 21 August 
2006). 
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right to equality, its constitutional duty to implement fair labour practices and her right to 
dignity. Finally, Dudley contended that Toms’ appointment amounted to unfair labour 
practice as it did not comply with the first respondent’s affirmative action policy.”717 
 
The City of Cape Town, on the other hand, contended that the Labour Court had no 
jurisdiction as Dudley should have exhausted the monitoring, enforcement and 
compliance procedures provided for in Chapter 5 of the EEA. The contention was that it 
was not the correct procedure to pursue unfair labour practice claims in the Labour Court, 
unless by agreement. The City of Cape Town contended further that appointing Toms 
over Dudley did not, in fact, amount to unfair discrimination.718 Their third contention 
was that Dudley’s claim that she was the better candidate, “alternatively ought to have 
been appointed on affirmative action grounds are mutually inconsistent or contradictory 
claims and are accordingly vague, embarrassing and bad in law.”719 
 
(b)  The Judgment 
On an analysis of the submissions put forward, the main conclusion the Court had to 
come to was to comment on the ‘sword and shield’ precedent as set down by Waglay, J in 
the Harmse case. The essence of the judgment can be found in the words of Tip AJ when 
it was stated that: 
 
“I regret that I am unable to follow this result. In my respectful view the 
learned Judge has not sufficiently maintained the distinction between Chapters 
2 and 3 that the interpretation of the Act requires. In general, for the reasons 
set out in this judgment, if due affirmative action measures have not been 
applied by a designated employer that gives rise to an enforcement issue under 
Chapter III and not an unfair discrimination claim under Chapter II. In 
particular, there is with respect no sound basis upon which sections 20 (3) and 
(5) fall to be read together with provisions of Chapter II and, likewise, no 
basis upon which can produce a right to affirmative action.”720 
                                               
717 Wilken ‘Affirmative Action Case Law Developments’ at 
http://www.deneysreitz.co.za/news/news.asp?ThisCat=2&ThisItem=446 (accessed 30 May 2006). 
718 Wilken ‘Affirmative Action’. 
719 Wilken ‘Affirmative Action’. 
720 Dudley v City of Cape Town & Another 438G-439A. 
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The court came to this conclusion on the basis that the general approach of the EEA to 
the concept of affirmative action is both systematic and collective.721 It was also reasoned 
that the EEA sets out specific provisions highlighting the fact that affirmative action is to 
be enforced administratively.722 A further reasoning of the court was that the EEA and 
Constitution both differentiate between affirmative action and unfair discrimination.723 
The final reasoning of the court was that, despite that fact that there may be a plausible 
link between affirmative action and the prohibition of unfair discrimination, they are not 
the same.724 It was held “that logical requirement does not put in place a bridge between 
the provisions of Chapter II and Chapter III. Their purpose and operation remain distinct. 
In general, a failure to comply with the requirements of Chapter III will be a non-
compliance issue and not one of unfair discrimination.”725 
 
The Labour Court, therefore, went back on the decision of the Harmse case. This 
decision nullified the right to preferential treatment. Affirmative action will, from now 
on, merely function as a shield to employers who have actions arising against them due to 
preferential treatment. Affirmative action is no longer a sword; it is no longer a cause of 
action for aggrieved unsuccessful candidates. 
 
(c)  Commentary on the Dudley Judgment 
The main strength of the Dudley judgment, it is submitted, is the severing of the link 
between Chapter II and Chapter III of the EEA that was created by the Harmse judgment.  
By separating these two Chapters of the EEA, “should an applicant be suitably qualified 
and not be successful in being appointed for a particular post, the matter must be dealt 
with administratively as set out in the EEA.”726 
 
                                               
721 Garbers (2004) 13 (7) CLL 61. 
722 Garbers (2004) 13 (7) CLL 61. 
723 Garbers (2004) 13 (7) CLL 61. 
724 Garbers (2004) 13 (7) CLL 61. 
725 Dudley v City of Cape Town & Another 438A. 
726 Wilken ‘Affirmative Action’. 
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By separating these two chapters, it is submitted that the obligation to implement 
affirmative action measures now only falls on designated employers and not all 
employers. The removal of the right to preferential treatment through the claim that one 
has been unfairly discriminated against also prevents an influx of fastidious and frivolous 
litigation.727 As stated above, every unsuccessful applicant who feels aggrieved would be 
able to approach the court under the Harmse judgment and, therefore, would cause an 
inundation of the courts by affirmative action and the infringement of the right thereof 
claims. If an employee has been unfairly discriminated against, however, they are still 
able to bring claims to the court under Chapter II of the EEA, as per the provisions of the 
EEA. A further reason that these Chapters must be separated is that under “Chapter II [of 
the EEA], the presence of unfair discrimination is a matter to be determined by the 
application of law. By contrast, Chapter III [of the EEA] is aimed at promoting 
affirmative action through consultation. Employers must consult employees on the 
content of the equity plan, as well as on its implementation.”728 
 
The separation also brings a return to the self-regulation of the EEA. Chapter II is 
intended to be regulated by adjudication of disputes regarding unfair discrimination, 
whereas the “Enforcement of employers’ affirmative action obligations are dealt with in 
Chapter V. That procedure begins with a complaint to a labour inspector, who must 
establish whether the employer has failed to comply with any of its obligations under the 
Act … if the employer refuses to give such an undertaking or fails to comply with an 
undertaking, the labour inspector must issue a compliance order.”729 By doing so, the 
EEA is now regulated as it was intended to be by the legislature.730 If the drafters 
intended affirmative action claims to be adjudicated in court, one can only assume that 
they would have included such a provision in the EEA. 
                                               
727 This was discussed in the commentary on the Harmse judgment earlier in this chapter where it was 
submitted that: ‘The major problem with the Harmse judgment, it is submitted, is that it may give rise to a 
rush of litigation. Any unsuccessful applicant could approach the courts claiming that their ‘right to 
preferential treatment’ has been infringed. This will create a huge workload for the courts, slowing down 
the court process and causing major administrative and procedural problems.’ See 5.3.2 (c) of this work. 
728 Grogan Workplace Law 297. 
729 Grogan Workplace Law 297. 
730 See Motalti ‘Enforceable Right’, where the judgment is summarised as follows: “Consequently, the 
Court established that the applicant did not have the locus standi to approach the Labour Court directly for 
an order that the City develop and implement an employment equity plan.” 
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Despite the fact that the Dudley judgment brings about a return to following the 
provisions of the EEA by separating the chapters, it does have some weaknesses. One of 
the major weaknesses of the Dudley judgment, it is submitted, is that by accepting the 
City of Cape Town’s contention that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction as Dudley 
should have exhausted the monitoring, enforcement and compliance procedures provided 
for in Chapter 5 of the EEA, one limits the right of access to court. The right of access to 
Court is a fundamental right in the Constitution. Under the right of access to court, 
“everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law 
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent 
and impartial tribunal or forum.”731 
 
If an applicant feels that they have not been given preferential treatment; or if the 
employer has not fulfilled his/her obligation to preferentially treat candidates from 
designated groups, the aggrieved applicant must go through a long arduous process 
before the matter can be heard before the courts. In terms of the ruling of the Dudley 
case, the applicant is under a duty to exhaust all enforcement procedures as provided for 
in the EEA to ensure implementation of affirmative action by designated employers. This 
creates an arduous and tedious process for the employee as opposed to merely taking the 
matter to court to be resolved. 
 
Although not a direct weakness of the Dudley case, the case of FAGWUSA & another v 
Hibiscus Coast Municipality & Others732 followed the Dudley case. This case went on to 
hold that “designated employees are not entitled to appointment merely because they are 
designated. If the employer bona fide considers the qualifications, suitability and 
experience of the candidates, the appointment of a white male might not be unfair to a 
black candidate merely because the successful candidate was a white male.”733 This 
judgment, it is submitted goes one step further than the Dudley case. By allowing for the 
appointment of the candidate from a non-designated group over an equally qualified 
                                               
731 Section 34 of the Constitution. 
732 (2004) 24 ILJ 1976 (LC). 
733 Grogan Workplace Law 298. 
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candidate from a designated group, it is submitted that one ends up rendering the 
preferential treatment in the EEA impotent by bestowing a voluntary status on affirmative 
action rather than the mandatory status it enjoys now.734 
 
The major problem with the Dudley judgment, it is submitted, is that it creates a barrier to 
the enforcement of affirmative action. Although the Harmse case was criticised above for 
creating a ‘fear in employers’, this fear may actually have a salutary effect. It could 
ensure that employers are proactive about implementing affirmative action as they are 
obliged to be under the EEA. A further criticism of the Dudley case is that, a “country 
like South Africa, with its gaping racial differentials in income and access to 
opportunities, cannot afford to have a statute that makes the redressing of these 
imbalances a mere defence in the hands of employers in the unlikely event that they get 
challenged about the implementation of their policies.”735 The members of the designated 
groups as created by the EEA need a sword.736 They need something to fight for their 
substantive equality rather than relying on a static piece of legislation in the EEA to 
ensure that they are given the things promised to them by the EEA. 
 
5.4.4 Affirmative Action: A Shield or Sword?   
  
Both cases accept the fact that affirmative action functions as a shield (defence) for 
employers. This shield can be used when it is claimed by an unsuccessful applicant that 
he or she has been unfairly discriminated against due to preferential treatment of an 
applicant from a designated group. The conflict arises as to whether or not affirmative 
action can also function as a sword (action) for an unsuccessful applicant from a 
                                               
734 It is submitted that if this judgment were to be set down as precedent for future cases, a situation is 
created whereby a white male is able to be given a position over an applicant from a designated group even 
if they were similarly qualified and were both suitably qualified for the job. This is regardless of the 
affirmative action measures in the EEA. In essence, the EEA measures and even the enforcement measures 
of the EEA will be rendered futile if this judgment were to be followed literally. 
735 Mbabane ‘Black Economic Empowerment’. 
736 Although it has been argued previously in this chapter that affirmative action should be focused on 
groups rather than individuals, this does not mean that the individuals within the group are ignored in their 
personal capacity. Any individual within any group is entitled to defend their rights as bestowed upon them 
due to being a member of a certain group or class. In essence, an individual obtains the right to affirmative 
action by being a member of a group. 
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designated group. In other words, can the unsuccessful applicant take action against an 
employer for not applying affirmative action measures and giving that unsuccessful 
applicant from a designated group preferential treatment? 
 
It would seem that the Courts have now chosen their stance in this debate. In the 
subsequent judgments of Public Servants Association (PSA) obo I Karriem v South 
African Police Services (SAPS)737 and Bernadette Kotze as well as Josephine Thekiso v 
IBM South Africa (Pty) Ltd738, held in the Cape Town and Johannesburg Labour Courts 
respectively, the Courts have sided with the Dudley judgment of Tip AJ. 
 
In the Karriem case, Nel AJ considered both the Harmse and Dudley judgments and 
concluded as follows: 
 
“I have considered the reasoning of Tipp AJ in Dudley … as well as that of 
Wagley J in Harmse … and, respectfully, find myself in agreement with the 
reasoning of Tipp AJ. 
 
I further find myself in agreement with Tipp AJ that any issue arising in 
respect of Chapter III of the EEA falls within the framework of Chapter V of 
the EEA and that Section 36 of the EEA sets out the initial enforcement step. 
 
I associate myself fully with the reasoned manner in which Tipp AJ arrived at 
[his] conclusion.” 
 
In support of the judgment passed down by Nel AJ in the Karriem case, Freund AJ in the 
Thekiso held as follows: 
 
“I do not accept that there is any basis on which I could conclude that the 
decision in Dudley was clearly erroneous and I therefore regard myself as 
bound by it. I note in this regard that Dudley was recently followed by this 
court in Public Servants Association, on behalf of I Karriem v SA Police 
Services & Another (unreported Case No C435/04).” 
                                               
737  
738  
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In coming to a conclusion from the argument above, it is submitted that neither case is, in 
fact, entirely correct or incorrect. Although subsequent judgments have endorsed the 
Dudley judgment, it is the writer’s belief that neither case satisfactorily gives a good 
judgment as to whether, and why, the law should merely give a shield or should give a 
sword and a shield. “The difference between Harmse and Dudley is not merely an issue 
of statutory interpretation. It highlights a policy choice.”739 The Harmse decision was a 
complete promotion of substantive equality in that it stated that if two similarly qualified 
applicants apply for the same position, the applicant who is in a designated group must be 
appointed to that post and, if they are not appointed, that person has the right to take 
action against the employer. The Dudley decision promotes formal equality. It shows that 
although there should be a preferential treatment of people from designated groups, it is 
up to legislation (the EEA) to ensure that no barriers are put in the way of this 
preferential treatment. 
 
The submission put forward is, therefore, to find a compromise between the two 
judgments. Although the EEA does not create a sword for designated groups and the 
precedents as set down by Dudley, Karriem and Thekiso specifically deny the use of a 
sword in affirmative action, it is submitted that the EEA should be amended in order to 
truly promote substantive equality. This would bring the EEA completely in line with the 
Constitutional aims. The purpose of affirmative action in South Africa is to ensure 
employment equity and substantive equality. The EEA is a legislative measure which 
enforces the right to substantive equality. By merely offering a shield to employees, one 
takes away much of the power of people in the designated groups to ensure that the 
measures of affirmative action created in the benefit are implemented. 
 
It is submitted that an applicant should be capable of bringing forward an action if they 
feel they should have been given preferential treatment – that there is a legitimate right to 
                                               
739 Grogan ‘Conflict over Equity’ (2004) April Employment Law Journal 17 at 17. 
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affirmative action.740 However, this action may not be brought before the courts if the 
applicant does not have similar qualifications as the other applicants. This must take into 
account all the factors listed in the EEA regarding ‘suitably qualified’. This does not 
mean that the applicant must only be suitably qualified or capable of performing the job 
in order to have the right to preferential treatment, but should be suitably qualified as well 
as having similar qualifications to the other applicants. If the candidate from a designated 
group is similarly qualified to a candidate from a non-designated group and suitably 
qualified, they should have the right to be chosen over that person. By creating this 
requirement to obtain the right to preferential treatment, one would prevent frivolous and 
trivial litigation. By giving the right to do this, it gives affirmative action more power and 
makes its enforcement more possible. By ensuring all possible avenues of enforcement 
are being used, one can bring about employment equity far more speedily than without its 
enforcement. 
 
This submission is, admittedly, a highly idealistic one. However, it is further submitted 
that employment equity is based on the creation of substantive equality, an idealistic and 
morally based goal. In order to achieve such an idealistic goal, one needs to allow for 
strong steps to be taken to promote and endorse these goals. The final submission, 
therefore, is that affirmative action in South Africa should function as both a shield and 
sword, though the applicant must first be a ‘master of the blade’ to wield that sword. 
 
5.5 The Continued Existence of the Employment Equity Act 
 
“It is unfortunate that a ‘sunset clause’ was not included in the Act. Even a 
date in the distant future, say twenty one years from the dawning of the new 
era in South Africa, would have been a strong affirmation of the belief that the 
democratic child must ultimately progress beyond puberty to adulthood.” 
– G Barker741 
 
                                               
740 If a claim is brought against the employer by an unsuccessful applicant, the successful applicant should 
be joined in the proceedings as they have the right to protect their reputation. See Grogan Workplace Law 
at 298 for a discussion in this regard; and PSA v Department of Justice & Others (2004) 25 ILJ 692 (LAC) 
for a case law example of this. 
741 ‘An Act of Equity’ (2001) In Camera, Rhodes University Law Students’ Journal 12 at 12. 
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5.5.1 Introduction 
 
Affirmative action, according to both the UN Economic and Social Council and the 
International Labour Organisation is only a temporary measure for correcting the status 
of a designated group.742 For this reason, affirmative action measures should also include 
some indication as to their temporary nature and to remove any perception that 
affirmative action measures are, or need to be, permanent. 
 
It is submitted that one of the major flaws of the Employment Equity Act, is that the Act 
does not foresee its own end. The Act does not have any provisions regarding its removal 
or even its continued operation in the future. The reason that this is a major flaw is that 
society does not stand still and, therefore, cannot be governed by legislation as significant 
as the EEA for an unspecified and lengthy period. The purpose of the EEA is to achieve 
employment equity and, therefore, it serves a limited function and so, by its very nature, 
must have some provision for its closure or termination. By having no provisions for its 
removal, the EEA seems to be an Act that cannot be removed without further legislation 
brought forward in government by concerned parties. 
 
A comment by Membathisi Mdladlana at a meeting of the Black Management Forum was 
that “nine years is not a long time. Those who are asking for a sunset clause apparently 
do not understand this, but racism is ingrained in our society. I was not invited to the 
                                               
742 Buys ‘Why Should Affirmative Action have a Sunset Clause?’ at 
http://www.solidaritysa.co.za/Home/wmview.php?ArtID=164 (accessed on 15 May 2006). It was stated by 
Bossuyt at the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights that 
affirmative action was a temporary measure. He said that “Affirmative action is a coherent packet of 
measures, of a temporary character … Special attention has to be paid to the temporary nature of the 
measure taken. The simple fact that a category of the population has suffered form disadvantageous 
economic or social conditions does not mean that, in order to upgrade its material position, any distinction 
based on the characteristic defining the group should be considered legitimate, even if this ground is 
irrelevant as a basis of distinction with regard to a particular right.” See 
http://www.imadr.org/geneva/2002/SCHR54.Week2.doc full the full text of Bossuyt’s speech. Emphasis on 
temporary character added by author. Marc Bossuyt is a professor at Antwerp University (Belgium) since 
1977 and Chairman of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights. See  
www.un.org/law/icc/elections/judges/bossuyt/nominationstatement(e).pdf for Bossuyt’s curriculum vitae. 
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funeral (of racism).”743 The comment is correct in that nine years is not enough time to 
rectify the discrimination of the past. However, some structure needs to be implemented 
to deal with the situation in the future when a ‘long time’ has past, what that long time is, 
is another question. 
 
Adding to the dark cloud hanging over the temporary nature of affirmative action was the 
rather nebulous response of President Mbeki when being asked about the end of 
affirmative action. “How long it will be necessary to continue with the affirmative action 
programmes will depend on how fast we succeed in eliminating this inequality,”744 said 
Mbeki. Although it reiterates the fact that employment equity measures must be of a 
temporary nature, it still leaves this important question unanswered. 
 
Although one may argue that at a future date, the repeal of the EEA may be discussed, it 
is submitted that to bring up the topic of a repeal of the EEA would be an arduous task. 
The proposition would have to be brought up in an extremely tentative manner due to the 
sensitive nature of the subject. Accordingly, the topic could be ignored for a lengthy 
period due to its sensitive nature. If this situation were to arise, the EEA would continue 
when it was unnecessary to do so and, therefore, would lack validity. It would then fall to 
the courts to determine whether or not the EEA should continue if an action arose 
regarding the validity of the EEA. It is, therefore, submitted, that the best method of 
removing the EEA is to include an end clause in the Act itself and, therefore, the sensitive 
topic regarding its repeal is self-regulated. 
 
There are two possible techniques for the removal of affirmative action that will be put 
forward in this work. The first alternative is the introduction of a ‘sunset clause’ into the 
EEA. The second alternative is the introduction of a ‘timetable’ into the Act.  
 
 
                                               
743 Le Roux ‘Affirmative Action To Stay’ at 
http://www.fin24.co.za/articles/default/display_article.asp?ArticleID=1518-1786_1744333 (accessed 15 
May 2006). 
744 Le Roux ‘Mbeki Rules out Equity Action Sunset Clause’ at 
http://www.dispatch.co.za/2003/06/06/southafrica/embeki.html\ (accessed on 15 May 2006). 
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5.5.2 Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representivity 
  
Before the implementation of an end clause for affirmative action, an objective and 
representative body should be created. This body should be given the task governing the 
continued existence and eventual removal of affirmative action. The function of this body 
should be to oversee the process of implementation and the progress of the affirmative 
action measures and to make recommendations for both continual amendment of the EEA 
and a date for the repeal of the Act. 
 
This commission should be made up of persons who are suitably qualified to determine 
whether or not society has reached a state of employment equity or substantive equality. 
It is submitted that the people best qualified to determine whether or not the correct 
provisions have prevailed is a body made up of sociologists, industrial relations experts 
and legal experts.745 This body must be required to analyse the current state of society at 
certain specified periods during the existence of the EEA and should make 
recommendations on the basis of their findings to the Minister to ensure that the EEA and 
its affirmative action are amended and / or end at the appropriate time. 
 
The Commission is titled the Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representivity746 in 
this work for ease of identifying the Commission being discussed. This body will be 
created by the inclusion of a seventh chapter in the EEA. This seventh chapter of the 
EEA should deal with all the provisions related to the CAWR’s role in the continued 
existence and / or removal of affirmative action in the future. The only changes between 
the suggested provisions with regard to the two different systems that will be discussed 
(the sunset clause and timetable) are section 68 and 71. The following is recommended as 
the seventh chapter to the EEA: 
 
 
 
                                               
745 The qualifications of the individuals from each field that is listed will be discussed in the proposed 
legislation put forward in this section of the work. 
746 Hereinafter referred to as CAWR. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
66. Establishment of Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representivity. – 
The Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representivity is hereby 
established. 
 
(Date of Commencement ____) 
 
67. Composition of Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representivity 
(1) The Commission consists of a chairperson, who must be a sociologist, 
and six other persons appointed by the Minister to hold office on a 
part-time basis 
 
 (2) The members of the Commission must include – 
  (a) Two sociologists747; 
  (b) Two industrial relations experts748; and 
  (c) Two legal experts749. 
 
(3) The Minister must appoint a member of the Commission to act as 
chairperson whenever the office of chairperson is vacant. 
 
(4) The members of the Commission must choose from among themselves 
a person to act in the capacity of chairperson during the temporary 
absence of the chairperson. 
 
(5) The Minister may determine--  
 
(a) The term of office for the chairperson and for each member of the 
Commission, but no member's term of office may exceed five 
years; 
 
(b) The remuneration and allowances to be paid to members of the 
                                               
747 ‘Sociologist’ should be included as a definition referring to a person with a Doctorate in Sociology. 
748 ‘Industrial Relations Expert’ should be should be included as a definition referring to a person with a 
Doctorate in Industrial Relations. 
749 ‘Legal Expert’ should be included as a definition referring to a person who has worked in the labour law 
field for over ten years. 
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Commission with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance; and 
 
(c) Any other conditions of appointment not provided for in this 
section. 
 
(6) The chairperson and members of the Commission may resign by 
giving at least one month's written notice to the Minister. 
 
(7) The Minister may remove the chairperson or a member of the 
Commission from office for-- 
 
(a) Serious misconduct; 
(b) Permanent incapacity; 
(c) That person's absence from three consecutive meetings of the 
Commission without the prior permission of the chairperson, 
except on good cause shown; or 
(d) Engaging in any activity that may undermine the integrity of the 
Commission.  
 
(Date of commencement of s. 67: __________) 
 
68.  Functions of for Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representivity— 
(1) The functions of the Commission will vary depending on the system used. 
 
(2) The Minister is required to act in a reasonable manner on the findings and 
recommendations of the Commission. 
 
(Date of commencement of s. 68:_________) 
 
69. Staff and expenses -- Subject to the laws governing the public service, the 
Minister must provide the Commission with the staff necessary for the 
performance of its functions. 
 
(Date of commencement of section 69: _________) 
 
70. Public hearings.--In performing its functions, the Commission may--  
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(a) Call for written representations from members of the public; and 
(b) Hold public hearings at which it may permit members of the 
public to make oral representations.  
 
(Date of commencement of s. 70: 14 May, 1999) 
 
71. Report by Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representativeness.-- 
The report date will vary depending on the system used. 
 
(Date of commencement s. 71 __________) 
 
The inclusion of section 68 (2) – The Minister is required to act in a reasonable manner 
on the findings and recommendations of the CAWR – ensures that the findings of the 
CAWR are taken with the utmost seriousness. This ensures that the Minister cannot 
ignore their findings, therefore rendering them impotent. If the Minister were able to 
merely hear their finding and recommendations but was not required to take heed of 
them, the politics of the day could determine the continued existence of the EEA. By 
making sure that the CAWR has such powers, the necessary changes to ensure an 
effective EEA can be made or a situation whereby the EEA becomes unnecessary but 
continues to exist cannot occur. 
 
5.5.3 A Sunset Clause 
 
One way of limiting the lifespan of the EEA would have been to include a sunset clause. 
This suggestion is not original to this thesis. “Solidarity recently [in 2004] put forward 
suggestions about introducing a so-called ‘sunset clause’ to affirmative action, arguing 
that a foreseeable end to the process should be envisioned.”750 However, the plea for the 
inclusion of a sunset clause in the EEA has so far fallen upon deaf ears. President Mbeki 
has dismissed the possibility of including a sunset clause in the EEA and believes the Act 
                                               
750 Visser ‘Coming to Terms with the Past and the Present: Afrikaner Experience of and Reaction to the 
'New' South Africa’ at http://academic.sun.ac.za/history/dokumente/coming_to_terms.pdf (accessed 16 
May 2006). 
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should stay as it is.751 This dismissal is ill advised, however. The sunset clause is a very 
necessary provision to include in any Act that should be of a temporary nature. 
 
(a) Definition 
A sunset clause is a “provision, inserted in a set of regulations, for the expiry of specified 
arrangements should certain conditions prevail.”752 In other words, if at some point in the 
future if South Africa reaches a point whereby employment equity and substantive 
equality can be said to have been reached, affirmative action measures would be required 
to end. 
 
(b) Should Certain Conditions Prevail 
As has been stated in the previous chapters, affirmative action in South Africa is focused 
on groups and not individuals. Thus ‘the conditions that prevail’ would be that black 
people, women and people with disabilities as a group achieve a substantive equality to 
white males as a group. This would have to be decided by an impartial body. Therefore, 
CAWR needs to look at the position of white males in South Africa as compared to the 
designated groups with regard to proportions and then determine whether or not the 
groups are proportionately equal.753 
 
In the case of United Steel Workers of America v Weber754 the court came to the 
conclusion that the affirmative action plan under scrutiny did not pose a heavy burden as 
it “ends when the racial composition of [the employer’s] craft work force matches the 
racial composition of the local population. It thus operates as a temporary tool for 
remedying past discrimination without attempting to ‘maintain’ a previously achieved 
balance.”755 This case serves as a good example for South Africa as it highlights: firstly, 
                                               
751 Le Roux ‘Mbeki Rules out Equity Action Sunset Clause’. 
752 Carew ‘The Language of Money’ at 
http://www.anz.com/edna/dictionary.asp?action=content&content=sunset_clause (accessed on 15 May 
2006). 
753 Although this description of the ‘certain conditions that should prevail’ may be a simplistic one, it is 
purposefully done as such. The ‘conditions that should prevail’ is a concept that is extremely difficult to 
define or ascertain and, for this reason, the qualifications of the members of the CAWR has been set at an 
extremely high standard across the three fields of expertise. 
754 443 US 193 (1979). 
755 Pretorius Employment Equity Law 9-35. 
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that affirmative action measures are only valid if they are temporary; and, secondly, 
possible conditions that must prevail for the end of affirmative action programmes.  
 
(c) Continual Amendment 
The sunset clause is a good system as it ensures the EEA will come to an end at the 
appropriate time. However, the sunset clause system cannot work on its own. It is 
submitted, however, that there will also need to be continual amendment clause. This 
would allow for the EEA to be constantly amended in order to ensure that it is working as 
efficiently as possible at all times during its existence. The purpose of continual 
amendment is to ensure the EEA is not static and that societal development does not 
overtake the EEA and cause the EEA to be an archaic piece of legislation that does not 
correctly reflect the problems of society.   
 
As shown by the Malaysian example, flexibility and continual amendment of affirmative 
action measures is vital to the effectiveness of affirmative action.756 Although the NEP 
implemented stringent affirmative action measures, the government was flexible in the 
enforcement of these measures when it saw that they were not working.757 A good 
example of this is the ‘growth pause’ suffered by the Malaysian economy in the early 
1980s.758 “The government confronted this situation realistically, and modified Malay 
preference policies in such a way as to emphasise the overall priority of promoting 
economic growth.”759 By doing so, the government put the economy, which is important 
for all people, ahead of helping out one group to the detriment of other groups. 
 
(d) Section 68 and 71 
As noted in the proposed legislation above, section 68 and 71 of the EEA would read as 
follows: 
 
                                               
756 Refer to Chapter IV of this work for a further discussion on affirmative action in Malaysia. 
757 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences of 'Affirmative Action' In Malaysia in Conflict: Policy Interactions in 
the Pacific Basin CSIA Discussion Paper, Harvard’ (1991) at 
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/disc_paper_91_08.pdf (accessed on 21 March 
2006). 
758 Emsley The Malaysian Experience of Affirmative Action: Lessons for South Africa (1997). 
759 Esman ‘Contrary Consequences’ 29. 
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68.  Functions of the Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representivity— 
 
(1) The Commission advises the Minister on— 
 
(a) The proportionate representativeness of the workplace; 
(b) Policy and any other matter concerning the amendment of this Act with 
regard to its effectiveness to correctly reflect the current requirements 
and needs of society; and 
(c) Whether or not conditions have prevailed that require the end of 
employment equity measures and the Employment Equity Act. 
 
(2) The Minister is required to act in a reasonable manner on the findings and 
recommendations of the Commission. 
 
71. Report by Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representivity.--The 
Commission must submit report to the Minister regarding their findings every 
five years from the commencement of section 71. 
 
As noted, the Commission would not amend the EEA or repeal the EEA itself but would 
merely propose amendments or the repeal of the EEA to the Minister. This would still 
have the effect of leaving the power in the hands of the Minister as the Commission 
merely recommends that the Employment Equity Act be amended or repealed at the 
sunset clause date. This would leave the power with the legislature and would, therefore, 
give validity to the process. Although the Commission would only be advisory, the 
Minister should be required to take serious heed of the Commission’s findings. Any 
action by the Minister to the contrary could bring about an infringement on all peoples 
right to just administrative action.760 
 
 
5.5.4   A Timetable 
 
(a)  Purpose of a Timetable 
The purpose of a timetable in an Act is to set a date for its monitoring, amendment and 
                                               
760 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
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repeal. This means that the Act has certain goals and a time limit in which to achieve 
these goals. On reaching that time limit set out in the Act, the Act is repealed whether or 
not these goals have been achieved. Although the Act is repealed, neither the Act nor its 
goals are forgotten. At the date of repeal, a new Act must be put in place to ensure the 
goals of the previous Act that have not been achieved, are given some importance and are 
attempted to be achieved. 
 
(b)  The Malaysian Example of Timetables 
The Malaysian experience of affirmative action saw the New Economic Policy761 being 
established in 1970, with the inclusion of a repeal date set twenty years later in 1990. The 
NEP had two major goals. The first was to eradicate poverty and the second was to bring 
about substantive equality for the Bumiputera people. The NEP was only successful in its 
second goal and poverty was still rife in Malaysia in 1990.762 Although one may say that 
this was a failure of the NEP, it is submitted that the NEP succeeded in that it brought 
about the more important goal of achieving substantive equality for its designated group 
– the Bumiputera people. The government can now take further action to bring about 
substantive equality for all people, regardless of race. The Malaysian government has 
now undertaken this task with a new policy, the National Development Policy replacing 
the NEP in 1991 which places “a larger focus on eradicating hardcore poverty, rather 
than on poverty between races, as undertaken by the NDP.”763 
 
This sets a good example for South Africa. On the date of repeal of the EEA, the 
government should review the current situation in South Africa and assess the progress, 
or lack of progress, of less advantaged people. By looking at their situation, new 
legislation can be produced to achieve substantive equality for all people regardless of 
race. Although not all people are substantively equal in South Africa, affirmative action 
is aimed at groups and so if groups are substantively equal at the date of repeal, a new 
Act with new goals can be passed. However, if the EEA has been unsuccessful, it can be 
                                               
761 Hereinafter referred to as the NEP. 
762 Global Rights ‘Affirmative Action: A Global Perspective’ at 
www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/Affirmative_Action_Global_Perspecitves.pdf?docID=2623 (accessed 
on 22 March 2006). 
763 De Klerk ‘Affirmative Action in Malaysia’ 4. 
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re-implemented or can be amended to such an extent that it focuses on all the areas it 
failed to achieve in its first term. 
 
(c)  The Repeal Date 
If the EEA were to include a timetable setting out the duration of its existence, the date to 
be used would be a matter of much controversy. The date that is submitted in this work is 
twenty-three years into the future from the date of commencement of the EEA. This date 
is submitted as it allows an individual to attend primary and secondary school, complete 
an undergraduate degree and complete a one-year post-graduate degree. This means that, 
at the end of the twenty-three year period of the EEA’s existence, all persons who were 
born on or after the date of commencement have, in theory, never experienced 
institutionalised discrimination and have experienced the benefits affirmative action. At 
that stage, the repeal date generation will all be on an equal footing. 
 
The problem with this twenty-three year date is that there will still persons who did suffer 
discrimination in the past in the employment market. These people would, therefore, not 
be able to receive the benefit of employment equity when they may still be in need of the 
benefits of employment equity. This could then lead to a complicated system of people 
having to be a certain age in order to be eligible to benefit from employment equity 
measures. The legislature will need to assess all the surrounding factors regarding 
employment equity and society and establish a uniform date for the EEA to end. 
 
A further problem revolves around the fact that all people are not substantively equal nor 
is their situation improving during the EEA. An example of this can be shown by the 
poor quality of many of the schools around the country that children have no option but 
to attend and, therefore, be caught in a perpetual cycle of substantive inequality.764 
                                               
764 These children are still being given an inferior education and are not being given an equal opportunity to 
succeed. It cannot be said that substantive equality is in place in this situation. Furthermore, one cannot set 
a finite date as to when a state of substantive equality has been reached for such children. Therefore, these 
children are still living under a form of discrimination and are not receiving any of the benefits of the EEA 
and other such corrective legislation. “Conditions under which hundreds of thousands of rural children are 
expected to learn. Of course they don't expect these remote schools to be the same as those in the cities. But 
they do expect certain basic standards. Instead, they sometimes find run-down shanty buildings without 
roofs, sanitation or electricity. Desks, if they exist, are usually old and damaged. And where are the basic 
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Despite the possibility of such problems, if this system were to be used, the repeal date 
should be included in the title of the EEA and the title should accordingly read as 
follows:  
 
EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 
NO. 55 OF 1998 
[ASSENTED TO 12 OCTOBER, 1998] 
[DATE OF COMMENCEMENT 9 AUGUST 1999] 
[DATE OF REPEAL 9 AUGUST 2021 (23 years later)] 
 
(d)  Section 68 and 71 
Although this approach is criticised as not being as effective as a sunset clause, it is still 
put forward with the necessary changes to the proposed chapter 7 of the EEA. As noted 
in the proposed legislation earlier in this section, section 68 and 71 of the EEA would 
read as follows: 
68.  Functions of for Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representivity— 
 (1)  The Commission advises the Minister on— 
 
(a) Determine the proportionate representativeness of the workplace; 
and 
(b) The current state of society and determine new measures focused 
on the current disproportionality in the representativeness of the 
workplace to be included in a follow up Act to this Act, if so 
required.  
 
(2) The Minister is required to act in a reasonable manner on the findings and 
recommendations of the Commission. 
 
71. Report by Commission for Analysis of Workplace Representativeness.--The 
Commission must submit report to the Minister regarding their findings two 
years prior to the repeal date of the Employment Equity Act. 
                                                                                                                                            
necessities like books, pencils and paper? Like the children, teachers are frustrated and powerless … These 
aren't informal schools we're talking about, but official state schools, supposedly funded by provincial 
education departments.” See Furlonger ‘Ignorance Is No Bliss For SA's 'Afterthought' Children’ at 
http://free.financialmail.co.za/rallytoread/rally2006/mar06.htm (accessed on 24 August 2006). 
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As can be seen, one of the functions of the Commission under the timetable system is to 
review societal changes before the completion and repeal of the EEA. A further function 
is to propose a new system that focuses on the areas and groups that still require 
development after the EEA has ended. 
 
5.5.5 Conclusion 
 
“It is clear that the UN and the ILO regard affirmative action as a temporary measure. 
Permanent discrimination against white males will turn them into second class citizens in 
their own country.”765 By having no end to affirmative action, the past will merely repeat 
itself and, eventually, it will be white males who will need to be given preferential 
treatment to allow them to be substantively equal to the rest of South Africa. For this 
reason, it is submitted that something has to be done to create a system for ending 
affirmative action. It may not be either of the two systems recommended in this work but 
it has to be something in order to validate affirmative action in South Africa. 
 
Although continual amendment can be included in the timetable system, this system 
could cause affirmative action measures to become too rigid. It does not allow for the 
EEA to end when circumstances necessitate its end but requires it to end at a specific 
date. The problem with this is that at the end date, the Act may have been required to end 
sometime ago. The end date is also extremely problematic to determine, as argued in 
5.5.4 (d).  
 
Of the two systems put forward by this work, the final recommendation, therefore, is to 
include a sunset clause in the EEA. It is submitted that this system will be far more 
effective than it currently is and will bring about results more quickly and more 
effectively than the timetable system. The sunset clause system ensures that the Act 
continues – with amendments – till the correct time and not a specific date in the future. 
Accordingly, the EEA becomes a living Act that truly reflects the needs of society. 
                                               
765 Buys ‘Why Should’. 
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5.6 Global Lessons for South Africa 
 
Several lessons have been put forward in this work that South Africa has learned and 
needs to learn. The two countries that were examined were Brazil, Canada and Malaysia. 
However, affirmative action is a system used in many other countries and there are 
lessons to be learned from a variety of countries. 
 
5.6.1 Brazil 
 
The inconsistency of the implementation of affirmative action in Brazil is one of 
its two major downfalls. The Brazilian system’s inconsistent approach and 
implementation can be highlighted best by examining the measures that have been 
introduced in the past six years, as discussed in chapter IV of this work.766 
 
This essentially creates different systems around the country and, therefore, Brazil will 
never be able to achieve anything on a national scale, which is the goal of their 
affirmative action measures. The current system would function well as a follow up to an 
initial system. The initial system should be consistent and implemented at a macro-level 
which results in the entire country being governed by one set of laws. When this system 
comes to an end, the problem areas can then be found and affirmative action can be 
implemented at a micro-level. 
 
The second major downfall is the problem of quotas. South African specifically excludes 
quotas and this is for good reason. A quota is not an active implementation of affirmative 
action. Quotas merely set up a required number and leave it at that. By implementing 
affirmative action in this manner, one does not achieve substantive equality of a high 
level that is efficient and effective. This system merely creates a cosmetic equality and 
will have a detrimental effect on the economy as the standard of performance will be low 
if people are merely given a benefit to make up numbers. It is, therefore, submitted that 
                                               
766 Global Rights ‘Global Perspective’. 
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the South African system of achieving substantive equality far outweighs the Brazilian 
system and the Brazilian system could learn a lot from South Africa. 
 
5.6.2 Canada 
 
The view put forward in this work regarding the lessons South Africa can learn from the 
Canadian affirmative action model is an optimistic one. The South African EEA is, 
essentially, a copy of the Canadian Employment Equity Act.767 However, it would seem 
that the South African Act saw the problems with the CEEA and amended those before 
introducing the South African EEA. There are, however, two provisions that South Africa 
did not include that it is proposed should be included. The first is the use of seniority 
rights as it gives a sense of validity in the minds of non-designated groups regarding the 
EEA.768 The second provision that should be included is the use of employment equity 
measures in the armed forces; however, this should be included only for the more senior 
levels of the armed forces of South Africa. 
 
5.6.3 Malaysia 
 
The two most important lessons Malaysia has to teach South Africa are flexibility and 
economic growth. Flexibility is essential as it ensures that affirmative action measures are 
not static and, therefore, ineffective when society changes or certain facets and 
circumstances of society change. Economic growth is even more important as affirmative 
action can only truly be successful if the economy also increases. Affirmative action, by 
its very nature, is only valid if it is not detrimental to those people who are not 
beneficiaries of affirmative action. Therefore, if affirmative action negatively affects the 
economy, it will be detrimental to the entire country, including the beneficiaries of 
affirmative action. 
                                               
767 Act c44 of 1995. 
768 To reiterate, this does not mean that people cannot be dismissed due to their senior status. It means that 
if a black, female or disabled candidate and white male candidate with ten-years of service in the company 
apply for the same job, for example, the white male should be preferred due to his senior status. Therefore, 
the EEA does not merely protect and promote designated groups but has the added protection of all types of 
people. 
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5.7 Conclusion: The Most Effective Employment Equity in South 
Africa 
 
It is submitted that if the changes proposed in this work are implemented into the current 
Employment Equity Act as it stands today, affirmative action will be far more functional 
in South Africa. The submissions made also give the courts some definitive 
interpretations to the EEA that they have failed to make themselves and have left as 
unanswered questions. Although these submissions are made with humility, they propose 
some major changes to employment equity law in South Africa. Although the 
submissions put forward propose amendments of legislation; changes to judicial 
precedent; have the effect of rendering some judicial precedents null and void; and cause 
the EEA to have a new interpretation, it is submitted that these changes are necessary. 
 
The proposals of this work are, therefore, put forward in an attempt to fill in the gaps of 
the current employment equity legislation. This is done in order to have the most 
effective employment equity measures possible in South Africa to ensure a quick and 
smooth transition to the substantively equal rainbow nation that was envisaged in 1994. 
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